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ABSTRACT
As the People’s Republic of China begins to accumulate influence on the
international stage through strategic usage of soft power, the history and
application of soft power throughout the history of China will be important to
future scholars of the politics of Beijing. This study will examine Beijing and its
government official’s perceptions of its soft power and how there have been
historical parallels between the modern People’s Republic of China and the Ming
Dynasty (1368-1644) in regard to soft power politics and China’s search for its
legitimacy as a rising global power. This study will use two examples that have
similar parallels: The eunuch admiral Zheng He (1371-1433) and his journey’s
through the South China Sea, the Indian Ocean and the Middle East and the
Confucius Institute, a teaching and cultural exchange program under the
auspices of the Office of Chinese Language International, known colloquially as
Hanban, an organization under the direct control of the Chinese Communist
Party’s leadership.
What connects these two topics is the subject of soft power, a term coined
by Joseph S. Nye, relating to the kind of power wielded by countries that does
not involve military force and uses a “Charm Strategy” to support favorable
treatment amongst its trading partners. Zheng He sailed the oceans to
neighboring countries, in an attempt to give legitimacy to Ming China through the
imperial tribute trade system. The Confucius Institute continues that legacy
today, teaching a view of China that is shaped in Beijing. I will show the parallels
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between this historical figure and that of the Confucius Institute, showing that the
pursuit of soft power is not a recent phenomenon in Chinese politics but a theory
and a motivation that has existed in China since medieval times in China’s
endless search for legitimacy in the eyes of its neighbors. I will be researching
the life and journeys of Zheng He, along with the controversies surrounding the
Confucius Institute and how all of these factors relate to China attempting to reinstate a legacy that the nation has was lost over since the nineteenth century’s
“Century of Humiliation”. This loss of prestige was a result of European colonial
power’s ambitions in the area. I will also use evidence to prove the importance of
Confucianism in regard to the development of soft power in China. As China
seeks to find its legitimacy, we will see that this has been some centuries in the
making and plays a crucial part of Chinese politics today. The re-assertion of
China’s place in the world as a rising world power will have geopolitical
implications for decades to come.
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CHAPTER ONE
THESIS, METHODOLOGY, SOURCES, PURPOSE OF THE
STUDY AND DEFINITIONS OF SOFT POWER

Why mount such a diplomatic charm offensive? As
China turns its gaze to nearby seas in search of
prosperity and secure energy supplies, it
has embarked on a naval buildup unprecedented in
modern history. Beijing evidently hopes to allay
suspicions aroused by its bid for sea power. In so
doing, it hopes to discourage the coastal nations of
East, Southeast and South Asia from banding
together-or with powerful outsiders such as the United
States-to balance the growth of Chinese power. At
home, Chinese leaders summon up Zheng He to help
turn the attention of the populace seaward,
rousing rank and file for seaward pursuits. Maritime
history, in short, now suffuses Chinese politics abroad
and at home.
-James R. Holmes in “Soft
Power at Sea1
Introduction and Thesis
In the study of world politics today, there is a great deal of focus on the
soft power aims of the People’s Republic of China. However, there is a very
common misconception that the PRC’s push for soft power is a recent affair.
Indeed, China has been seen as a rising power in the last few decades but has

James R. Holmes, Soft Power at Sea: Zheng He and China’s Maritime
Diplomacy”, University of Georgia Center for International Trade and Security,
(2006).
1

1

taken a unique view of its own power as non-hegemonic. From the point of view
of the PRC, the PRC is a non-hegemonic power and claims that the recent
amount of soft power that the PRC has gained in the last few decades has been
a result of China’s peaceful rise. However, the perception of what soft power is
may differ from that of western nations and Beijing. Joshua Kurlantzick a special
correspondent for The New Republic in his book Charm Offensive makes an
interesting observation in that “Beijing offers the charm of a lion and not a
mouse”.2 In the last year, the United States under the Trump administration has
moved away from international cooperation and the possibility that Trump is
ceding America’s global leadership role becoming more apparent. As the United
States seems to push away from globalization and as America has been willing
to push away former allies and interests, China under President Xi Jinping has
been more than willing to fill the void. This can be seen in a historical light as
well. China has long considered the nineteenth century as its “century of
humiliation” when colonial powers forced a series of unequal treaties during the
two Opium Wars with Great Britain. In the first years of the twentieth century the
anti-foreign Boxer Uprising’s aftermath also forced humiliating concessions on
the waning Qing Dynasty who in 1911 would fall from power, replaced with the
Republic of China. In 1927, the Nationalist movement and later in 1948, Mao
Zedong’s Communists came into power, making the twentieth century a century

Joshua Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power is Transforming
the World”, (New Haven: Yale University Press.) 2007, 6.
2
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of upheaval in China. Beijing’s international relations today are often motivated
by an urge to recapture the lost glory of the “Middle Kingdom” and through soft
power methods and China has found a way to accomplish this through the use of
finding ways to improve Beijing’s international image. While some scholars would
refer to this method as “soft power” as a collective term for Beijing’s motivations,
there are problems with portraying these motivations as purely an issue of soft
powers vs. hard power. What Beijing and the PRC’s perception of what soft
power is can be very different from that of the United States and the European
Union for example. Beijing’s perception of its soft power in some cases may blur
the lines of the original concept of soft power as originally defined by Joseph S.
Nye. In any case, it seems that the term soft power may be a problematic
concept to give simple definitions to. It will be important to distinguish and unpack
what soft power means and also discuss the problematic concept of soft power in
itself and critically examine if Beijing’s diplomatic practices can be considered
soft power at all.
The use of soft power in China’s history has hardly been a recent
development however. During the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644), Admiral Zheng He
(1371-1433) a eunuch military commander and explorer exercised soft power
during the rule of Zhu Di, the Yongle Emperor (1402-1424) and third emperor of
the Ming Dynasty. Zheng He traveled through the South China Sea and the
Indian Ocean along the way visiting numerous countries along the way in an
effort to show both the wealth and power of the Ming Dynasty, a charm offensive

3

in its own right. In the modern day, the Confucius Institute an educational and
cultural exchange program run by Hanban and organization with ties to the
PRC’s politburo has in many ways taken up Zheng He’s mantle as a soft power
force. These two examples of soft power will serve as the two main examples of
this study which is to not only show that there are historical and modern-day
components to the PRC’s recent soft power but that the most core component of
all in terms of China’s recent interest in soft power is the search for legitimacy in
its soft power relations with the nations of the world.
The thesis of this study is that there are parallels between Zheng He and
the Confucius Institute in two periods of China’s soft power: the fifteenth century
and the twenty-first century. Furthermore, the perceptions and meanings of soft
power in China may be different than that of other nations or other periods of
time. Joshua Kurlantzick noted that China’s soft power resembles that of a “lion
and not a mouse”. This form of power may be different from traditional soft
power in that it is used by authoritarian regimes as a form of coercing other
countries viewpoints to the regimes point of view. The National Endowment for
Democracy, a Washington based think-tank has defined this as “sharp power”.
This paper will examine the soft power efforts of the PRC, using the Confucius
Institute and Zheng He as examples to show the historical parallels between the
two while examining the motivations of the PRC government which is the search
for legitimacy.

4

This legitimacy that is perceived by members of the PRC government to
have been lost in the nineteenth century and only started to be regained in the
waning years of the twentieth century.3 One of the main ideas of this paper is
also that there is an explicit link between the ideas of Ming glory, non-hegemonic
expansion and the Confucius Institute. A common claim made by the PRC
regarding the foreign policy of China is that historically and today China remains
a non-hegemonic power with the peacefulness of its rise often being touted by its
leadership, which has an implied claim that China’s rivals such as the United
States do not follow a similar policy. In September 2011the Information Office of
the State Council of the PRC released a white paper titled: “China’s Peaceful
Development” that gives a summary of this point of view held by the PRC
government:
China has declared to the rest of the world on many occasions that it
takes a path of peaceful development and is committed to upholding world
peace and promoting common development and prosperity for all
countries. At the beginning of the second decade of the 21st century and
on the occasion of the 90th anniversary of the founding of the Communist
Party of China (CPC), China declared solemnly again to the world that
peaceful development is a strategic choice made by China to realize
modernization, make itself strong and prosperous, and make more
contribution to the progress of human civilization. China will unswervingly
follow the path of peaceful development. 4
This idea of cooperation and common development has been a crucial
part of China’s recent success in diplomacy within the last decade. Rather than

3

Valarie Hilton, The Open Empire: A History of China to 1800, (New York, NY:
W.W. Norton & Company Inc. 2015), 420.
4 PRC Government, PRC State Council, “China’s Peaceful Development”,
(Beijing: State Council Information Office, 2011) 1.
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seeing China as an antagonist on the world stage, the PRC has allowed a more
benevolent and non-interventionist image of the country to be formed in its new
state propaganda. This new view allows Beijing to wield its soft power in a way
that allows former adversaries to become partners. Whether or not the
Communist system of government of the PRC can survive in its present form in
the future under the face of such pragmatism will also be something to consider
in the coming decades.
The lionization of historical figures of the Ming as soft power heroes such
as Zheng He, have been used by leaders such as Xi Jinping to prove to the world
that China has always been and peaceful and non-hegemonic power. This study
will attempt to establish the link between this idea of idealizing the past and using
figures of the past to promote modern China’s rise in importance to the world and
show that the Confucius Institute’s mission at its core is to promote similar ideas
to the world of non-hegemonic power regarding the PRC. The paper will also
show who has explicitly pushed this form of historical soft power, starting with
Confucian and eunuch officials in the fourteenth century and the Ministry of
Education and the in the twenty-first.
The Confucius Institute has today, a stated goal of influencing foreign
perceptions of China and spreading Chinese culture, with teaching and cultural
studies as the Confucius Institute’s method of choice. The first stated by-law of
the Confucius Institute’s constitution lays out clearly this mission statement of the
Confucius Institute:

6

Confucius Institutes devote themselves to satisfying the demands of
people from different countries and regions in the world who learn the
Chinese language, to enhancing understanding of the Chinese language
and culture by these peoples, to strengthening educational and cultural
exchange and cooperation between China and other countries, to
deepening friendly relationships with other nations, to promoting the
development of multi-culturalism, and to construct a harmonious world.5
The Confucius Institute’s funding comes directly from the PRC
government. showing there is direct government control.6 Zheng He sailed with
his fleet to spread China’s influence and to increase the prestige of the Dragon
Throne. Zheng He used trade and goodwill as a carrot, but he also wielded the
threat of military force (the stick) when required, hoping the Ming Dynasty’s
neighbors to see China as a powerful but benevolent super power.7 However,
what often can be defined as soft power may also have some hard power
elements or indeed may not be soft power at all. For example, in 2006, Nye
wrote an article in Foreign Policy regarding the difficulty in defining soft power
titled: Think Again: Soft Power. In this article Nye uses the example of economic
sanctions being considered a form of soft power and how that point of view is
erroneous. Nye writes:
Economic Strength Is Soft Power: No. In a recent article on options for
dealing with Iran, Peter Brookes of the Heritage Foundation refers to soft
power options such as economic sanctions. But there is nothing soft about
sanctions if you are on the receiving end. They are clearly intended to
coerce and are thus a form of hard power. Economic strength can be
converted into hard or soft power: You can coerce countries with
5

Hanban, Constitution and by-laws of the Confucius Institute, 1.
John Sudworth, “Confucius Institute: The Hard Side of China's Soft Power,”
BBC News, 22 Dec. 2014,
7 Louise Levathes, When China Ruled the Seas, The Treasure Fleet of the
Dragon Throne, 1405-33, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), 20.
6
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sanctions or woo them with wealth. As Walter Russell Mead has argued,
economic power is sticky power; it seduces as much as it compels. There
is no doubt that a successful economy is an important source of attraction.
Sometimes in real-world situations, it is difficult to distinguish what part of
an economic relationship is comprised of hard and soft power. European
leaders describe other countries desire to accede to the European Union
(EU) as a sign of Europe’s soft power. Turkey today is making changes in
its human rights policies and domestic law to adjust to EU standards. How
much of this change is driven by the economic inducement of market
access, and how much by the attractiveness of Europe’s successful
economic and political system? It’s clear that some Turks are replying
more to the hard power of inducement, whereas others are attracted to the
European model of human rights and economic freedom.8
The key point that Nye is coming across here is that coercion is the main
determining factor between the difference between soft and hard power in the
case of economic sanctions. This is an example of the problematization
regarding of what exactly defines soft power. So, if the PRC for example were to
use economic sanctions against another country, this would be a form of
coercive hard power on the part of the PRC by Nye’s definition. It is important to
consider also that just because soft power does not use military force as part of
the process of soft power, it does not mean that soft power is inherently peaceful
or even as Nye points out in the article, the most humane option.
By studying what defines soft power and proving that the PRC has utilized
both a historical and contemporary trend of using soft power in its approach to
politics, we can gain a better understanding of what the PRC’s political goals will
be in the coming decades by using the methods of history and political science.
Just as Zheng He’s two voyages across the vast ocean to Africa served for the

8

Joseph S. Nye, “Think Again: Soft Power”, Foreign Policy, Feb 23, 2006.
8

dual purposes of benefiting from trade and spreading Chinese culture, so too
does the PRC, by way of its Confucius Institute gain influence and build
infrastructure in order to benefit from modern day African nation’s supply of
resources. As James R. Holmes explains, economic development has been the
key driving influence in China’s recent interest in expanding sea power. 9 Other
nations and especially those of us in the United States, would do well to learn
from the historical nature of Beijing’s soft power methods.
This study will be divided into six chapters and will examine Zheng He’s
life and how it relates to modern soft power politics to China today and how it
influences China’s perceptions of its own power. I will use and problematize the
very concept of soft power in itself to show that the PRC’s perception of soft
power does not necessarily align with other concepts of the definition of soft
power. I will also explore the idea of the Confucius Institute as a tool of modern
day soft power strategy as well as a parallel to Zheng He. I will also examine the
PRC’s efforts to find legitimacy and respect around the world. By examining the
methods of teaching practiced in western universities, I will attempt to prove that
there is also a threat to academic freedom from these teaching approaches.
Finally, this study will also examine the historical roots of soft power in Confucian
thought, using quotes from Confucius as primary sources to show the long

9

Holmes, Soft Power at Sea, 5.
9

historical trend soft power has had not only on the politics of Beijing, but in the
ancient culture itself.
This chapter (Chapter One) will focus on a review of the literature
examined for this study’s sources and show the methodology used as well as
give a brief overview concerning the history and development of soft power as a
political theory. The second chapter will focus on Zheng He himself and will give
historical examples of his usage of both soft and hard power and how the Ming
have been historically used by succeeding dynasties and governments to
promote ideals of national and on some occasions, racial unity, especially in
terms of the Han ethnic group which connects Ming glory to aspects of Han
chauvinism. Chapter Three will focus on the Confucius Institute, giving examples
of the Confucius Institute’s policies and the controversy surrounding its actions in
universities around the world. Chapter four will examine Confucianism and the
history of the eunuchs of the court who were the rivals of the Confucian scholar
officials during the lifetime of Zheng He and lead to him nearly being erased from
the historical record. 10 But most importantly, Chapter Four will also focus on
using quotes from Confucius to show that the practice of soft power has long
been a part of Confucian thought and is therefore a long-term practice in Chinese
culture itself.11 Chapter Five will consist of defending my thesis statements with

10

Levathes, When China Ruled the Seas, 34.
Anja Lahitan, China's Soft Power: Challenges of Confucianism and Confucius
Institutes, Journal of Comparative Asian Development, vol. 14 no. 2, (24th July
2015): 200-226.
11
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counter-arguments, giving common arguments against the supposed “peaceful”
nature of Zheng He’s voyages as well as showing the Confucius Institute’s point
of view when dealing with the controversy surrounding them. The sixth and final
chapter will be my conclusion to the sources I have collected and will make the
concluding arguments of this study. Finally, I will focus on what possible future
research can be done with this topic and how it might benefit students of history
and the other social sciences.

Research Questions, Definition of Terms and Sources
There are several questions that will be important to consider during the
writing of this study. These questions will allow the reader to examine the
methodology of this study, which will use a documentary form of analysis using
primary and secondary sources as evidence. Some examples of these questions
will be questions such as: Was Zheng He a peaceful explorer or an Imperialist?
Is the Confucius Institute a mere teaching organization or is it a soft power
gambit used by the PRC, or perhaps both? Is there a historical continuity with
China starting to show interest in gaining resources in Africa, similar to Zheng
He’s travels to Africa for trade purposes? What role did the Ming tribute trade
system have in the treasure voyages? Perhaps the most important question that
can be asked is what benefit will this study have in the research of Chinese
history as well as modern day Chinese politics? What can students learn from

11

this study, and what benefits will there be for these future students to study this
topic? This study will attempt to answer these questions throughout the entire
work and these questions will also help the reader understand the arguments
that will be made in this study.
Before the concept soft power is to be defined, it is important to give the
reader some knowledge about the numerous sources being used in this study.
The following sources are the ones of most importance, a full list of sources can
be found in the bibliography.

Primary Sources
One of the most important Primary Sources I will be using is the Mingshi
(The history of the Ming) which is the official history of the Ming Dynasty written
throughout 18th century during the Qing Dynasty. By examining passages in the
Mingshi, there will be a greater comprehension of what the political world that
Zheng He lived in was like for the purposes of this study. Several of the
passages of the Mingshi that I will be using come from Edward L. Dryer’s
translations in his book Zheng He and the Oceans of the Early Ming Dynasty
which he includes in his appendices. This chapter of the Mingshi has a lot value,
especially since it shows what the total size of the military forces and crew

12

members were.12 Dryer’s translations of the Mingshi will also be insightful into
what concepts of Imperial Chinese rule entailed such as the tribute trade system.
Excerpts from the Mingshi will give insight into what Chinese scholars of the time
thought about nearby foreign nations and what their role was deemed to be as
“clients” of the Dragon Throne.
Another primary source that will be used are the stele inscriptions that
Zheng He left behind in the ports of Liujiang and Fujian that were erected by
Zheng He himself. These inscriptions were erected in preparation for Zheng He’s
seventh and final journey (1431-33).13 Dryer has two of these inscriptions
translated in his book and they will both be used to show what Zheng He thought
of the Treasure Voyages himself and what his own motivations were according to
Zheng He himself. Zheng He also mentions firsthand what his perceptions of
numerous foreign nations were in the context of how well they submitted to
accepting client state status under the Ming Dynasty. For example, Zheng He,
admits to the kidnapping of foreign rulers who in his words “resisted
transformation.”14 These inscriptions are also useful for cross-referencing
different accounts of Zheng He from both past and modern-day scholars.

12

Edward L. Dryer, Zheng He and The Oceans of the Early Ming Dynasty, (New
York: Pearson Education, 2007), 187.
13 Zheng He, Zheng He’s Liujiang Inscription, Translated by Edward Dryer, (New
York: Edward Dryer. 2007) 191.
14 Zheng He, Zheng He’s Changle Inscription of 1431: Record [of Prayers]
Answered by the Divine Spirit of the Heavenly Princess, Translated by Edward
Dryer, (New York: Edward Dryer. 2007), 198.
13

The Confucian Analects will be used in this study to show what Confucian
thought was in terms of foreign relations between nations as well as what the
Confucians thought of foreign wars and their justification. This is meant to show
what the Confucian view of hard and soft power are. Furthermore, by studying
the Analects we can compare and contrast the Confucian scholar officials’ view
of foreign policy with that of the Eunuch officials as detailed in Mingshi. The
Confucians tended to also disapprove of foreign policy adventures such as the
Treasure Voyages due to the Confucian belief that “lesser” nations should come
to China rather than China come to them, as well as seeing mercantile profit as
being an unworthy thing. This is the opposite view of what the Yongle emperor’s
eunuch officials who saw a lot of profitability, as well as gains in power for the
empire if direct foreign interventionalist actions and relations were pursued.15
Therefore, study of both the Analects and the entries in the Mingshi can give an
informative look at what Ming era politics were like in Zheng He’s time and what
the motivations for these two factions were.
Ma Huan who was one Zheng He’s lieutenants and served on the treasure
fleet as a translator is also a crucial primary source as he was one of Zheng He’s
contemporary’s and accompanied him on many of the treasure voyages. His
work the Ying-Yai Sheng-lan (Overall Survey of the Ocean’s Shores” details and
gives many first-hand accounts of the places Zheng He journeyed to and remains

15

Levathes, When China Ruled the Seas, 175.
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one of the few surviving primary sources remaining of one of the treasure fleet’s
members and gives first hand descriptions of the places Zheng He traveled to,
especially his descriptions of Calicut.16 Another contemporary of Zheng He, Fei
Xin wrote the Xingcha Shenglan (Overall Survey of the Star Raft) dated 1436
which was three years after the death of Zheng He.17 Fei Xin also writes of the
countries that Zheng He visited, which he (Fei Xin) was a part of. These twoprimary sources will prove invaluable by giving a narrative of Zheng He by men
who knew him.
The primary sources that I will be using for the Confucius Institute will be
newspaper articles and scholarly journals as well as statements from the
Confucius Institute themselves. While a good portion of this study will be focusing
on the criticisms of the Confucius Institute, it is important to give the Confucius
Institute’s side of the issue as well. Marshall Sahlin’s, a professor at the
University of Chicago and one of the leading critics of the Confucius Institute’s
practices regarding academic freedom will also be a useful but not unbiased
source of information. Sahlin’s pamphlet Academic Malware gives a good
account of a lot of the controversy that has surrounded the Confucius Institute in
universities in North America18 His pamphlet has proven to be a large resource
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Ma Huan, The Overall Survey of the Oceans Shores, Translated by J.V.G.
Mills, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge: J.V.G. Mills.1970) 137-145.
17 Fei Xin, The Overall Survey of the Star Raft, Translated by J.V.G. Mills, (Otto
Harrassowitz. 1996) 3.
18 Elizabeth Redden, “Chicago Faculty Object to their Confucius Institute”., Inside
Higher Education, April 29, 2014.
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for newspaper sources as he cites many of the controversies surrounding the
Confucius Institute in his book and it has links to many newspapers articles and
scholarly journals that can prove to be useful sources for this work, although it is
equally important to realize that there is some considerable bias in this material.
Another valuable source that will be used in this study will also be the
numerous white papers and government reports that are published by the
governments of the PRC and the United States. These will give perspective into
the soft power that is wielded by both nations in international affairs. The white
papers will also be used to show what the opinions of both the US and PRC are
in regard to the Confucius Institute and what their role is in the world. Using these
government sources will help answer questions such as “what does soft power
and hegemony mean from the perspective of the US and the PRC?” for example.

Secondary Sources
One of the most important sources used in this study is Soft Power: The
Means to Success in World Politics. by Joseph S. Nye Jr. Nye, the creator of the
term “soft power” gives an overall layman’s understanding of soft power in this
book. Nye defines power itself as the ability to get outcomes one wants.19 While
written under the George W. Bush Administration, the book is still relevant to soft
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power studies today. as we see the soft power of the United States start to slip
away. Nye argues that America’s “go at it alone” approach to foreign affairs such
as the Iraq War have cost America power and friends.20 Nye argues that soft
power was always the foundation of America’s power and that America should
refocus on its soft power elements if it wants to regain prestige. While not about
China per-se the Nye book is a good introductory text to the concept of soft
power and explains it very well in ways a person new to the concept of soft
power would understand. Another important source concerning soft power is
Charm Offensive by Joshua Kurlantzick. Kurlantzick is a journalist from
Baltimore, Maryland who is a Fellow on the Council of Foreign Relations.
Kurlantzick gives an in-depth history of the rise of Chinese modern soft power
and China’s new place in the world economy. Kurlantzick argues that it's
important for the US to understand this soft power and warns that China is
making friends and inroads in economic partners while the US is facing a decline
in its standing in the economic world.21 Overall, Kurlantzick’s book gives a good
explanation of the rise of China’s soft power and how the US should pay more
attention to it.
Michael Barr in his work, Who’s Afraid of China? The Challenge of
Chinese Soft Power argues that China being seen as a threat is a result of the
insecurity of the government in the US. Barr’s book looks at China’s rising
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economy and its role in creating soft power, but does so by having some
criticisms of the West. There is often a fear in the United States that since China
is not following Neoliberal policies, it might not meet western democratic
standards. Barr dismisses a lot of these notions as sinophobia and sinomania
and looks into issues of ethnocentrism and models of development. Barr feels
that a lot of the arguments against China’s rise comes from a massive “chip on
the shoulder” of Americans concerning China. Barr argues that many concerns
about China in the west are outdated and needlessly aggressive and stem from
fears of losing soft power in the world to China.
When studying the subject of Zheng He, one of the most important books
available to western readers is Louise Levathes’ book, When China Ruled the
Seas. Levathes makes the argument that had the Ming Dynasty continued its
naval buildup, China may have well become the premier colonial power instead
of European nations.22 In the beginning of Levathes’ book she gives a brief
overview of the voyages and the political machinations that ended them.
Levathes argues that the conflict between the eunuchs at the Ming Court and the
Confucian Scholar Officials was one of the primary reasons that Zheng He fell
from grace and how the voyages were unable to reach their full potential.
Levathes also examines the inner workings of the Yongle emperor’s court as well
as technical specifications on the ships that Zheng He had in his treasure fleet.
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Levathes also looks into the power play politics Zheng He engaged in, such as
interfering in the Ceylon civil war, gaining the submission of foreign leaders to the
Dragon Throne and the establishment of client states in Southeast Asia and
India. Overall, Levathes’ work is one of the most complete works regarding
Zheng He and has often been used as an important source by many studying the
subject of the treasure voyages.
Besides Levathes, there is another book that many China scholars refer to
in the study of Zheng He. China historian Edward L. Dryer’s book, Zheng He:
China and the Oceans in the Early Ming Dynasty gives a very detailed account of
Zheng He’s life. Dryer gives an explanation of why Zheng He’s fleet despite
being far better funded and organized did not achieve the successes of his
European counterparts.23 Dryer takes a very methodological approach to the
subject matter and relies heavily on primary sources for his research many of
which are his own translations. One of the more interesting things that Dryer
argues is that while Zheng He’s ships probably were the largest in the world at
the time, their size may have been exaggerated in the historical record.
A well cited secondary source when discussing the impact that the first
Ming ruler Zhu Yuanzhang (1328-1398) has had on both historical and modern
soft power in China is Long Live the Emperor! Uses of the Ming Founder across
Six Centuries of East Asian History which is a collection of essays by numerous
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historians edited by Sarah Schneewind. While Zheng He and Zhu Yuanzhang’s
son Zhu Di are the main focus of this work in terms of historical soft power,
Schneewind’s work will be valuable in showing that soft power politics were also
being practiced both at the time of the Ming founder’s death and for six centuries
beyond. Using Zhu Yuanzhang as a national “hero” in both Nationalist China and
the PRC has proven to be an effective tool of propaganda and has helped
China’s domestic soft power in considerable ways which will also be examined.
Geoff Wade takes a look at Zheng He in a much different perspective in
his journal article published in the Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal
Asiatic Society titled The Zheng He Voyages: A Reassessment. Wade argues
and gives a revisionist view of the Zheng He voyages. Rather than seeing these
as “friendship voyages” Wade argues instead that they were examples of
Imperialism of the Yongle emperor and connects them to the invasions of Dai
Viet and Yu-Nan. Wade argues that these were attempts to create a Pax Ming in
the East Asian maritime world. Wade argues that these voyages were essentially
proto-colonialism.24 Wade’s work will serve as an effective counterpoint to the
thesis of its study giving credence to the argument that Zheng He’s voyages
were not as entirely peaceful as portrayed. One of the final major sources that is
important to this work, is a journal article by Barbara Peterson titled The Ming
Voyages of Cheng Ho (Zheng He). Barbara Peterson gives basic background on
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the life of Zheng He, his early life and death and the specifications and the
purpose of Zheng He’s treasure ships as compared to the ships Columbus sailed
in. Peterson’s main argument in this article is that the purpose of the voyages
was to both consolidate power at home and impress and build allies while
projecting Ming power at the same time.25

Definitions of Important Terms and Historical Figures
Related to the Study
Soft power is a term coined by Joseph S. Nye in regard to a type of
political and social power. Soft power is the ability to use peaceful negotiation, or
ideally charm for one party to force a more favorable outcome on another. This
concept is contrasted with hard power, which is often achieved with coercion,
most famously with military power. soft power by contrast, is accomplished
through the promotion of culture, using negotiation and influencing social and
public opinion. soft power is generally defined with the analogy “the carrot” which
is part of the famous “carrot and stick” analogy representing reward and
punishment. The use of soft power in modern day diplomacy and politics is
considered to be highly important and is an integral part of U.S., EU and PRC
diplomacy all around the world. One of the biggest advantages it gives is allowing
smaller countries without much military power to “punch above their weight”.
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Hard power on the other hand, is “the stick” form of the hard power/soft power
dynamic. Hard power can be seen as a form of power and negotiation using
force to achieve one’s objectives. The most famous form of this power is that of
military strength. This military strength (or implied usage of it as a threat) is a
central tenant of the concept of hard power, but other forms of hard power can be
shown through economics as well, such as the use of sanctions. Hard power is
often distinguished from soft power due to its coercive nature.
The problem regarding soft power in many cases is a matter of perception.
Looking back at the article in Foreign Policy written by Nye, we see a clear
problematization in modern day perceptions of soft power. Economic sanctions,
recalling or the resignation of ambassadors in protest of a country’s policy and
trade wars may be perceived by the casual observer as soft power. As Nye
argues, this is a misinterpretation of soft power. Soft power in itself is noncoercive and relies on charm for the method to work.26 There is also the idea that
it is rare that soft power and hard power work in complete isolation of each other.
A country can use charm and wealth to woo a country, but that very same wealth
can be used to conduct trade wars and military funding for the recipient nations
rivals. It is important in the study of soft power not to confuse popular perceptions
of soft power with the reality and nature of this method of diplomacy.
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When studying the connection between historical soft power and modern
day soft power, the historical figure Zheng He is often brought up as the most
prominent example of this connection. Zheng He was Ming era Admiral who is
famous for his diplomatic missions to Southeast Asia, Ceylon and Africa. Zheng
He was a eunuch who had great favor in the court of the third emperor of the
Ming Dynasty, Zhu Di (1360-1424). Among his many accomplishments was the
recognition of Chinese authority with China’s neighbors, the establishment of
trade ties in Palambang, Ceylon and Sumatra as well as in Africa and Indonesia.
He also engaged in a brief land war against the kingdom of Kotte in 1411 in
modern day Sri Lanka after the expedition fleet was attacked. After the death of
Zhu Di in 1424, Zheng He’s fortunes and favor fell somewhat but were briefly
resurgent in the reign of the fifth Ming emperor, Zhu Zhanji. After 1433 there
were no more treasure voyages and Zheng He died shortly afterward, either in
1433 on the way back to China or in 1434 shortly after the completion of the final
voyage.
The dynasty which Zheng He served at that time was the Ming Dynasty.
Founded in 1368 by Zhu Yuanzhang, the first Ming emperor, the Ming Dynasty
was the final native Han Chinese dynasty of Imperial China. The dynasty rose in
the final chaotic years of the Mongol Yuan Dynasty, and became the dominant
power in East Asia. In the context of this study, the Ming Dynasty was the
dynasty in power during Zheng He’s tenure as admiral of the treasure fleet. The
Ming Dynasty lasted two hundred and seventy-six years until it was overthrown
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the Li Zicheng who then established the short lived Shun dynasty. The Shun
dynasty was overthrown shortly after by the Manchu-led Qing in 1636 which
would be the last dynasty of China
The treasure fleet is a general term referring to the armada of Zheng He
that sailed across the Indian Ocean in the 14th century. The fleet was both a
display of Ming military might use to awe the nations it visited, but also to show
off the technological might of China and serve as an example of Ming prosperity.
The fleet was decommissioned at the end of the final treasure voyage in 1433
due to Ming hostility to foreign travel. One of the most important technological
innovations of these ships was watertight bulwark compartments that the Ming
shipwrights modeled on the multichambered structure of a bamboo stalk. In
addition, the treasure ships also had a balanced rudder which placed itself as
much of the rudder towards the stern of the ship as behind it, making the
steerage of the ship much easier.27 The treasure fleet was a technological marvel
of its time period and showed the advanced nature of Ming shipbuilding.
During Zheng He’s tenure as admiral of the fleet, the emperor that he
served was the Yongle Emperor also known by his personal name, Zhu Di. Zhu
Di came to power in 1402 after the conclusion of a brutal civil war lasting from
1399-1402. In the context of this study, Zhu Di is an important historical figure
due to his long-lasting friendship and patronage of Zheng He. Zhu Di came to
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power as a usurper, and therefore was obsessive in finding ways to show off his
legitimacy as a ruler. One-way Zhu Di intended to show off his power and
legitimacy was gaining recognition of his supremacy from foreign neighbors and
this was done through Zheng He’s journeys. Zhu Di was also famous and distinct
from his father Zhu Yuanzhang by showing great favor to the eunuch members of
the Ming court, at the expense of the Confucian Scholar officials.
Another important term in understanding the soft power politics of the
Ming era is the tribute trade system. The tribute trade system was the official
system that numerous Chinese dynasties, and most famously the Ming and Qing
dynasties, used to deal with trade agreements with neighboring nations. The
implication of this system was that the countries wishing to trade with China were
considered inferior due to their “barbarian” status and that they were obliged to
recognize the Chinese emperor’s suzerainty over them. Most famously during the
Qing dynasty this was shown in a physical sense when foreign emissaries would
“kowtow” to the Emperor during formal audiences. This kowtowing was a form of
submission demonstrated by the supplicant going on to one’s hands and knees
and pressing their head to the floor several times. This was meant to show that
China was the “center of the world” (The Middle Kingdom) and that the Emperor
and therefore China, was the “elder brother” of these nations. In reality however,
nearly all of these tribute states were de-facto independent nations and these
rituals were merely a formality that had to be performed to participate in trade. In
the nineteenth century, this ritual kowtowing would become a point of
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concertation with European Empires such as the British Empire which saw these
rituals as an insult to their pride and standing.
In the history of the Ming Dynasty, Confucian scholar officials played a
role as one of the two major factions in court life at the time of Zheng He’s life.
The scholar officials had thrived under the first Emperor of the Ming Zhu
Yuanzhang, but by the time of Zhu Di’s reign they had lost a degree of influence
in favor of their rivals the palace eunuchs. The scholar officials as good
Confucians, were against the treasure voyages as it violated the Confucian policy
that foreign nations should come to China for diplomacy instead of the other way
around.28 After the death of Zhu Di much of their lost power and influence was
restored to them and they regained influence in the court.
The Palace Eunuchs were officials who had undergone castration at a
young age and were the only one’s trusted to oversee the concubines of the
emperor, and under Zhu Di served in high office. Zheng He was amongst their
number. Often taken as prisoners of war at a young age and castrated, they were
given unique positions close to the imperial family since due to their castration
they posed no threat of overthrowing the emperor and forming their own dynasty.
They flourished under Zhu Di and were ardent supporters of the treasure
voyages, and were often rivals of the Confucians.
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Besides the political and historical aspects and terms used in this paper,
there are aspects of philosophy and education that are related to Chinese identity
and power politics. The history of soft power in China is intimately related to a
philosophy and moral guidance system known as Confucianism which is based
on the teachings of Chinese philosopher and educator Confucius (551-479 BC).
The teachings developed by Confucius placed a large emphasis on the family
and filial piety to one’s parents was considered one of the main tenants of the
philosophy. By the time of the Ming Dynasty, officials in high positions of the
government would have been scholars of the Confucian school and based their
foreign policy around Confucian principles. These principles tended to favor
isolationism in foreign affairs and also a dislike of engaging in foreign conflicts.29
While Confucianism was suppressed in the early years of the PRC, Confucius
has been “rehabilitated” in modern day China and his name has been given to
the Confucius Institute. This signals a revival of Confucius as a central figure in
Chinese educational life.30
The Confucius Institute was started in 2004, as a PRC-led non-profit
public educational organization, overseen by the Office of Chinese Language
Council International, also known as Hanban. The goals of the Confucius
Institute are to promote Chinese culture, language and perform cultural exchange
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in countries outside of China. The Confucius Institute cooperates with its
associated colleges, with many CI’s in a number of universities around the world
including North America, Europe, Australia, Africa and Asia. The Confucius
Institute is sometimes compared to other language and cultural institutes such as
Académie Francaise from France and the Goethe Institute in Germany. The
Confucius Institute can also be seen as an aspect of the PRC’s soft power
policies, hoping to present an image of China that is consistent with the principles
the PRC government wishes to promote. The Confucius Institute is controlled by
Hanban which is the colloquial abbreviated form of the Office of Chinese
Language Council International. Hanban is a self-described “Non-governmental
Organization” but has explicit ties to the Chinese Ministry of Education as
reported by The Economist.31 In the context of this study, Hanban is the
organization that is in charge of The Confucius Institute. The current director of
Hanban is Xu Lin, who also serves as a vice ministerial official in the politburo of
the People’s Republic of China.
A rival to the Confucius Institute has emerged in the form of the Taiwan
Academy. The Taiwan Academy is the Taiwanese government’s foreign teaching
organization. Unlike the Confucius Institute they are known for teaching
traditional Chinese characters in their language program as opposed to simplified
Chinese writing which is common in the PRC. While the Taiwan Academy
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officially denies they are competing with the Confucius Institute, it has
nevertheless shown signs of competition and rivalry, with both organizations
promoting their respective government’s views and definitions of China to foreign
students. However, their reach and power are minor compared to that of the
Confucius Institute which is far better organized and funded and has many more
associations with foreign universities.32

Methodology
For the methodology of this work, I will be using a documentary method of
analysis, due to much of this study being related to the field of history and
political science and primarily the former. I will be analyzing numerous
documents, that have to do with the Confucius Institute and Ming China and
other documents relevant to the time period. This will allow a type of research
that will help make the argument for my thesis much stronger. Books and
newspapers will of course be one of the primary documents that I will be
analyzing, but I will also be giving a lot of attention to scholarly journals by
experts in the field, primary source documents such as the afore-mentioned
Mingshi, as well as the writings of famous Confucian scholars. Additionally, I will
use all forms of media both written and broadcast and biographies. The two
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schools of the arts and sciences that I will be using in this form of analysis will be
that of history and political science. The historical method of analysis will use
historiography and primary sources to argue for the thesis of this work while
political science will be used in a historical and modern sense. In the historical
sense I will show the inner workings of the Ming Court especially concerning the
conflict between the main two factions of the court: the court eunuchs and the
Confucian scholar officials.
This documentary form of analysis will be used in a way that attempts to
present a non-biased view of events. For example, not will I only use documents
that argue for the Confucius Institute’s controversies but also show the Confucius
Institute’s side of the story as well. By examining primary sources for historical
context and supplementing them with secondary sources from authors and
experts on the subject of Zheng He, a balanced narrative will be given that is
concise and attempts to be free of bias. From a historical standpoint, this will also
analyze why Zheng He’s journeys have been considered historically to have
been “failures” in the long term as compared to that of the European explorers of
the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, which gave rise to the empires forged by
European colonialism. I will also examine the numerous allegations against the
Confucius Institute and delve deep into why the Confucius Institute is considered
to be controversial, but most importantly I will show why the Confucius Institute is
at its very heart a method of modern day soft power, which parallels with similar
soft power policies of the fifteenth century.
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Understanding Hard and Soft Power
Power is like the weather, everyone depends on it
and talks about it, but few understand it. Just
farmers and meteorologists try to forecast the
weather, political leaders and analysts try to describe
and predict changes in power relationships. Power is
like love, easier to experience than to define or
measure, but no less real for that. The dictionary tells
us that power is the capacity to do things. At this most
general level, power means the ability to get the
outcomes one wants. The dictionary also tells us that
power means having the capabilities to affect the
behavior of others to make those things happen.
-Joseph S. Nye in
“Soft Power”33
Before a lengthy and critical examination of historical and modern soft
power in China can be attempted it will be prudent to define what “power”
actually means. At a basic level, power can have many definitions. Is power the
ability for one group to coerce another group to conform to the other groups will?
Or is power the absolute measure of a person’s ability to exert his or her will? In
the time of the Roman Republic and Empire, a man’s personal “command power”
was called “Imperium” (where the words imperial, empire and emperor have their
basis in Latin and Germanic based languages) which was defined as how much
power an individual, such as a senator for example, had at his disposal. The
higher the Imperium, the more influence or “gravitas” the individual had. From
Nye’s point of view, power is the ability to get others to do what one wants. This
kind of power in the political sense at least, is defined by Nye as having two
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definitions, “command power” and “co-optive power”.34 Hard and soft power is
therefore defined as being that of “command” and “co-optive” which is a simple
way of saying that hard and soft power can be defined and related to each other.
Nye defines these two methods of power:
Hard and soft power are related because they are both aspects of the
ability to achieve one’s purpose by affecting the behavior of others. The
distinction between them is one of degree, both the nature of the behavior
and the tangibility of the resources. Command power-the ability to change
what others do-can rest on coercion or inducement. Co-optive power- the
ability to shape what others want-can rest on the attractiveness of one’s
culture and values or the ability to manipulate the agenda of political
choices in a manner that makes others fail to express some preferences
because they seem too unrealistic. The types of behavior between the
command and co-option range along a spectrum from coercion to
economic inducement to agenda setting to pure attraction.35
From Nye’s perspective, the main thing that differentiates soft and hard
power is the threat of force in the case of hard power and in the case of soft
power, “making one’s arguments attractive.” Therefore, charm and coercion are
what define soft and hard power. Using soft power in modern times has been a
very attractive way for nations to flex their power on a global scale giving smaller
nations a more level playing ground with nations that may have much more
military might and strength. This allows smaller nations to punch above their own
weight class. Soft power can take many different forms as well. Soft power for
example, can be things like culture and entertainment, foreign aid and
development and not just pure economic power. American culture for example, is
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recognized (although not necessarily universally loved) around the world. This
can be seen as a far more powerful weapon in America’s political arsenal than all
the military equipment in the world, and if one is to believe Nye, America would
be far better off sticking to soft rather hard power, in Washington’s diplomatic
relations. This definition of hard and soft power has been traditionally in
diplomacy been referred to as the “carrot and the stick.” This idiom comes from
the concept of a cart driver with a mule using carrots and sticks as an example of
reward and punishment. Therefore, hard and soft power can be categorized as
“reward” and “punishment”. The way to properly wield soft and hard power
however is to find a balance between the two. When two reasonable actors come
together it may be more advantageous to use charm and convincing policy for
the two actors to come to a mutually beneficial (or at least presumed mutually
beneficial) arrangement with one another. This can come in the form of treaties
and trade agreements which are two very common examples of the results of
soft power policy. This is not to say that all agreements and treaties are won
through soft power. The 1918 Treaty of Versailles was certainly seen as “the
stick” by the German government of the time period, which helped usher in even
more destructive war two decades later, showing the coercive nature of hard
power.
A true problem rises however, when two non-rational state actors meet
and “the stick” may be the more prudent choice to use in a confrontation. But
ideally this should be seen as a last resort, where one can see no path forward
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through simple negotiation. Of course, much like soft power, hard power is not
easily defined, since hard power can be the utilization of force, but it more often
is the implied threat of force that tends to win the day when hard power is
utilized. War is after all, expensive and the threat of war is usually more
successful (in the short term) in these kinds of negotiations. Another great
equalizer in the hard power and soft power dynamic is the threat of nuclear
weapons. In 2014, Andrew Cottey a researcher for the Royal Irish Academy
published a paper titled “The EU and Nuclear Non-Proliferation: Soft Power and
the Bomb?” which discusses the impact nuclear weapons have on soft power
policies. The abstract sums up the problem between the reach of soft power and
the unwillingness for all the EU member states to have a coherent nuclear policy:
In the last 20 years the European Union has sought to play a larger role in
international efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It’s
member states have advanced common EU positions in the main global
non-proliferation frameworks; it is a leading provider of technical and
financial assistance to other states and multilateral organizations in
support of non-proliferation; and it has used its political and economic
leverage to support non-proliferation (in particular, in relation to Iran). The
EU’s non-proliferation strategy reflects a primarily soft or normative power
approach, emphasizing support for multilateral institutions and
international norms. The EU’s soft power is limited, however, by
continuing differences between its member states in relation to nuclear
weapons and the difficulty of persuading other states to buy into the EU’s
approach.36

Andrew Cottey, “The EU and Nuclear Non-Proliferation: Soft Power and the
Bomb?”, Irish Studies in International Affairs, vol. 25, (March 2014): 1.
36

34

There is difficulty in finding a coherent soft power approach in many
international affairs as the example of the EU as shown in Cottey’s work
demonstrates. This is also a good example of where the perceived nature of soft
power is problematized. What exactly are the methods being used by the EU in
pursuit of non-proliferation? Do they involve sanctions? Who do these sanctions
affect? Can these methods truly be called soft cower when there is a threat of
coercion? By using Nye’s measurements of power there are some hard-power
elements in the coercive nature of these actions. It suffices to say that while
charm and wealth can be used to woo a nation, hard power and soft power rarely
work within full isolation each other. Coercion is not soft power and it is important
not to label any non-violent political policy as a soft power policy.
In the case of China, even a casual observer can see that soft power has
had an impact how the PRC has been conducting Beijing’s diplomatic affairs.
China has for example, been doing a lot of aid and development in African
nations rich with natural resources. In these nations, China has been creating
better roads, funding education and has even played a large role in the African
Development Bank, signaling clear economic intent in these areas. China may
not be doing these actions for purely altruistic reasons, but their effect has been
undeniable. China’s soft power polices have also caused academic leaders such
as Kurlantzick to re-assess Nye’s definitions of soft power. Kurlantzick claims
that in Nye’s definition of soft power he excluded other elements such as
investment, trade and formal diplomacy, instead defining soft power as a nation
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advertising its “brand”.37 Kurlantzick, however, claims that China has significantly
changed the game, and therefore the definitions of soft power. Kurlantzick claims
that China defines soft power as anything outside the military and security norm
and can include “coercive” economic levers like development and aid. Kurlantzick
finishes this idea by saying “Indeed, Beijing offers the charm of a lion, not a
mouse: it can threaten other nations with these sticks if they do not help China
achieve its goals, but it can offer sizable carrots if they do”.38
The most apparent observation that can be taken from both Nye and
Kurlantzick’s views of soft power is that while its definition may change, the
overall goal of “charming” another nation instead of using force is apparent. In
the case of China’s understanding of its power, it has been a huge boon for the
nation’s rise to relevance in the world stage and has also allowed China to
change the image in its country by accumulating political capital through soft
power. China’s new “charm offensive” has also allowed China to engage in an
increasingly effective way in the economic world. BRICS, which is an acronym for
an association of five major national economies (Brazil, Russia, India, China and
South Africa respectively), has recently emerged as a rival to the World Trade
Organization. China is a founding member of the BRICS bank and the bank is
becoming a rival to the WTO. No longer can America claim to be the sole nation
in charge of the world and the world economy. Many nations are now turning up
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their nose to American aid and development, and are instead turning to China as
the next world leader. As both Nye and Kurlantzick have pointed out, it would be
in the United States’ best interest to re-examine Washington’s foreign policy and
start embracing soft power policies, which contrary to popular belief the United
States has a long history of and at least for now, leads in terms of popular
culture, entertainment and many other advantages. But these will not necessarily
last forever and now that a new cultural rival has emerged on the scene perhaps
it time for the United States to adopt a charm strategy of its own?
China’s history with soft power politics is often times erroneously said to
have its origins in response to the 19th and early 20th century, which is known as
the “century of humiliation” in popular Chinese historical thought.39 The century of
humiliation refers to the era of colonial exploitation by European colonial powers
between 1839 with the First Opium War (1839) and the 1949 establishment of
the People’s Republic of China. This was the era when great colonial powers
such as Great Britain and France took advantage of China’s political weakness
and imposed multiple unfair treaties on China which turned China into a secondrate power. Beijing’s modern-day rise is therefore seen by many Chinese as a
“reclamation” of its past glory rather than China being the new kid on the block. 40
Much as Beijing has now reclaimed its place in the world, there is vast historical
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evidence that the PRC government is now reclaiming a centuries old tradition of
soft power. China has often been portrayed as a “closed empire” but this
perception, often held by western nations, does not take into account the
centuries of Chinese diplomatic missions to other nations, the Tribute Trade
system and the massive influence China has had on the culture of nations
surrounding it such as Japan, Korea and Vietnam. China has had many
numerous foreign wars in its past as well as centuries of trade with other nations
and due to China considering all nations it traded with to be client states, it shows
that the numerous Chinese dynasties did care greatly about wielding power
either through military force for nations hostile to China, to trading peacefully and
acting as a “big brother” to nations China considered in its sphere of influence.
The Ming was the best example of both hard and soft power being wielded to
benefit the Ming state and its divine emperor, and will be a great example of
historical usage of soft power that the PRC has inherited from China’s past.
However, to completely ignore the impact that the “gunboat diplomacy” of
the nineteenth century had on China would also be an error. China in modern
times has been in a search for legitimacy in the eyes of the world and a lot of
China’s motivations to gain that legitimacy is due to past humiliations. Evidence
for this point of view can even be found in the government documents that China
publishes every year. In the “what it is about” section of the “China’s Peaceful
Development” white paper there is a statement that details the need for
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legitimacy as well as past humiliations being a motivator for this new strategy on
the part of the PRC:
Over the past 5,000 years, people of all ethnic groups in China, with
diligence and wisdom, have created a splendid civilization and built a
unified multi-ethnic country. The Chinese civilization has a unique feature
of being enduring, inclusive and open. The Chinese nation has
endeavored to learn from other nations and improved itself through
centuries of interactions with the rest of the world, making major
contribution to the progress of human civilization. In the mid-19th century,
Western powers forced open China's door with gunboats. Internal turmoil
and foreign aggression gradually turned China into a semi-colonial and
semi-feudal society. The country became poor and weak, and the people
suffered from wars and chaos. Facing imminent danger of national
subjugation, one generation of patriots after another fought hard to find a
way to reform and save the nation. The Revolution of 1911 put an end to
the system of monarchy which had ruled China for several thousand
years, and inspired the Chinese people to struggle for independence and
prosperity. However, such efforts and struggle failed to change the nature
of China as a semi-colonial and semi-feudal society, or lift the Chinese
people out of misery. Living up to the people's expectation, the CPC led
them in carrying out arduous struggle, and finally founded the People's
Republic of China in 1949. This marked the realization of China's
independence and liberation of its people and ushered in a new epoch in
China's history.
In the past six decades and more since the founding of New China, and
particularly since the introduction of the reform and opening-up policies in
1978, the Chinese government has worked hard to explore a path of
socialist modernization that conforms to China's conditions and the trend
of the times. Overcoming difficulties and setbacks, the Chinese people
have advanced with the times, drawn on both experience and lessons
from the development of China itself and other countries, deepened
understanding of the laws governing the development of human society,
and promoted the self-improvement and growth of the socialist system.
Through arduous struggle, the Chinese people have succeeded in finding
a path of development conforming to China's reality, the path of socialism
with Chinese characteristics.41
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The idea of the “path of socialism with Chinese characteristics” has been
used by the PRC to justify using capitalist business practices while still being in
theory a communist state. This practice has been used since the time of Deng
Xiaoping and has been continued by all succeeding presidents of the PRC,
including Hu Jintao and more recently Xi Jinping. To understand the concept of
soft power from the point of view of China it is important to look into both China’s
past and present. The travels of Zheng He indeed had soft power elements to his
journeys but the “century of humiliation” is also a crucial part in understanding
why Beijing wishes to have a legitimate role that is taken seriously by other
nations on the world stage in the modern day.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE EMPEROR AND THE ADMIRAL: THE LIFE AND
ADVENTURES OF ZHENG HE AND ITS IMPACT
ON MING SOFT POWER RELATIONS

Rebellion, (that is plotting against the dynasty) and
lese-majeste (that is plotting to desecrate imperial
ancestral alters, mausoleums, and palaces). All
conspirators regardless of whether they are leaders
or followers shall be executed by slicing. Their
grandfathers, fathers, sons, grandsons, older
brothers, younger brothers, and those who live
with them regardless of surname differences; sons of
paternal uncles and brothers regardless of whether
they have the same registration; if they are sixteen
years of age or over, regardless of serious or
crippling disease, they shall be executed. Those
fifteen or below, mothers, daughters, wives, and
concubines older and younger sisters, sons’ wives
and concubines, shall be given as slaves to the
households of titular nobility. Their property shall be
confiscated by the government…
-Excerpt from the Penal
Section of The Great Ming Code
42
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The Origins of the Ming Dynasty
Before getting into the specifics of Zheng He’s life, it would be prudent to
present a basic overview of the early history of the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644), its
first two emperors, and the rise of Zhu Di the third emperor of the Ming Dynasty,
and Zheng He’s patron. By looking at these historical figures, we will see the kind
of world Zheng He lived in, and what the political realities were that he faced. The
Ming Dynasty was the last ethnic Han dynasty in the history of China. The
previous dynasty, the Yuan Dynasty (1271-1368) founded by Kublai Khan (12151294) was overthrown in 1368 by Zhu Yuanzhang, the leader of the rebellion
against the Yuan, who would come to be known as Ming Taizu (r.1368-1398) first
emperor of the Ming Dynasty. Like many founders of previous dynasties, Taizu
was of humble birth,43 but he was able to rally support against the hated
Mongols, and succeeded in his civil war despite the odds, against the more
militarily powerful Yuan. Once the Yuan Dynasty fell in 1368, Zhu Yuanzhang
began to consolidate power in his new capital of Nanjing (Nanking) and began to
build up state infrastructure. The Confucian scholar officials benefited the most
from this new arrangement of power and the court eunuchs felt their power
decrease due to Zhu Yuanzhang’s distrust of them.44 Many of Zhu Yuanzhang’s
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closest friends and allies took up the position of commanders of the Ming’s
armies. This arrangement would not last forever. After the purges of 1380, many
of the merit-based nobility in the empire were executed and Zhu Yuanzhang’s
sons would remain as the most powerful military commanders in the empire
commanding vast armies from their fiefs.
The rise to power Zhu Yuanzhang shows the interplay between both hard
and soft power. Zhu Yuanzhang used the power of charm and persuasion back
when he was a peasant soldier rebelling against the Yuan Dynasty. Once Zhu
Yuanzhang came to power however, he used coercion and strict autocratic
policies to cement his power. This is often a common strategy throughout history
with autocratic rulers who often play the liberator at first but become the tyrant
once their power is achieved. Zhu Yuanzhang was very conscious of how he was
able to overthrow the Yuan through popular rebellion and became increasingly
paranoid that the same might be done to him. In 1380, he executed Chancellor
Hu Weiyong on charges of conspiracy and forming a faction (a capital crime) and
thereafter abolished the chancellery.45 In the wake of this event, Zhu Yuanzhang
established the Jinyiwei (Embroidered Uniform Guard) as his secret police and
they would assist considerably in helping Zhu Yuanzhang in the purges of his
late reign. Zhu Yuanzhang also wrote extensively on the responsibilities of
rulership and how the founders of dynasties such as himself proved to be better
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at ruling the common people due to his humble origins. Zhu Yuanzhang himself
writes on his own brand of populist ideals in this passage of the August Ming
Ancestral Instruction:
I have observed since ancient times, when states established their laws it
was always done by the ruler who first received the mandate. At that time
the laws were fixed and the people observed them. Thus, was the imperial
benevolence and authority extended through the realm so that people
could enjoy peace and security. This was because at the outset of the
founding the ruler endured hardships, saw many men, and became
experienced in handling affairs. In comparison to a ruler born and bred
deep within the palace, unfamiliar with the world, or a hermit scholar living
alone in the mountains or forests considering himself enlightened, how
different it was for me. When I was young I was orphaned and poor and
grew up amidst warfare. At the age of twenty-four I joined the ranks and
was ordered about for three years. Then I gathered together and studied
the ways of training soldiers, planning to compete with the warlords. It was
trying and worrisome. I was apprehensive and on guard for nearly twenty
years until I was able to unite the empire.46
Zhu Yuanzhang in this period began abandoning the path of charming and
wooing the population and instead began to exercise his power of coercion in
order to maintain his own power. Seeking to prevent that path of power to any
potential rival, the emperor initiated the brutal purges which would leave many of
the upper echelons of the Ming government dead. In the case of Hu Weiyong,
the purge that followed after his fall from power and execution left an estimated
thirty thousand people dead. Zhu Yuanzhong fathered twenty-six sons and
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sixteen daughters through the empress Ma and his numerous concubines.47 One
of these sons, Zhu Di (r.1402-1424) the future Yongle emperor, was born from
Zhu Yuanzhang’s lesser consorts. Zhu Di would eventually become the third
emperor of the Ming Dynasty but not until after winning a successful civil war that
would not end until 1402 against his nephew Zhu Yunwen (1377-1402) the future
Jianwen emperor, who would rule as the second emperor of the dynasty. In
1380, Zhu Di along with the rest of his brothers were ordered to their fiefs in a
practice known as Zhiguo which was the standard rite of passage for younger
sons of an emperor.48 Zhu Di’s fief was the region of Yan with the city of Beiping
(Beijing) as its capital. Zhu Di as the Prince of Yan was therefore given
considerable military power on the northern border of the Ming Empire. For Zhu
Di, this base of power would prove crucial in his rise to power.
After the death of his oldest son in 1392, Zhu Yuanzhang considered
having Zhu Di, whom he considered the most capable of his sons, succeed him,
but he was advised against this by his Confucian courtiers. They instead
recommended his grandson Zhu Yunwen as successor.49 The reasoning for
selecting Zhu Yunwen had to do with laws of succession that were strictly
enforced in the Ming Dynasty. According to Hok Lam Chan, a later edition
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passage of the August Ming Ancestral Instruction translated by Edward L.
Farmer lays out the order of succession which Zhu Yuanzhang had to grapple
with:
If there are no imperial sons (i.e., the eldest son born to an emperor’s
primary consort) in the court, the succession will pass to the younger
brother when the elder brother dies. Those born of lesser consorts shall
not be elevated even though they are older. If there are treacherous
officials who advocate abandoning sons of the primary consort and
elevating the sons of lesser consorts, the sons of the lesser consorts shall
hold fast to their station and not move. They should send a message to
the son of the primary consort who ought to be appointed. The essential of
the matter is that the son of the primary consort occupy the throne. The
throne shall decapitate the treacherous officials immediately.50
In order to secure a smooth succession for Zhu Yunwen, Zhu Yuanzhang
launched another purge to ensure none could challenge Zhu Yunwen for the
throne upon his succession. Fifteen thousand civil officials and military
commanders were killed in this purge. Upon the death of the first Emperor of the
Ming, Zhu Yuanzhang ordered his sons to their fiefs and remain there so they
would not threaten Zhu Yunwen’s ascension. Here we once again see a hard
power approach in contrast to the revolutionary peasant hero figure of Zhu
Yuanzhang’s early years. Instead of using persuasion and the granting of favors
to officials of uncertain loyalty, Zhu Yuanzhang decided that a hard purge would
be the most effective method to secure his son’s future. By using coercion and
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terror, the later years of Zhu Yuanzhang’s reign match perfectly with many
historical autocratic regimes facing their first succession crisis.
In 1398 Zhu Yuanzhong finally died and Zhu Yunwen ascended to the
throne as the Jianwen emperor. By 1399, Zhu Yunwen had ordered the death of
five of his uncles and two more had died of natural causes.51 Zhu Di in a clever
ruse, feigned madness in order to reduce the suspicion of Zhu Yunwen while he
quietly built up his forces and consolidated power. Meanwhile in Nanjing, Zhu
Yunwen surrounded himself with Confucian scholar officials often taking their
advice in regard to how to consolidate his power as a wise and sagely ruler. Zhu
Di, no doubt, feared for his life after seeing the very obvious example of what
happened to his other brothers and soon plotted rebellion against his nephew
knowing that time was short.
The Confucian scholar officials that surrounded Zhu Yunwen suggested
that he carry out a policy in 1398 known as “wasting of the feudatories” which
was a policy that deprived feudatory fief holders (Zhu Yunwen’s uncles) of the
military power of the fiefs they controlled. This caused Zhu Di in his fief of Yan to
be sealed off from the rest of the empire, while Zhu Yunwen took action against
the weaker fief holders. Zhu Di however played a very successful gambit against
his nephew in the summer of 1399, convincing his nephew to release his two
sons who were being held hostage back into Zhu Di’s custody, to ensure loyal
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behavior from his uncle. Therefore, Zhu Di had quashed the biggest obstacle to
his seizure of power by manipulating his naïve nephew into returning the only
insurance of Zhu Di’s cooperation with the new Emperor.52 Zhu Di determined
that it was then time to strike, and began an open rebellion against his nephew in
1399. The excuse Zhu Di used to justify his rebellion was that “deceitful
ministers” (the Confucians) had “corrupted” the young emperor and according to
Dryer, issued a manifesto that called for “Ancestral Injunctions” which gave the
Prince of Yan the right to come to Nanjing and “suppress difficulties” with the
ministers who had “deceived” his nephews.53 This began the long and bloody
civil war (1399-1402) of Zhu Di which would last four years. Initially, Zhu Yunwen
underestimated Zhu Di’s military aptitude due to the loyalist’s vastly superior
numbers. Zhu Di engaged in successful guerilla tactics and raids to sap at the
supply lines of Zhu Yunwen’s numerically superior forces.
The first troops sent by Zhu Yunwen were easily routed by Zhu Di’s
forces. A successful night raid against loyal forces, who were in their camp
drinking and celebrating the Autumn Festival in Heibei province, resulted in eight
thousand loyalist forces being killed or captured, and this was further
compounded by an additional loss of ten thousand soldiers in another ambush,
with Zhu Di’s soldiers hiding under a bridge underwater using reeds as breathing
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instruments.54 These successful guerilla tactics devastated the initial forces sent
to suppress the rebellion and after they retreated and regrouped, Zhu Yunwen
began to take his uncle’s rebellion seriously. He raised a new army and marched
straight into the prince of Yan’s lands in 1399 and in December laid siege to
Beiping itself. This was the First Siege of Beiping (1399) and proved to be a
decisive victory for the rebel forces. On the very walls of Beiping, the city
managed to hold due to the resourcefulness and strategy of Zhu Di’s
commanders and managed to inflict two hundred thousand casualties on the
loyalist forces. One of the commanders defending the walls was a young eunuch
and companion of Zhu Di by the name of Ma He. Ma He and the other
commanders of the city proved decisive in the siege of Beiping and after the
Imperial army retreated, it gave the rebel forces some breathing room. After a
failed invasion of Shanxi in 1400, a second loyalist army was routed. This
temporary success for Zhu Di came to an end in 1400-1401 when a new fresh
army forced Zhu Di on to the defensive.
This was the low point in the rebellion for Zhu Di and a stalemate occurred
which Zhu Di gave into despair.55 However, the disunity among the eunuchs in
the Imperial Court gave an opportunity to Zhu Di. The defecting eunuchs, who
had felt their power being reduced during the reign of the first and second Ming
emperors, defected to Zhu Di’s cause and brought secrets with them, showing
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the weaknesses in Nanjing’s defenses. This would be a crucial turning point in
the war and give Zhu Di the opportunity to seize the Dragon Throne. As for the
prince of Yan’s companion Ma He, who had played a decisive role in the defense
of Beiping, this would be the beginning of a very long and fruitful career as the
right-hand man of Zhu Di. In January 1402, Zhu Di’s armies marched out of
Beiping with Ma He as one of the commanders of Zhu Di’s army. This would be
the turning point of the war and would change the young eunuch’s life forever as
he marched alongside his master, ready to lay siege to the Imperial Capital of
Nanjing.
The story of Zhu Yuanzhang’s rise to power is a perfect example of a
leader using both hard and soft power to achieve their own ends. The emperor
was able in his early years to craft the image of a peasant hero, a virtuous
exemplar who fought to liberate the common people using the charm and
persuasion inherent in soft power politics. After wooing the population however,
and coming to power, Zhu Yunwen frequently used coercion to get what he
wanted becoming an autocratic ruler as brutal as the Yuan emperors. The
comparisons one could make with later figures in Chinese history such as Mao
Zedong are similar to that of Zhu Yuanzhang and many other autocratic rulers.
This also shows that once again, hard and soft power rarely work in isolation
from each other and indeed often complement one or the other
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Culture Heroes: Soft Power and Uses of Zhu Yuanzhang
in International Politics and Culture
The early years of the Ming Dynasty have a lot of relevance in perceptions
of how soft power is used by the government of the PRC. Film and popular
culture have been a medium of soft power not only in the United States but in
China as well. The populist peasant revolutionary Zhu Yuanzhang has taken a
life of its own in film and popular culture. By maintaining the persuasive image of
Zhu Yuanzhang, the proto-communist revolutionary and ignoring his later
coercive autocratic hard power tendencies of Zhu Yuanzhang’s later reign, the
PRC has the perfect icon to show that it has always had a “revolutionary past”.
This also lends a sort of legitimacy to the PRC government itself as it gives a
veneer of continuing historical legitimacy being passed on from the Ming and
Qing dynasties. For example, Michael Szonyi of Harvard University writes about
“Ming Fever” which is his description of the craze for everything Ming Dynasty
related in China when in 2007 he noticed this trend take off following the
successful miniseries detailing the life of the Ming founder. Szonyi noticed back
in 2005 that the “Ming Fever” had its genesis in the Zheng He story:
The first symptoms of what would come to be called the ‘Ming fever’ or fad
appeared in 2005, the six hundredth anniversary of the voyages of Zheng
He 鄭和 (1371-1433), the eunuch who led a series of massive official
naval missions throughout southeast Asia, as far as the Middle East and
the west coast of Africa. The anniversary inspired a host of
commemorations, culminating in the State Council declaring 11 July to be
‘China National Maritime Day’ (Zhongguo hanghai ri 中國航海日). There
were state sponsored conferences and exhibitions, historical
reconstructions, and a high-budget television drama about the exploits of
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the fifteenth century traveler. The Nanjing shipyards where Zheng He’s
boats were built have been developed as a park and museum.56
The using of Zheng He, Zhu Di and Zhu Yuanzong as popular culture
icons has proven to be very successful. China in its search for legitimacy in the
eyes of the world is tempted to use historical personages in its past, even though
these figures would sharply contrast with orthodox Marxist political theory by
romanticizing historical rulers who would have been “feudal” by Marx’s
definition.57 That being said the story of a peasant who led a “people’s revolution”
can fit nicely into the official narrative of the PRC if certain historical context is
ignored. Szonyi gives an explanation for this contradiction:
The People’s Republic (PRC) has always had a complex and fraught
relationship with China’s history. Mao Zedong read historical works
voraciously and was fond of quoting from them and employing historical
allusions. But he also launched campaigns like the Anti-Four-Olds
movement (po si jiu 破四舊), seeking to destroy the influence of the past
as well as its material legacies in the hope of producing a blank slate on
which to build a utopian future. Like other regimes in China and
elsewhere, the PRC government has frequently used historical narratives
to construct national identity and to legitimate policies. One has only to
think of official accounts of the history of Taiwan or Tibet. The current
Ming fever suggests that the past is still very much part of life in the
present in China. 58
One of the key words used here is a recurring theme in China’s past and
present: legitimacy. The need for legitimacy in the eyes of the world is one of the
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concepts that has driven China to reclaim its position as a world power. It was
legitimacy that as one of the primary motivations for the treasure voyages and it
is the search for legitimacy that plays a crucial part in China being able to use its
past to prop up heroes that are needed to cement that legitimacy. The fact that
the PRC also uses practicality in dealing with its past has indeed been an
effective part of China’s usage of soft power and that practicality also led to
China becoming a very relevant and very powerful country by the end of the
twentieth century.59
There have been further uses of using the Ming as a rallying cry for many
of China’s upheavals in the twentieth century. In Sarah Schneewind’s edited
work Long Live the Emperor! Uses of the Ming Founder Across Six Centuries of
East Asian History, there is an essay written by Rebecca Nedostup titled Two
Tombs: Thoughts on Zhu Yuanzhang, the Kuomintang, and the Meanings of
National Heros. In this essay Nedostup explains how national heroes were used
by Nationalist China under Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek as “racial heroes”
of the Han Chinese ethnic group during the 1911 revolution. Nedostup argues
that despite the autocratic nature of Zhu Yuanzhang, the Ming founder was often
used by the KMT as a symbol of Han unification, especially in the “racialist”
nature of the historical figure. Using Zhu Yuanzhang’s rebellion against the
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Mongol Yuan Dynasty (1271-1368) as an analogy for the Han fighting against the
Manchu led Qing Dynasty (1644-1912) proved to be an effective form of
propaganda to rally the mostly Han revolutionaries against the Manchu Qing and
served as a way to promote Han nationalism.60 Nedostup’s argument of using
heroes of the past to promote modern day causes has plenty of analogies in
modern day politics in China. The anti-corruption campaign of President Xi for
example, has a historical analogy with Zhu Yuanzhang’s own anti-corruption
campaign, albeit Xi’s may be less draconian then that of Zhu Yuanzhang’s which
saw thousands of civilians butchered.61
This usage of national heroes also in many ways contributes to the soft
power policies of Beijing’s charm strategy. By using versions of historical that
may be “sanitized” to fit into the nominally socialist but also practical world view
of the PRC, national heroes like Zhu Yuanzhang can be used to promote the
“One China” principle, especially in the sense of national unity. Another paper as
cited in Schneewind’s written by Gray Tuttle is an essay, Using Zhu Yuanzhang’s
Communications with Tibetans to Justify PRC Rule in Tibet explains the
argument that the modern-day PRC has used Zhu Yuanzhang’s communications
with the Tibetan lama’s in the fourteenth to prove that China and Tibet have been
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undivided at least since the Yuan Dynasty. The Ming Dynasty by this argument’s
assertion, inherited in its rise to power in terms of continuance of governance.
Tuttle gives a refutation of this point of view, pointing out that despite the Ming
Dynasty giving out certain honors and titles to some of the religious sects in Tibet
such as the Sagya Sect, this does not mean that the Ming Dynasty ruled Tibet in
a unified sense, but rather that it was a policy of “pacification” with the Ming
Dynasty only conferring rule upon on sects that had “control of their own areas”.
Tuttle also argues that despite the PRC’s claim to the contrary, no one religious
leader had full control over Tibet during the time of the Ming.62 Nevertheless, the
PRC has adamantly claimed that Tibet was not independent fully in this time
period and has used this argument to justify its continued rule of the territory.63
The soft power benefits of this policy are clear in that they support the idea of an
“undivided” China, a policy that Beijing is very sensitive to in international affairs.
If Beijing can convince other nations to adopt the point of view that
historically Tibet was always a part of China and use the “culture hero” Zhu
Yuanzhang to achieve this end, then the PRC will be able to gain a considerable
amount of soft power on the world stage and diminish the Tibetan Independence
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Movement without firing a shot using coercion. In the larger picture of power
politics, the PRC can use charm and persuasion to convince nations to accept its
foreign and national policy, no matter how questionable the historical claims the
PRC presents as evidence are.

The Early Life of Zheng He and Zhu Di’s Ascension
In the aftermath of the toppling of the Yuan Dynasty in 1368, the Mongols
and remnant Yuan forces had retreated to Yunnan, with the newly created Ming
Dynasty hot on their heels. In 1374, Zhu Yuanzhang demanded that the Mongols
and their leader Basalawarmi submit to Ming rule and sent envoys to convey this
message. The envoys were killed, and in response the Ming forces under
General Fu Youde invaded Yunnan. Fu Youde’s three hundred thousand strong
army successfully invaded Yunnan and by 1382 had captured the provincial seat
of Kunming after which the rebellion’s leaders committed suicide to avoid
capture. Fu Youde then began a reign of terror against the local population,
killing hundreds of thousands of Miao and Yao tribesmen.64 Another common
method used against the population was the kidnapping of young boys to serve
as eunuchs in the imperial court. One of these boys was a young ten-year-old
child by the name of Ma He. Ma He’s surname Ma, according to Dryer, often but
not always indicated Muslim faith. Also, according to Dryer, Ma He’s grandfather
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and father both had the name Haji indicating they had completed the Hajj, a
pilgrimage to Mecca. While Ma He’s family were of Chinese Muslim extraction,
Ma He was known to mostly practice Buddhism in his religious life and took a
Buddhist name 65 The boy was taken by Fu Youde and was subjected to
castration. According to Levathes, in China in this time period, castration was
accomplished by the quick stroke of a knife that cut off both the penis and testes
of the victim with a plug left in the urethra.66 After this brutal act, Ma He was put
into the household of the Prince of Yan, Zhu Di.
Growing up in the Prince of Yan’s court, Ma He rose through the ranks to
become an able military commander. He was one of the commanders during the
siege of Beijing in 1399.67 Early in his life at court, Ma He had befriended Zhu Di,
and the young prince and the eunuch had become very close friends. Ma He
served as a boyhood companion and later in life as a rising military general.
These early skirmishes in Mongolia were formative years for Ma He and were
crucial for him to get the necessary training for a military career. Most
importantly, these campaigns and hard fighting forged an ever-closer bond
between Zhu Di and Ma He. These campaigns would also give Zhu Di’s troops
an opportunity to “cut their teeth” in warfare. These veterans would prove crucial
to the 1399-1402 Ming Civil War, especially the Mongol defectors of the
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Uriyangqad tribe who fought for Zhu Di in the civil war.68 In particular, a Mongol
leader by the name of Nagahachu surrendered to Zhu Di during his campaign
with Inner Mongolia. Zhu Di treated Nagahachu and his men like honored guests
and soon convinced them to join his forces. These expert horse-archers would
prove to be a strategic asset in the civil war.69 This consolidation of forces and
military power showed that Zhu Di was indeed thinking in the long term, indeed
his chances of success in the war may have been much slimmer.
The beginning of the war was nowhere near as dramatic and climactic as
the final siege of Nanjing in January 1402. Zhu Di had left Beiping with his
generals, among them was Ma He and Zhu Di’s new Uriyangqad allies. Nanjing
had formidable defenses, defended by perhaps the longest wall in any city of the
time period and strict punishments for guards who were found sleeping on duty
or intoxicated, with the punishment being death or if under a lenient commander
the removal of one’s ear.70 As well prepared as Zhu Di was for the siege, these
defenses proved to be a difficult obstacle to overcome. However, even in the
context of military siege soft power (intrigue) could have its advantages over hard
power (an all-out assault, or lengthy siege). The river fleet commander, Chen
Xuan (1365-1433) was one of many disgruntled military commanders who had
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lost faith with the loyalist regime in Nanjing.71 With Chen Xuan’s help, Zhu Di’s
forces crossed the Yangtze. With the help of two defected commanders who
agreed to open the gates, Zhu Di, Ma He and the rebel army marched through
Nanjing’s Jinchuan gate on July 17th 1402. By the time Zhu Di had reached the
Imperial palace, the Jianwen Emperor’s last loyal servants and guards had set
the Imperial Palace ablaze. A charred corpse was presented to Zhu Di as the
corpse of his nephew, but the corpse was so badly burned it could not be
identified. According to the Comprehensive Mirror of the Ming Dynasty, a work
written by Chinese historian Xia Xe, the Jianwen Emperor Zhu Yunwen very
likely died in the conflagration, there were rumors he had escaped, most
famously as a monk as cited by Leavthes.72
Despite these rumors Zhu Di ascended to the Dragon Throne on the 17th
of July as the Yongle (perpetual happiness) Emperor. Zhu Di, being a usurper
was quick to find ways to give himself legitimacy and prove that The Mandate of
Heaven had indeed been granted to him. However, the rumors of his nephew’s
survival haunted him and so he almost immediately started financing searches
for his possible whereabouts or conclusive evidence of his death.73 Zhu Di’s
eunuch general Ma He for his part also rose in stature due to invaluable
generalship during this campaign. Ma He was elevated by Zhu Di to the position
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of Taijian (Grand Director) of the Directorate of Palace Servants, one of the
highest-ranking positions a Palace Eunuch could attain. This also allowed Ma He
the right to wear the red robes of a high-ranking Eunuch of the court, a symbol of
his new high status. In 1404 on New Year’s Day in commemoration of Ma He’s
defense of the Zheng Village Dike during the civil war, Zhu Di conferred upon Ma
He the name of Zheng in honor of his role in this battle.74
The civil war of Yongle once again shows the need for legitimacy in the
politics of China both past and present. Perhaps one of the greatest factors in
Zhu Di’s favor to grant him legitimacy was the promise of stability. The promise of
stability is a common way many governments in China either Imperial or the PRC
have kept their power. In an article written for The Diplomat by Ankit Panda
argues that it is the promise of stability, rooting out corruption and giving China
an important place in the world is what keeps the CCP in power in China and not
only, as conventional wisdom would argue, the massive economic growth that
has resulted from the legacy of Deng Xiaoping. Panda argues:
Where does the CCP’s legitimacy come from then? As Greer notes,
maybe looking at the per capita distribution of wealth in China has been
the wrong measure all along—it’s unnecessarily reductive and dismissive
of the opinions of actual Chinese people. Instead, Chinese people would
attribute the legitimacy of the CCP to specific policy initiatives (i.e., fighting
corruption, delivering justice to wrong-doers within the country’s power
apparatus) as well as more diffuse, nation-level factors (i.e., the CCP’s
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role in helping China, as a country and a nation, become wealthy,
powerful, and respected on the international stage”).75
President Xi, the current President of the People’s Republic, has been an
exemplar of this idea. Xi has in recent years launched a tireless anti-corruption
campaign intended according to government sources to clean up rampant
corruption in the party leadership. Critics of this policy have noted that many of
these “corrupt” officials have been at times Xi’s rivals and that the anti-corruption
campaign has been an excuse for President Xi to remove political opposition.76
Xi has also not been much of a stranger to the concept of raising China’s
prestige around the world, hoping to reclaim China’s place in the world by
focusing hard on foreign relations and diplomacy.
Zhu Di in an apparent parallel in history also sought to increase China’s prestige
to its neighbors. In Zheng He’s biography in the Mingshi as cited in Dryer’s work,
Zheng He and the Oceans of the Early Ming Dynasty, a similar yearning for
China to gain prestige under the tenure of Zhu Di is expressed:
Zheng He a native of Yunnan, is the one whom the world calls the Grand
Director of the Three Treasures. Originally, he served the Prince of Yan in
the palace of his princely fief. He followed [when the prince] raised troops,
accumulated merit [in his service, and] was promoted to Grand Director.
[Emperor] Chengzu had suspected that Emperor Hui had fled beyond the
sea and wanted to track him down moreover, he wanted to display his
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soldiers in strange lands in order to make manifest the wealth and power
of the Middle Kingdom. (304.2b-4b)77
Zhu Di recognized not only his need for legitimacy as a ruler justifying a civil war
but also the need for legitimacy around the world. Using the excuse that he was
following leads concerning rumors of his nephew’s survival, Zhu Di in reality was
re-asserting China’s prestigious place in the world and wished to use soft power
to display the wealth and prestige for China hoping to forge favorable trade
agreements with China’s neighbors. In the modern day, President Xi’s foreign
policy which hopes to show that China is a wealthy and advanced nation is
motivated by enticing foreign investment to come to China and take part in
China’s new booming economy is a clear parallel to these events. In both ruler’s
cases a theme of “reclaiming lost glory” and showing of the prestige and wealth
of China in order to attract “investment” whether 14th century style tribute trade
policies or the economic policy of the PRC remains a constant theme in China’s
search for legitimacy.
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Soft Power and the Search for Legitimacy:
The First Voyage and the Birth of the Treasure Fleet
In autumn of 1405, the fleet of 317 brightly painted
junks with a total crew of more than 27,000 men was
ready to depart from Nanjing. As the ships assembled
in formation in the center of the Yangzi, the sculpted
“eyes” on the majestic bows looked anxiously
downstream toward the open sea. The destination of
the treasure ships was Calicut-the powerful city state
in Kerala on the west coast of India that had a market
for spices and rare woods that attracted traders
throughout the Indian Ocean. Here in this isolated
coastal region west of the Ghat range, grew
cardamom, cinnamon, ginger, turmeric, and precious
pepper, worth its weight in gold. After the flooding of
the ancient Indian harbor of Muziris in 1341, Calicut
had emerged as the most important port not only in
India, but in all of south Asia
-Louise Levathes
on the voyage to
Calicut by the
Treasure Fleet78
While Zhu Di now had full and absolute power as emperor, he was still in a
very tenuous position. First of all, Zhu Di and the entire empire were painfully
aware that he was a usurper. While this was nothing new in the history of China,
indeed the concept of The Mandate of Heaven, an ideal similar to the European
“Divine Right of Kings” seemed to support it. The Mandate of Heaven was a
concept started in the Zhou Dynasty (1046 BC–256 BC) that justified a ruler’s
divine right of rule and the right of rebellion against an unjust ruler who would
have lost the mandate in the eyes of the divine. The tricky part in this case was
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that the loss of the Mandate of Heaven usually applied to one dynasty
overthrowing another, rather than a usurpation of the same dynasty, although
Zhu Di was hardly alone in being the usurper of the same dynasty. Nevertheless,
the possible survival of Zhu Yunwen the Jianwen Emperor disturbed and worried
Zhu Di greatly. Not only were there rumors that he had escaped disguised as a
monk, but there were other rumors that Zhu Yunwen had escaped overseas,
plotting his return to China.79 Regardless of whether this was true or not, Zhu Di
was in desperate need to see his rule as legitimate and what better way to gain
legitimacy then having it acknowledged by rulers of China’s neighbors?
In 1403, still new on the throne, Zhu Di ordered the construction of the
Treasure Fleet, a vast armada of war and trade ships that would sail around the
Indian Ocean and collect tribute and acknowledgement of the Ming Dynasty’s
superiority from China’s neighbors. The military usage of this fleet and the threat
of force in a hard power sense could not be denied, but Zhu Di’s plans tended to
be of a more diplomatic soft power tone. These ships would display the vast
wealth and power of the Ming and its new emperor, showing the benefits of token
submission under the tribute trade system. The rumors of the Jianwen’s survival
overseas indeed may have been a motivation for these journeys although
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according to Yang Wei, that was very unlikely as the cost of launching seven
voyages because of a mere rumor would not have been very feasible.80
According to the Mingshi, the official history of the Ming, the treasure ships were
447 by 183 feet in their size.81 According to Sally K. Church in her scholarly
article “Zheng He: An Investigation into the Plausibility of 450-foot Treasure
Ships” the actual sizes of these ships in Longjiang were probably closer to 200250 ft. in length. Church bases her argument of the findings of Professor Xin
Yuan’ou, a shipbuilding engineering professor at Shanghai Jiaotang University. 82
Church writes:
At a conference entitled "Venture Toward the Seas" held in Taipei in
September 2001, Xin Yuan'ou, shipbuilding engineer and professor of the
history of science at Shanghai Jiaotong University, presented a paper
entitled "Guanyu Zheng He baochuan chidu de jishu fenshi” (A Technical
Analysis of the Size of Zheng He’s Ships.) In this paper, he argued that
Zheng He's ships could not have been as large as recorded in the official
Ming history (Ming shi). According to that work, the ships constructed for
Zheng He's maritime expeditions were 44 zhang 3t long and 18 zhang
wide, equivalent to 447 ft. by 183 ft. (138.4 m by 56 m).3 A ship this size
would have been roughly 1.4 times the size of an American football field,4
and approximately the same size as the USS Minnesota (456 ft. long by
78 ft. 10 in wide), a steel battleship launched in 1905 and later used in the
First World War. In arguing against this size, Xin was motivated in part by
an immediate, practical concern. Preparations were being made for the
600th anniversary of Zheng He's first expedition in 2005, and proposals
were being put forward for the construction of replicas of Zheng He's
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ships. Xin was concerned that any such replica be of a realistic size so as
to be economical, seaworthy and safe.83
Despite the controversy regarding the size of the Treasure Fleet itself, the
ships and their vast numbers, this was indeed an impressive fleet. The Treasure
Fleet was no merchant fleet either, it was a full armada and the military nature of
this fleet, whatever soft power intentions the emperor may have had cannot be
denied. The fleet represented a massive show of force against China’s
neighbors, but still had the intention of trade, although this was in the context of
the tribute trade system, which relied on an understanding that any nation trading
with China acknowledged the emperor as their overlord. It is hard to determine
whether or not this was a course of soft power or hard power. On the one hand,
the tribute trade system, is coercive, on the other there is a degree of charm
involved in the tribute trade process as well. This example shows that often times
hard and soft power work together and not in isolation of each other. By having a
token acknowledgement of supremacy, the Ming Dynasty could have control over
China’s neighbors without having to use an all-out military invasion. This often
worked for the rulers of China’s neighbors as well, since they realized this was at
best only a de jure surrendering of their sovereignty, a rather small price to pay to
participate in the sharing of China’s vast wealth.
Shortly after coming to the throne, Zhu Di had repudiated his father’s
decree that had limited trade between China and foreign nations. The first
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emperor of the Ming had been advised by his Confucian scholar-officials that
agriculture alone was the basis for Chinese wealth. Zhu Di on the other hand,
saw the advantage of opening up trade with China’s neighbors, decreeing, “Now
all within the four seas are one family! Let there be mutual trade at the frontier
barriers in order to supply the country’s needs and to encourage distant people to
come!”84 In the previous thirty years the trade of the Indian Ocean had become
nearly nothing, so it became obvious that Zhu Di wished to open up this vast
trade route and with Calicut, a city state in the West Indian region of Kerala. This
would be the first Chinese international fleet operating in the Indian Ocean. 85 The
cutting of trade in southeast Asia as well had been devastating in Indonesia and
Malaysia.86
As cited by Levathes, there was definitely a prevailing appetite within
southeast Asia and India to resume the mutually beneficial trade relationship that
had been ended by the first emperor of the Ming, on advice from his Confucian
officials. In autumn 1405, after over a year of planning and construction Zheng
He’s grand armada sailed out of Longjiang towards the state of Champa
(Vietnam). While in Champa, Zheng He traded in Ming porcelain and silks. In
exchange, the people of Champa traded with aloe wood, rhinoceros horn and
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elephant ivory, all of which was regarded as tribute to the Yongle Emperor.
Moving on from Champa, the armada made its way to the island of Java. The
Chinese and Javanese had endured difficult relations in their past, culminating in
the 1377 execution of several Chinese envoys, (sent by China in order to force
the recognition of the state Palembang, a rival of the Javanese) by Javanese
King Hayam Wuruk. This was of course an affront to the Dragon Throne, and
trade as a result had dwindled to nothing and Zheng He was determined to
reverse this. Fei Xin (1385-136), who served as one of Zheng He’s lieutenants in
his work The Overall Survey of the Star Raft gives a well detailed description of
Java and its many trade items during the treasure fleet’s visit:
The port in the mouth of the river where one lands and leaves [this
country] is called hsin-t’sun. The inhabitants live all round. They plait
kayang leaves to cover their houses. The shop-houses run side by side,
forming a market, where they buy and sell [the things] which have been
gathered together. This country is rich and prolific. Pearls, gold and silver,
yakut stones and cat’s-eyes, blue, red and other kinds of [precious]
stones, mother-of-pearl, carnelians, nutmegs, long peppers, gardenia
flowers, putchuck and [even] salt-there is nothing which they don’t have.
This certainty is so because [the country] is situated in a place where all
trade comes through.87
On his way to Java and Sumatra, Zheng He had avoided the state of
Palembang, which out of all these city states was the wealthiest of them all. Their
wealth came as a result of a war between the Javanese city states who had
claimed Palembang as their own and had installed a Javanese controlled puppet
government in the city. The inhabitants of Palembang had thrown out the
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Javanese but during this time of upheaval, the notorious Chinese pirate Chen
Zuyi had taken control of the city and made Palembang a stronghold of piracy
and lawlessness, similar to the “Pirate Republic” of Nassau in the early 18 th
century during British rule in the Bahamas. On his return to China, Zheng He
would deal with Chen Zuyi but the time was not quite right for a full military
engagement, especially when Zheng He was trying to repair relations with the
Javanese, thus showing that at least for now, soft power diplomacy would win the
day.88
We can see through this narrative that the Chinese already had a large
and thriving community in Java and indeed dominated a large part of the trade
there, which would have made Zheng He’s job considerably easier. After
spending some time in Java and Sumatra trading, the fleet moved on to the
kingdom of Ceylon (Sri Lanka), where unlike what happened in Java, Zheng He
met with a much different reception than he did in Java, which was rather positive
compared to that of Ceylon. Zheng He noted that the ruler of Ceylon, as cited by
Dryer and Levathes, had treated him and the emperor’s emissaries badly and
had proved “arrogant and disrespectful and wanted to harm Zheng He”. 89 Zheng
He decided it would be best to leave Ceylon for the time being but made note of
Ceylon’s military defenses and vast wealth in precious gemstones. According to
Ma Huan, a Chinese Muslim scholar who participated in the voyages and
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contemporary of both Zheng He and Fei Xin, Zheng He and the fleet made haste
to their original destination of Calicut which the Chinese regarded as “The Great
Country of the Western Ocean” showing the amount of prestige and admiration
the Chinese put on this west Indian city state. Ma Huan described the people
there as being “honest and trustworthy.”90 According to Levathes, Zheng He
stayed in Calicut from December 1406 to April 1407. The unusual extended
duration of this trade mission was due to the rituals and bargaining that was
standard of an official trade mission sent by the emperor. Zheng He’s experience
in Calicut was peaceful and he knew that by following a soft power policy he
could gain a favorable trade relationship in Calicut which was one of the busiest
ports in all of Asia. From this port flowed goods from all over Asia, Europe and
the Middle East. He also took great care to show respect to the Zamurin which
was the title of the ruler of Calicut. According to Ma Huan the bargaining stage in
these trade missions could take a month if done quickly and two to three months
if slow. He gives a description of the lengthy process:
If a treasure-ship goes there, it is left entirely to the two men to
superintend the buying and selling; the king sends a chief and a Che-ti
Wei-no-chito examine the account books in the official bureau; a broker
comes and joins them; [and] a high officer who commands the ships
discusses the choice of a certain date for fixing prices. When the day
arrives, they first of all take the silk embroideries and the open-work silks,
and other such goods which have been brought there, and discuss the
price of them one by one; [and] when [the price] has been fixed, they write
out an agreement stating the amount of the price; [this agreement] is
retained by these persons. The chief and the Che-ti, with his excellency
90
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the eunuch, all join hands together, and the broker then says ‘In such and
such a moon on such and such a day, we have all joined hands and
sealed our agreement with a hand-clasp; whether [the price] be dear or
cheap, we will never repudiate it or change it. After that, the Che-ti and the
men of wealth then come bringing precious stones, pearls, corals, and
other such things, so that they may be examined and the price discussed;
[this] cannot be settled in a day; [if done] quickly, [it takes] one moon; [if
done] slowly, [it takes] two or three moons.’91
Since Zheng He understood the need and benefits of diplomacy to gain
recognition of Zhu Di’s legitimacy, Zheng He likely spent a lot of time negotiating
with the Zamurin and gaining recognition of Zhu Di’s sovereignty under the
tribute trade system, but this is still speculation. Regardless, in April the fleet
began its return journey to China. Coming along with Zheng He were
ambassadors from Calicut, Java and Sumatra who were to be taken to the
imperial court and submit themselves to Zhu Di, a time-honored ritual in Imperial
China, where emissaries would prostrate themselves before the emperor in
submission, and in return the emperor would reward them with rich gifts and treat
them as guests of extreme honor. But there was one further amount of business
that had to be taken care of: the pirate Chen Zuyi. Here Zheng He abandoned his
soft power policy and turned the wrath of the Ming Navy onto Chen Zuyi. Zheng
He utterly destroyed the pirates and burned their hideout in Palembang, both
freeing the people of Palembang from Chen Zuyi’s rule and capturing alive the
pirate. Chen Zuyi was bound in chains and was to be taken with Zheng He to
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Nanjing to face execution for his crimes.92 Fei Xin also gives a firsthand account
on the capture of the infamous pirate:
In the third year of Yung-lo (1405) when Emperor Tai-tsung Wen huang-ti
(Zhu Di) of our present dynasty ordered the principal envoy, the Grand
Eunuch Cheng Ho, and others to take supreme command of a fleet and to
precede to all the foreign countries, the pirate Chen Tsu-I and his
followers met in the country of Srivijaya where they plundered foreign
merchants and even attacked our ships. [But] they became victims of a
secret plan on the part of our principal envoy, and like brutes caught in a
net, they were exterminated, their leaders being captured alive and sent
as prisoners to the imperial palace. After this the seas were restored to
imperial peace and order.93
In the summer of 1407, the fleet had returned to China and Zheng He
returned to a very pleased emperor, who while distraught that no word had been
heard about his predecessor Zhu Yunwen, was still very pleased that the
legitimacy of his rule had been recognized by many rulers of southeast Asia and
India. Overall, the first expedition had shown that Zheng He had a great grasp of
knowledge on both soft power and hard power. He re-established trade
relationships using the awe and majesty of the Treasure Fleet, relationships that
were in great deterioration for over thirty years. He also made quick work of a
notorious Chinese pirate that was affecting trade relationships all around the area
and had quickly brought him to heel. Ceylon had proved to be problematic in
establishing relations but they could be dealt with in the future as Zheng He
would later prove.
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The journeys to Java and Calicut have had lasting impacts on the relations
between China, India and Java today. A crucial part of China’s soft power is
using its past to establish that China’s relations were peaceful and prosperous
with its neighbors for centuries, especially when it comes to Zheng He, who has
served as a useful bit of propaganda in the last few decades when dealing with
relations with China’s neighbors. In May 2005, the Nanjing Museum and many
numerous cities in China, Java and India celebrated Zheng He’s sexcentenary,
celebrating 600 years since the first voyage of the admiral. The China Heritage
Quarterly gives a brief summarization of the celebrations:
This tribute to Zheng He, master mariner of the Ming dynasty (1368-1644),
is merely one frisson in the flurry of activities organized for the
sexcentenary. Stamped with patriotism, most events are designed to
appeal to Chinese who hail from the various hometowns and localities in
China associated with Zheng He, or who now live in the areas of
Southeast and South Asia, as well as the Middle East and even East
Africa, once visited by Zheng He's fleets. Although Zheng He came to be
deified and included in local Chinese pantheons in Tian Hou temples, he
was in fact a Muslim, a fact not overlooked in the present celebrations. 94
Beijing has found a great propaganda spokesman in the form of the Ming
admiral. The PRC has recently been using Zheng He in its relations with the
Javanese and India as a way to promote the “peaceful co-existence” between
nations that have had long standing relations with China. However, there have
been some pitfalls in the relationship between the PRC and Java. In Tuban a part
of East Java, a 30.4-meter-tall statue of Guan Yu a famous Chinese general of
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the Three Kingdoms Era (220-280 BC) who was later deified was unveiled in
Tuban sparking massive controversy with a fundamentalist minority of Tuban’s
Muslim population. In the Straits Times the events and controversy are
summarized:
Indonesia has urged officials to stand up to mob pressure after Muslim
and nationalist protesters called for a 30m-tall statue of a Chinese deity
erected in a temple complex in an East Java town to be torn down. The
brightly painted statue of Guan Yu, a general who is worshipped by some
Chinese people, was inaugurated last month in a temple complex in the
fishing town of Tuban, and is claimed to be South-east Asia's tallest
representation of the deity. The statue in Tuban, about 100km west of the
city of Surabaya, has been partially covered up after the protests,
provoking both praise and ridicule on social media in the world's most
populous Muslim- majority country Teten Masduki, chief of staff to
President Joko Widodo, told reporters: "If they ask for the statue to be torn
down, the authorities cannot bow to such pressure. “Protesters
demonstrated this week outside Surabaya's Parliament against the statue,
some wearing paramilitary-style outfits and waving placards that read
"Demolish it" and "We are not worshippers of idols”. Allowing a depiction
of a foreign general was "a symbol of treason to this nation", an unnamed
protester said in a video of the rally on news portal Kompas.com. Officials
of the Kwan Sing Bio Temple in Tuban declined to comment, but the
media have quoted residents as saying the statue was good for tourism.95
While China’s perception of its soft power is a perception that celebrates
peaceful exploration and relations, that perception may not always be shared
with the nations China is attempting to woo. In the example shown in East Java
concerning the Guan Yu statue, what China may see as sharing its culture, some
Javanese natives may see China’s perception of its own soft power as being a
kind of cultural imperialism. There is also a perception by an extreme religious
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minority that the statue serves as an insult to the Muslim population’s religious
beliefs tinged with Indonesian nationalism clashing with Chinese nationalism.
When it comes to Zheng He, there is perhaps a bit of irony in this point of view
seeing that Zheng He was born to a Muslim father and there is considerable
evidence he may have shared his father’s beliefs at least on a cultural level. The
overall point that is being established here however is that China’s own
perceptions of its history and soft power may at many times clash with what other
nations and peoples consider Chinese soft (and hard) to be. Quite likely in the
case of the Guan Yu statue, religious belief may be used as an excuse and the
real problem lies with nationalism as implied in the article.
This distrustfulness of China’s motivations has also been the source of
contention when it comes to national territory as well. The Senkaku/Diayou
islands dispute between China, Japan and Korea has shown that China is willing
to forego soft power diplomacy when it comes to territorial integrity. From the
forward to a white paper published by the PRC State Council in 2012, we can
see how seriously China considers territorial integrity to be to its foreign policy:
Diaoyu Dao and its affiliated islands are an inseparable part of the
Chinese territory. Diaoyu Dao is China's inherent territory in all historical,
geographical and legal terms, and China enjoys indisputable sovereignty
over Diaoyu Dao. Japan’s occupation of Diaoyu Dao during the SinoJapanese War in 1895 is illegal and invalid. After World War II, Diaoyu
Dao was returned to China in accordance with such international legal
documents as the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Proclamation. No
matter what unilateral step Japan takes over Diaoyu Dao, it will not
change the fact that Diaoyu Dao belongs to China. For quite some time,
Japan has repeatedly stirred up troubles on the issue of Diaoyu Dao. On
September 10, 2012, the Japanese government announced the
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"purchase" of Diaoyu Dao and its affiliated Nanxiao Dao and Beixiao Dao
and the implementation of the so-called "nationalization". This is a move
that grossly violates China's territorial sovereignty and seriously tramples
on historical facts and international jurisprudence.
China is firmly opposed to Japan's violation of China's sovereignty over
Diaoyu Dao in whatever form and has taken resolute measures to curb
any such act. China's position on the issue of Diaoyu Dao is clear-cut and
consistent. China's will to defend national sovereignty and territorial
integrity is firm and its resolve to uphold the outcomes of the World AntiFascist War will not be shaken by any force.96
Notice the terms “inseparable” and “inherent territory” in the language of
this white paper. These concepts lend credence to the idea that the past
humiliations in losing territory to the European powers in the nineteenth-century
shape China’s national and foreign policy. The idea of China being “inseparable”
has long been a road-block in finalizing territorial borders between China and her
neighbors. Therefore, the concerns of nationalists in Indonesia doesn’t
necessarily come out of nowhere or out of just pure nationalism and jingoism.
There is a perceived fear of losing territory and cultural influence though both
traditional and cultural imperialism. Either from the aspect of territory as can be
seen in the Senkaku island dispute or through cultural imperialism as seen
through the incident involving the Guan Yu statue. As China’s soft power
increases, there will be indeed blowback towards what is seen as China
encroaching on the culture of others, which can even fuel conspiracy theories
such as one popular one amongst certain nationalists in Indonesia, claiming that
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the government is secretly in control of the entire Indonesian government and
that these soft power efforts are examples of China imposing its culture on an
unwilling population, threatening cultural sovereignty. 97
The United States Congressional Research Service published a white
paper in December 2015 summarizing a lot of these issues of sovereignty and
territory. Titled “Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone Disputes
Involving China” the white paper asserts that China using the so-called “ninedash line”, a vaguely located line of demarcation that the PRC asserts are its
territorial waters. The white paper asserts that China is using a ““salami-slicing”
strategy that employs a series of incremental actions, none of which by itself is a
casus belli, to gradually change the status quo in China’s favor.” in the words of
the report.98 If China is indeed being more aggressive in its territorial ambitions,
this may give credence to the “sharp power” theory in that while China is using
soft power to increase its territorial sovereignty, it is still using elements of
coercion and flexing of military muscle to achieve that end.
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Second and Third Voyages: China’s Power Increases
and the Civil War of Ceylon
The second voyage of the treasure ships was considerably smaller than
that of the first. The reasoning for this return voyage to Calicut was to give formal
imperial recognition to Calicut’s new king Mana Vikraan. On the way to Calicut,
the Treasure Fleet also stopped in Java to settle some old scores with the
Javanese. As previously mentioned in Zhu Di’s grandfather’s day, several envoys
had been executed by the Javanese and rather recently from 1401-1406 there
was a civil war between the two kings of Java, (whom the Ming referred to as the
west and east kings respectively). The west king had killed 170 Chinese
diplomatic staff during the war and Zheng He and his fleet were dispatched to
Java to show the emperor’s displeasure and demand recompense.99 It is
interesting to note, however, that there is not much mention of this event during
Zheng He’s first voyage to Java during the first expedition, which turned out to be
largely peaceful. Nevertheless, the large armada had cowed the Javanese into
submission and Zhu Di demanded that the Javanese send ambassadors to
Nanjing to apologize and pay retribution for their acts. The Javanese and Ming
agreed to 60,000 ounces of gold. Zhu Di also told them to reflect on the “situation
in Vietnam” which Zhu Di had recently begun a conquest of.100
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The fleet’s sequence of stops likely followed this pattern: The fleet would
leave from Nanjing to Liangjiang to Changle and then would have sailed to Siam
(Thailand) and then Java; from Java the fleet would have sailed to Malacca then
Sumatra and then finally Calicut.101 Barbara Peterson in her scholarly article “The
Ming Voyages of Cheng-Ho (Zheng He)” writes a very succinct description of the
second voyage:
The second voyage was planned in 1407, setting sail in 1408,
sailing into Calicut when Cheng Ho generously dispersed gifts to
the king, carrying out “the formal investiture of the king of Calicut”,
and erecting a commemorative pavilion, then returned by way of
Siam and Java. The blessing or investiture given by the Chinese
fleet commander representing the emperor in China set an
important precedent, and contributed again that China was the
Middle Kingdom and that foreign regions were vassal or tributary
states. Further, while in Java, Cheng Ho and the Chinese fleet was
called upon to settle a local power struggle, which he did again
exerting the pre-eminence of China, “strengthening the idea that
China as the Middle Kingdom had the power to arbitrate disputes
involving its tributary states. Upon returning to Nanking (which had
served as capital until 1420 when it moved to Peking), Cheng Ho
built a temple to honor Tien Hou (Queen of Heaven).102
According to Peterson, Zheng He during his second voyage seemed to be
practicing hard power politics when it came to Java, but in the case of Calicut, a
softer diplomatic (but still forcefully imperialist) form of diplomacy was practiced
by Zheng He. Although by Nye’s definition of soft power, this would be closer to a
hard power action due to the coercive nature of the tribute trade system. The first
two journeys also showed a rising interest in the Ming government to reassert
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itself as the “bigger brother” of China’s neighbors and extract tribute from its de
jure vassal states under the tribute trade system. As mentioned earlier, this is the
most apparent and historically recognizable method of Chinese soft power,
gaining political power and influence through nominal “submissions” by various
rulers increased China’s prestige but also made it so that China could build
mutually beneficial trade relationships with their neighbors. However, the fact that
Zheng He personally intervened in Java’s political affairs (and as we will see in
Ceylon’s during the third voyage) shows that Zheng He was pursuing a
simultaneous hard power policy as well if it was deemed necessary. In Zheng
He’s defense, the situation in Java was a lot more important and “nearby” to
Chinese trade interests so it was necessary to have more direct action when
dealing with the Javanese. Furthermore, the past and present incidents of
Chinese diplomats being slaughtered was an insult that was too great to ignore.
In either case, Zhu Di had clearly shown that he was interested in the affairs of
China’s neighbors, and that Ming China was at least, under Zhu Di, moving away
from its agrarian based economy supported by the Confucians, and getting
closer to the eunuch supported foreign trade policy.
In 1409, Zhu Di gave the order for a third expedition to Calicut. Calicut
however, was not the most important destination of this third expedition. Ceylon
had been aggressive towards China and especially towards Zheng He during the
first expedition had been disrespected by Alagakkonara, the king of Ceylon.
Furthermore, Ceylon had been performing raids against China’s new trade
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partners and Zhu Di felt that now was a good time to begin a show of force. As
recorded in the Tailong Shilu, a primary source of the time period when Zheng
He reached Ceylon and came ashore, the forces of the king attacked them after
demanding the Chinese surrender their gold and silver. Dryer cites this passage
from the Tailong Shilu in full:
Palace official Zheng He and the others, who had gone to the barbarian
countries of the Western Ocean, returned and presented as captives the
King of Ceylon, Alagkkonora, together with his family and dependents.
Zheng, He and the others, in the course of their first embassy to the
barbarians had arrived at Ceylon, and Alagakkotona had been rude and
disrespectful and intended to kill Zheng He. Zheng He realized this and
left. Moreover, Alagakkonora was not on friendly terms with the
neighboring countries, and he had often intercepted and plundered their
embassies en route to and from China. Since the other barbarians all had
suffered from this, when Zheng He returned they once more treated
Ceylon with contempt. Because of this provocation, Alagakkonora lured
Zheng He into the interior of the country and sent his son Nayanar to
demand gold, silver, and other precious goods. If these goods were not
turned over, then 50,000 barbarian troops were to rise from concealment
and plunder Zheng He’s ships. Moreover, trees had been felled to block
the narrow passages and cut off Zheng He’s path of retreat, so that the
separate Chinese contingents could not reinforce one another.
When Zheng He and the others realized they were in danger of becoming
separated from the fleet, they pressed their troops to returned to the ships
quickly. When they reached the roadblocks, Zheng He said to his
subordinates, “The main body of the bandits has already come out, so the
interior of the country must be empty. Moreover, they are saying we are
only an invading army that is isolated and afraid and incapable of doing
anything. But if we go forth and attack them, then contrary to their
expectations we may gain their objective.” Then he secretly ordered
messengers to go by other unblocked roads back to the Chinese ships, to
order their petty officers and soldiers to hold out to the death with all their
strength. Meanwhile he personally led over two thousand troops under his
immediate command by indirect routes. They assaulted the earthen walls
of the capital by surprise and broke through, capturing Algakkonora and
his family, dependents and principal chieftains. The barbarian army then
returned and surrounded the city. Zheng He engaged them in battle
several times and heavily defeated them.
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Afterward, when Zheng He returned, the assembled Ming ministers
requested that Alagakkonora and other captives be executed. But the
emperor pitied them as ignorant people who were without knowledge of
the Mandate of Heaven; he treated them leniently and released them,
giving them food and clothing, and ordering the Ministry of Rites to advise
on selecting a worthy one from Alagakkonara’s family to be set up as king,
in order to continue the sacrifices of the kingdom of Ceylon.103
This narrative of Zheng He’s capture of Alagakkonora does confirm that at
least from the Chinese point of view, that Zheng He was not the initial aggressor
and makes Zheng He justified in his breaking of soft power policy in order to
avenge past and present wrongs upon Ceylon. However, there are some
inaccuracies in the report that may have inflated Alagakkonora’s importance in
Ceylon. To begin with, there was no unified “Kingdom of Ceylon” at this time. The
island was divided into three warring states that were participating in the civil war
in which Alagakkonora was a participant, furthermore the rulers of the cities of
Gampola and Kotte, his opponents, had a greater legitimate claim to the throne
of Ceylon. According to the Singhalese version of events, Alagakkonora
suspected that Zheng He was attempting to steal the island’s holy relic the
“sacred tooth of Buddha” and was also resisting a conquering army sent to
subjugate his kingdom.104 Barbara Peterson on the other hand seems to regard
the Singhalese as being the initial aggressor, perhaps due to a desire to plunder
Zheng He’s ships because of the massive bounty of wealth they were carrying,
but also conceding the possibility that like the Singhalese version of the story,
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they were resisting a foreign invasion.105 Fei Xin gives firsthand account of
Alagakkonora’s capture:
[But] their king, Alagakkonara was stubbornly ungrateful and formed a plot
to injure the [imperial] fleet. [Therefore] our principal envoy, the Grand
Eunuch Cheng Ho, and others secretly planned [to strike first]: they drew
up troops unobserved, and with three or four brief orders, they caused the
whole body to hasten forward, [with each man] keeping a gag over [his]
mouth. During the middle of the night, at one sound from a signal gun,
they made a furious onslaught with ardent courage and captured the king
alive. In the ninth year of Yung-lo (1411) he was taken [to China] and
presented below the imperial palace. He asked for clemency, and being
pardoned, he was allowed to return to his country. [Since then] the “four
barbarians” are all respectful.106
Regardless of whichever faction started the hostilities, both Ming and
Singhalese sources agree that Alagakkonora was taken captive and deposed by
Zheng He and Zhu Di. Zhu Di’s mercy in sparing his life was a tactical choice; it
both showed the “benevolence” of Zhu Di and also allowed him to hand pick a
member of Alagakkonora’s family as a puppet ruler. This was a standard practice
of the Chinese of the time. Unlike the later Europeans who often took a hard
power approach of directly conquering or at least bringing local nobility to heel,
the Chinese were more likely to install puppet rulers who were friendly but still
nominally independent of Chinese rule, despite their oaths of allegiance. In this
way, Zhu Di and Zheng He employed a cunning method of soft power; they were
able to maintain China’s prestige in the “submission” of the countries, while
having knowledge that they would not be able to enforce it de facto, making the
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submission of these rulers cause the nation in question to “lose face”. The
extremely profitable trade relations and wealth they gained in trading with China
certainly helped.

The Importance of Face
The capture of Alagakkonora also has parallels in Chinese perceptions of
their soft power. One of the concepts is of honor and “saving face” which was
one of the motivations for Zheng He to attack and capture Alagakkonora due to
the “disrespect” he had shown the emissaries of the dragon throne by attacking
the fleet. In this case soft power had to be forgotten for a small time but it wasn’t
completely abandoned in the event. Once Zheng He had brought Alagakkonora
before the emperor he was ceremoniously “pardoned” for his offense and was
either allowed to return to Ceylon or was exiled, depending on the sources. In
either case, Zheng He and Zhu Di were able to cause a change in government
and put a puppet ruler that was more controllable by the Ming Dynasty on the
throne of Ceylon. The action against Alagakkonora is perhaps one of the most
cited examples of opponents of the theory that Zheng He was a peaceful
explorer, such as Geoff Wade tend to use an example. At the very least it is
unsurprising that a military fleet engaged in hard power politics. Even in the lens
of soft power policy, it is plain to see that by creating a puppet ruler that the
Chinese concept and perception of soft power may be very different from the
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western concept, which agrees with Kurlantzick’s theory that in perceptions of
soft power, Beijing is more like a lion than a mouse.
This concept of “saving face” is perhaps one of the most crucial parts of
Chinese culture westerners often have trouble understanding. All cultures have
concepts regarding proper etiquette and honor especially the perceived personal
honor of a person in society’s eye. There are however, vastly complex unique
traits to the Chinese concept of “face” that have been a part of Chinese culture
for millennia. The concept of face in China has also evolved and has hardly
stayed the same, often reflecting the point of view of the current society. In The
New York Times, journalist Tom Doctoroff gives this description of the
importance of face in Chinese culture to give western readers a better
understanding of the importance of “face” in Chinese culture:
“Face — a cliché, but it’s so true — is the currency of advancement,” he
said. “It’s like a social bank account. You spend it and you save it and you
invest. And when you take away somebody’s face you take away
someone’s fundamental sense of security.” You make someone lose face
if you make them feel that they’ve given a wrong or silly answer” in a
meeting, Mr. Doctoroff said. “You need to take whatever people are
saying, whether it’s a creative idea or a strategy idea, and you need to find
that kernel of wisdom in there. Usually there is something that is relevant.
And they need to build on that. “If you end up with a Charlie Brown
situation, with the entire class ha-ha-ing, that’s a disaster, and people will
loathe you for it.”
In the same article, Saul Gitlin gives an explanation as to why when
comes to westerners, face can be doubly important to the Chinese:
“Because of China’s history of exploitation by foreign countries who
colonized China or raided China for business purposes, particularly in the
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business sphere, Chinese do not want to be seen culturally as having
been ‘had’ by Western businesspeople,” he said.
“That may sound fairly intuitive, but it is related to the very recent 200-year
history in China, up through the middle part of last century, when Western
businesspeople clearly had the upper hand commercially and politically in
China,” he explained. Today, there is a fierce concern that China must
“never go back to that inferior position during that dynastic and imperial
period, when China was exploited by imperialist Western powers.”107
As explained above, Zheng He’s motivations of saving face against
Alagakkonora is connected to a sense of both pride and shame. Zheng He under
no circumstances could allow an insult to the emperor slide, especially when
Alagakkonora was trying to raid the treasures Zheng He was bringing back to his
master i.e. the emperor’s personal property. In this understanding of face, we can
see why Zheng He had chosen the hard power option at first rather than the soft
power option. In modern times, the “century of humiliation” has been a more
recent cultural component in the concept of face as Saul Gatlin explained. Part of
China’s perception of its own power is not only to reclaim its rightful place in
history, but to never again be weak enough to be exploited by outsiders.
“Face” itself in Chinese culture also has two different “kinds” or definitions.
The first is a more ancient concept known as Mianzi “status, shame and position”
and Lian which is related to societal expectations. Aris Teon, a journalist writing
for the China Journal gives an explanation of these two concepts in a way that’s
easier for westerners to understand:
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However, the first difficulty in defining the Chinese concept of “face” is that
the Chinese language uses two different words: lian (臉/脸) and mianzi (面
子). Each of them has a distinct, though somewhat overlapping
connotation. According to Hsien Chin Hu, mianzi is the older word, dating
back to ancient literature. Lian, on the other hand, is a more recent word
whose earliest reference can be found during the Yuan Dynasty (12771367) Broadly speaking, lian means “sense of shame in relation to social
standards of morality and behavior”, while mianzi means “status, prestige,
social position”. A person may have mianzi and yet have no lian. For
example, a corrupt official who disregards social and moral standards has
no lian; however, if he has status and prestige, he has mianzi, despite
having achieved his success by immoral means.108
This understanding of face will have to be better understood by diplomats
and businesspeople dealing with China in the near future. The concept of face,
shame and rectifying these problems are a crucial component of China’s own
understanding of power either in its harder form or the softer one. As
Alagakkonora realized too late, an insult to an emissary of the emperor is not one
to be taken lightly, as in today insulting the mianzi of a Chinese CEO could very
well cause an agreement between two companies to fail for example.
There are similar issues of “face” in western societies as well. It would be
disingenuous to suggest that there is no concept of “face” when it comes to
social standards and morals and behavior in western countries. National pride in
many cases has been a motivator for foreign policy with the United States. For
example, the 1991 Gulf War with Iraq, there is a persuasive argument that the
United States was trying to save “face” due to a bad reputation in military
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success following the Vietnam War. The main difference between saving face in
East Asian societies and that of western ones is how societies are built on the
expectations of face. This concept in East Asian and especially Chinese,
Japanese and Korean society is built upon and strengthened by philosophies
such as Confucianism that gives concepts of filial piety and obedience to the civil
order a unique east Asian view of the concept of face. In Imperial China,
fatherhood was considered the paramount top of the social pyramid and this is
enforced by filial piety. Concepts of “face” and honor are deeply tied to the
Confucian mindset of just rule and filial piety. In the realm of politics, it is no
wonder that “face” is so important in Chinese foreign policy. To lose ones “face”
is to shame the greater “family” of the nation. While personal honor and pride are
significant parts of western society, the aspect of filial piety gives the Chinese
concept of face a deeper and far more personal meaning. While cultural
determination should be avoided as well as giving such “absolutes”, from
sociological point of view it is worth noting that they are unique concepts of face
in different cultures that can differ but also complement one another in different
ways.
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The Qilin and The Riches of the Middle East and Africa:
the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Voyages
In 1414 Zheng He’s men encountered an African
giraffe in Bengal, where it had been sent as a gift from
Kenya. The Bengali king agreed to send the animal
on to Beijing, where the Yongle Emperor first refused
to greet it, but in 1415, when a second giraffe arrived,
the emperor agreed to participate in a lavish
welcoming ceremony. The giraffe reminded the
Chinese of a mythical, auspicious unicorn-like animal,
the qinlin.
-Isabel Hilton
in “The Open
Empire”109
The most famous of Zheng He’s voyages were the three voyages that
brought his fleet to the Persian Gulf and Africa. These voyages were the ones
where Zheng He famously brought a giraffe, an unknown creature at the time
that was associated with the legendary creature known as the Qinlin. On 18
December 1412, after a year and a half of staying in China, Zheng He was
ordered by Zhu Di to embark on a fourth voyage. Zhu Di was still campaigning in
the north in Mongolia and busy establishing Beijing as a second imperial capital
when the fleet departed in the autumn of 1413. The fleet followed the usual
pattern of sailing to Champa, Java, Sumatra, Ceylon and Calicut but this time
Zheng He would sail farther west. Zheng He after likely visiting the islands of the
Maldives and Laccadives, made out for his final destination of Hormuz, and
island city in the Persian Gulf famed for its riches. Hormuz was a massive
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shipping port that handled trade from all over the Middle East and India and was
often a first stop for trade goods making their way to China The choice of Hormuz
was made both to establish a naval presence in the Persian Gulf in an effort to
show of the wealth and power of Ming China and in an effort to encourage trade
with distant nations.
On Zheng He’s return voyage back to China, he once again took part in a
military intervention, this time in Semudera. Sekandar, a rebel had started a
rebellion against the legitimate ruler, a young prince by the name of Zain alAbidin. Semudera was captured by Zheng He in a brief land engagement in
Sumatra. This conflict arose when Sekandar had attempted to seize the throne
for himself, claiming to be the legitimate son of the former king and thus the
young prince’s half-brother who was considered by the Ming ruler to be
legitimate. When Zheng He arrived, he showered Zain al-Abidin with gifts and
praise, thus confirming that the Ming saw Zain as the legitimate ruler. Sekander
was enraged that he was not chosen to receive these luxurious gifts and led ten
thousand soldiers against Zheng He.110 In the following battle Zheng He was
victorious against Sekander’s more numerous, but less disciplined force and
Sekander as well as his family were captured. On the return voyage to Nanjing,
Sekander was transported with Zheng He’s men to the capital where at an
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unknown time later was publicly executed in the presence of the court. Fei Xin
gives a detailed first-hand description of these events:
In the eleventh year of Yung-lo (1413), a false king, Sekander, robbed and
usurped this country. The [legitimate] king sent an envoy to the Imperial
Court to explain his case and seek relief. The emperor ordered the
principal envoy, the Grand Eunuch Cheng Ho, and others to take
command of government troops, to destroy [the usurpers], and to seize
the false king alive. In the thirteenth year of Yung-lo (1415) he was taken
[to China] and presented below the imperial palace and all the foreigners
were relegated to a state of submission.111
This intervention would be the last of Zheng He’s major military
interventions and would signal an end to his “hard power” stance during these
voyages. As with Chen Zuyi and Alagakkonora, Zheng He had interfered militarily
to establish Ming supremacy and in Chinese tradition, put a friendlier ruler on the
throne (or in this case re-establishing one of Zhu Di’s vassals as a ruler). The
fourth voyage also proved that Zheng He was willing to explore more distant
lands. Zheng He had not gone beyond Calicut in the first three voyages so the
fourth had major significance in that Zheng He was willing to truly become an
explorer rather than simply the commander of an armada keeping order.
The most important event of the fourth voyage came in the form of tribute
while Zheng He was in Bengal. A gift from Bengal’s ruler was transported with
Zheng He as a gift to the emperor: a giraffe. To the Chinese, this creature was
identified as the mythic qilin (known to the Japanese as a Kirin, which serves as
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the mascot and name for Kirin Beer).112 The giraffe had never been seen before
in China and had caused a great sensation when presented to the Ming court on
20 September 1414. The Qilin as a mythical creature was purported to only
appear in times of great peace and tranquility, and is considered to be included
as one of the four sacred animals of China, including the dragon, phoenix and
the tortoise.113 Zheng He’s Lieutenant, Yang Min, considered the giraffe brought
on to the Treasure Fleet to indeed be this mythic creature and saw it as an
auspicious sign of Zhu Di’s reign. Yang Min was sent as part of a detached fleet
to travel to China personally to present the giraffe to the emperor’s court while
Zheng He stayed in Hormuz to trade. Zhu Di was pleased by this rich and exotic
gift Such a rare and exotic creature from Africa, a creature at that time
completely unknown to the Chinese, displays the wonder and adventure of the
treasure voyages and in a mythical sense, displayed the favor that heaven had
granted on Zhu Di’s reign. A second giraffe would be brought to the court in 1415
and this time Zhu Di decided not to show his traditional humility and formally
welcomed the qilin as an auspicious sign of his divine reign.114
In 1416, Zhu Di had returned to Nanjing and was greeted by the
ambassadors of seventeen countries which had accompanied Zheng He during
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the fourth voyage.115 He had been spending more and more time at his other
capital Beijing (formally Beiping) but decided to spend the year 1416 in the old
capital of his father. The ambassadors were received with great fanfare and upon
their oaths of submission the emperor by tradition in the tribute trade system,
lavished them with expensive and exotic gifts, showing the emperor’s favor. By
autumn 1416, Zhu Di ordered Zheng He to undertake a fifth voyage to return
these ambassadors home. The fleet departed visiting the usual destinations:
Champa, Pahang, Java, Palembang, Sumatra with the fleet then making its way
to Semudera, then to Ceylon and finally making port in Zheng He’s usual base in
Calicut. After leaving Calicut (during the voyages Zheng He likely dropped off the
numerous ambassadors on the way) Zheng He once again made the journey to
Hormuz in the Persian Gulf to trade in precious rubies and other gemstones,
pearls and of course famed Persian carpets.116 Zheng He himself in his Changle
Inscription of 1431 as cited by Dryer, describes the journey to Hormuz and the
numerous gifts he received:
In the fifteenth year of Yongle (1417) we went in command of the fleet to
the Western Regions, whose country of Hormuz presented lions (shizi),
leopard (jinqianbao), and large Arabian horses (daxima), [while
the]country of Aden {Adan) presented qilin, whose foreign name is zulafa,
along with the long-horned maha animal (oryx), the country of Mogadishu
sent zebras (huafulu)as well as lions, the country of Brava (Bulawa)
presented thousand-li camels (luotuo) as well as ostriches (tuoji), and the
countries of Java and Calicut both presented miligao animals. There were
none who did not vie to present gems hidden in the mountains or
submerged in the ocean, or pearls buried in the sand or cast upon the
115
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shore, and each sent as on, paternal uncle, or younger brother of the king,
bearing a memorial of submission written on gold leaf, to court with the
tribute.117
Zheng He’s voyages to Africa, all those centuries ago, created lasting and
positive consequences and opportunities for China that continue to the present
day. Never before had the Chinese sailed so far, and Africa to this day remains a
primary trading interest of the PRC. By 1421, Zhu Di was already campaigning in
Mongolia when, three years after the end of the fifth voyage he once again was
visited by ambassadors of numerous countries. On 3 of March 1421, Zhu Di
requested that these ambassadors, after lavishing the usual gifts upon them,
were once again ordered to be returned home by the treasure fleet. The fleet set
sail in spring of 1421, beginning the shortest of the treasure voyages which is
also the voyage of which there is very little confirmable details. According to
Levathes, this voyage along with the mission of returning the ambassadors was a
voyage of pure exploration rather than one of trade and military intervention.118
The length of the journey and its dates have been of some considerable debate
among scholars. As cited by Dryer, there is mention from Gong Zhen a
contemporary and secretary of Zheng He, that Zheng He was present in China in
November of 1421 which would not have given Zheng He the required time to
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have visited all the places he was purported to visit.119 Dryer ultimately concludes
that this interpretation is hard to confirm writing;
J.J.L Duyvndek argued that Zheng He was still in China on 10 November
1421, citing Gong Zhen’s Xinyang Fanguo Zhi for an imperial edict of that
date instructing Zheng He and three other leading eunuchs had received
orders to conduct the barbarian leaders home. Even though Zheng He
could have departed shortly afterward, the voyage would have then have
taken place entirely in 1422, and that would not allow enough time for
Zheng He to personally visit all of the countries he allegedly traveled to on
the sixth voyage. Under this interpretation, he assigned squadron
commanders to finish the business of this voyage, and it is explicitly stated
for this voyage that the fleet was divided into squadrons.120
If Dryer’s interpretation was right, it would seem Zheng He may not have
visited all of these places on his journey but he may well have visited a good
number of them while returning to China. Regardless, the sixth journey remained
much smaller and less impactful than the other five treasure journey
Zheng He’s journey to Africa has a very apparent parallel in the
history of China in recent decades. One of the largest exercises in China’s soft
power has been its diplomatic and cultural influence (or in some interpretations
cultural imperialism) over Africa. As the United States begins to pull back from a
lot of international commitments in the last decade, especially in a much sharper
turn in the last year during the first year of the Trump administration.121Beijing,
following the steps of Zheng He has re-shifted a large portion of its foreign policy
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in China. A lot of this motivation has been a desire for Africa’s vast resources
while at the same time increasing Beijing’s soft power in Africa, often through
cultural exchange, sharing of wealth business contracts and in recent years even
join-military exercises.122 However the relationship with African nations may not
be as equal as perceived. Recalling the historical tribute trade system that the
Ming Dynasty practiced in Zheng He’s time, there may be in implication from
China that nation’s in Africa have a junior partner status. Writing for Fortune Mark
Esposito and Terence Tse summarizes this new relationship:
But despite the substantial investments, most of the them have been
routinely cast as detrimental to Africa’s overall competitiveness. The
projects are dependent on deals made at the highest political levels. They
lack competitive and transparent bidding processes, and most of the work
force employed at these ventures has been Chinese. Promises of job
creation have not been fulfilled. Further, when Africans are hired, local
rules and regulations are often flouted, leading at times to poor safety. For
instance, at Chinese-run mines in Zambia’s copper belt, employees must
work for two years before they get safety helmets. Ventilation below
ground is poor, and deadly accidents occur almost on a daily basis. More
frequently, jobs are lost to Chinese employees, who are ferried in project
by project. For example, the growing Chinese presence in South Africa
may have cost the country 75,000 jobs from 2000 to 2011. In Nigeria, the
influx of low-priced Chinese textile goods has caused 80% of Nigerian
companies in this industry to close. Africans’ impression of Chinese firms
could also be shaped by illegal practices carried out by them. For
example, by law, mining on small plots of 25 acres or less is restricted to
Ghanaian nationals. However, many Chinese continue to explore for gold
in conjunction with local landowners, even though regulations have made
it clear that such practice is illegal. The result: Many Africans see
themselves to be exploited by the newcomers.123
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There is perhaps, a sense of historical irony here. Since China has lost
face historically and was forced into a series of unequal treaties in the aftermath
of the Opium Wars and the Boxer Uprising, it would seem that the reverse is
happening in the case of China and Africa. While many countries like Kenya
have eagerly accepted Beijing’s economic development, Africa has also been
exploited by foreign powers and it is understandable that many would see their
relationship with China as one-sided. Beijing however for its part, has been quick
to deny any exploitation. There is also some truth to China’s defense in not
following in the footsteps of European colonialism. In the Harvard Political
Review, Elizabeth Manero gives some justification to China’s actions in Africa in
regard to accusations of neo-colonialism:
Despite criticisms of colonialism, this relationship has provided Africa with
significant benefits. China, for its part, has gone out of its away to deny
claims of colonial abuses. Wang Yi, China’s Foreign Minister, insisted in a
2015 tour of Kenya, that “[China] absolutely will not take the old path of
Western colonists, and we absolutely will not sacrifice Africa’s ecological
environment and long-term interests.” Indeed, this relationship is not as
black and white as it may first seem. Dirk Willem de Vilde, a Senior
Research Fellow and head of International Economic Development at the
Overseas Development Institute (ODI), told the HPR that “on all the
infrastructure indicators, African countries are way behind compared to
other countries. There is a huge infrastructure gap that is holding back
development in many African countries at the moment.”
In an attempt to rectify this, numerous infrastructure programs funded by
Chinese developmental assistance have created much needed roads,
bridges, railways, schools, and hospitals that are beginning to bridge this
gap. Chinese doctors played an important role in addressing the Ebola
outbreak in 2015, and, despite criticisms of exploitative labor treatment,
the Chinese saved mines that had been deteriorating under previous
investors, which expanded facilities, rescued jobs, and created thousands
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of new ones. Beyond this, there has been significant investment in
services and manufacturing as well.124
As for Beijing’s own arguments for its efforts in Africa, a white paper published by
the PRC state council in 2010 lays out clearly what Beijing’s views on its efforts
in Africa are:
During their years of development, China and Africa give full play to the
complementary advantages in each other's resources and economic
structures, abiding by the principles of equality, effectiveness, mutual
benefit and reciprocity, and mutual development, and keep enhancing
economic and trade cooperation to achieve mutual benefit and progress.
Practice proves that China-Africa economic and trade cooperation serves
the common interests of the two sides, helps Africa to reach the UN
Millennium Development Goals, and boosts common prosperity and
progress for China and Africa.125
From Beijing’s point of view, Beijing is merely cooperating in a mutual trade
partnership and denies any accusations of colonialism in Africa. Of course,
accusations of actual traditional colonialism are hard to prove and, in most cases,
would be a gross exaggeration. In the case of Africa, a continent that like China,
has felt the sting of colonialism in its past, it is perhaps very understandable why
some African nations would be weary and suspicious of both Washington and
Beijing’s diplomacy in the area. It is clear that Beijing’s relationship to Africa can’t
be so easily put into black and white categories as Esponito claims Africa on the
other hand, can hardly be considered an equal partner in terms of the power
dynamic between the two countries. China’s government may be helping out
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Africa on an economic basis, but there is no guarantee that Beijing will keep the
relationship equal. Now with the PRC military operating in numerous African
countries, we can now see a brand-new fleet journeying to Africa much like the
Grand Eunuch himself. China scholars and political scientists would do well to
focus their attention on Beijing’s relationship to Africa and the upcoming future
decades will tell if the PRC has learned from its experiences also as a previously
exploited nation or if the PRC will become a neo-colonial force.

The Death of Zhu Di and the Final Voyage
On August 12, 1424, a serious blow to Zheng He’s fortunes and that of the
eunuchs occurred: Zhu Di, the Yongle Emperor “grew ill and died. Zhu Di was on
the way to Beijing to start a new campaign in Mongolia when he died and for the
eunuchs, losing their benefactor was a serious blow. The new Emperor Zhu
Gaochi was enthroned in September of 1424. According to the Renzong Shilu
the annals of the third emperor of the Ming Dynasty, Zhu Gaochi (1378-1425)
restored the disgraced Confucian ministers and released from captivity all the
scholars he had imprisoned and the Confucians once again controlled the
court.126 One of the scholars released, Xia Yuanji, was reinstated as finance
minister for the new Emperor and persuaded Zhu Gaochi to end the treasure
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voyages, according to the Renzong Shilu.127 Zhu Gaochi’s main interest was
decreasing the tax burden on his subjects and promoting the more isolationist
stances of the founder of the Ming, Zhu Yuanzhong, his grandfather. These
policies would fit in more with the plans of reverting back to the agricultural
economy of Zhu Gaochi’s grandfather, and which had largely been promoted by
the Confucian officials since the reign of the first Ming Emperor.
Zheng He however, was not as seriously affected by these changes in
policy, unlike his eunuch colleagues. Zhu Gaochi had given Zheng He the role of
commander of Nanjing’s military defenses, a very prestigious position in the Ming
hierarchy. This relaxing life in his twilight years was not to last forever, on May
29, 1425, Zhu Gaochi succumbed to an illness he had been suffering from for
several months and died, leaving his son Zhu Zhanji (1399-1435) as his
successor. Zhu Zhanji assumed the throne upon his father’s death in 1425 and
took the Dragon Throne under the reign name of Xuande. Zhu Zhanji’s
personality could be described as a mix of his grandfather and father, favoring a
balance between the eunuchs and Confucians in terms of influence in the court.
Once the greatest and staunchest opponents of the Treasure Fleet, Xia Yuanji
died in 1430 and Zhu Zhanji started showing interest in making a seventh and
final voyage for the Treasure Fleet, which had remained unused for quite some
time. It was clear by 1430, the tribute trade between China and its neighbors had
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been decreasing the international prestige of the Ming Dynasty. To combat this
image, Zhu Zhanji had ordered a new expedition to begin a brand new soft power
campaign of regaining the recognition from other nations that China had lost.
Levathes records that on the 29th of June 1430, Zhu Zhanji had issued an edict
naming Zheng He the commander of a new fleet to improve the deteriorating
relations China was experiencing with the nations of southeast Asia and the
Indian Ocean.128
This new Treasure Fleet would be the largest of the assembled fleets of
the treasure voyages, over 100 ships with 27,500 men in total for the entire
expedition.129 The fleet also had a secondary mission objective of solving a
diplomatic crisis between the king of Siam and Malacca, with Zheng He given a
written letter from the emperor demanding the king of Siam cease all aggression
towards Malacca. Once again, the main destination for the fleet was Calicut and
this would be the final voyage of Zheng He where either in Calicut or on his
return journey he would die in 1433. When the fleet set sail, Zheng He now in his
sixties, wished to document all of his accomplishments for future explorers and
commissioned a stone tablet in Changle, which detailed all of his
accomplishments, and remains one of the most important primary sources
regarding Zheng He’s life.
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On 19 of January 1431, the fleet set out from China beginning the last of
the great treasure voyages. The fleet stayed in China proper for a few months,
gathering supplies and did not fully depart until 1432, a year later. The fleet in
this final journey visited Java, Palembang, Malacca, Semudera, Ceylon and
finally arrived in Calicut in December 1432. Here Zheng He remained while
smaller squadrons were sent to the Middle East and Persia under the command
of Hong Bao, one of the eunuchs accompanying Zheng He. The detached fleets
were said to have traded for Arab medical texts and medicine which the Chinese
had begun to take a keen interest in and the Arabs were renowned for at this
time for having made great successes in the field of medicine. These and other
precious trade items such as aloe were traded in exchange for the famed Ming
porcelain, Jade and other items from China which the Middle Eastern nations
were hungry for.
Zheng He, however, back in Calicut was facing increasingly ailing health
at his age of sixty-two. As cited by Levathes, Ma Huan was sent by Zheng He as
an emissary to Mecca and gave a description of the Muslim holy city while
there130 According to Levathes, Zheng He’s health waned and he likely died in
1432 on the return Journey and was buried at sea.131 Barbara Peterson argues
that Zheng He may have died a bit earlier while he was still in Calicut. 132
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Regardless, with Zheng He’s death the support for funding of such extravagant
projects ceased as the Confucians gained more power, and considered such
journeys to be an extravagant waste. While trade would continue between China
and foreign nations for some time, this was the end of the treasure voyages and
Ming naval superiority would crumble in later decades. The legacy of Zheng He
would live on for some time and in the late 20th and early 21st century, official
Chinese views have changed from him from being considered an example of
early Ming waste and extravagance on the part of the eunuchs, to being
rehabilitated historically as China’s Magellan or Columbus. It did take a long time
however for Zheng He to be recognized and rehabilitated as noted by Yang Wei,
who also notes that the Confucian scholar officials had burned Zheng He’s logs
to discourage any future expeditions.133

Soft Power and the Legacy of Zheng He
While a more thorough examination of Zheng He and the Confucius
Institute’s motivations will be examined in Chapter 5, it will be important to end
this narrative on Zheng He’s life briefly with the impact his legacy had on
Beijing’s present day soft power policies. While his contemporaries in the 15 th
Century sought to suppress knowledge of Zheng He and his adventures,
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scholars in the PRC and in western nations have begun to take a keen interest in
his actions. Zheng He indeed had a very hard power and militaristic nature to his
treasure voyages, but was the military nature of the fleet the primary motivation
for Zheng He’s travels? The three major hard power interventions of the fleet
were in Palembang, Ceylon and Semedura. These do stand out as stark contrast
to the accepted narrative today popular amongst PRC scholars which usually
contend that Zheng He’s voyages were of a peaceful soft power nature. There is
a lot of evidence however to support the point of view of most scholars of this
subject, that view being these were mostly peaceful soft power missions with
trade and recognition of Chinese suzerainty as its main goals. With the exception
of the three examples above and the pirate suppression campaign of the first
journey, Zheng He and his men engaged in relatively little fighting for a giant war
armada and certainly spent more time trading than fighting. The nature of the
tribute trade system, with foreign rulers making token gestures of submission,
while in reality not losing any of their power de facto fits in with Chinese policy at
the time which was not very expansionist, preferring to have client states and
puppet rulers as opposed to the colonial ambitions of European powers. China’s
soft power during the Ming indeed increased with nations stretching from
southeast Asia all the way to the Persian Gulf and Arabian Peninsula recognizing
Chinese influence and the power of the Ming emperors.
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Zheng He’s legacy also has an important part to play in the PRC’s modern
day soft power policies. As explained by James L. Holmes, the PRC’s new
interest in developing sea power. Holmes writes:
How China’s leadership uses the Ming legacy says much about what it
hopes to accomplish at sea in coming years. Economic development
drives this quest for sea power. Chinese industry’s demand for reliable
seaborne shipments of fuel and other commodities has beckoned Beijing’s
attentions and energies to the waters plied by Zheng’s fleet six centuries
ago. Assuring free passage throughout the sea lines of communication
linking the Persian Gulf region and the Horn of Africa with Chinese
seaports has been a matter of surpassing importance. Indeed, Chinese
leaders have come to believe the survival of communist rule depends on
economic development and the comforts it brings a potentially restive
populace.134
Zheng He has therefore become a symbol of a new China, eager to
increase its soft power and trade amongst the nations of the world. After the
“century of humiliation” in the 19th century the PRC has had reason to look to its
past as Beijing re-asserts its “rightful place” on the world stage. Zheng He serves
as a convenient symbol for Beijing to rally around, showing that China was a sea
power long before their European counterparts and if it were not for the
interference of government officials in the Ming Dynasty, Ming China may have
become a Maritime Empire in its own right. As China re-asserts itself on the
world stage, Zheng He may be the beacon that the PRC needs from its own
history to light the way into a multi-polar world and serve as a symbol of China’s
proud maritime history often forgotten until recently. Zheng He may have lost his
influence in the years after his life but today he remains a strong and iconic figure
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in Chinese history and as a symbol of the Ming Dynasty’s early soft power efforts
in the Indian Ocean and beyond.
There is also an importance in tying Ming glory to China’s soft power
which Zheng He’s story is a crucial part of. Ming glory also has a relation to the
concept of Han chauvinism or ethnocentrism in favor of the Han people. As
mentioned earlier in regard to the first Ming ruler Zhu Yuanzhang, the first
emperor was lionized as a “vanquisher of alien culture.”135 The racial component
of the 1911 revolution against the Manchu rulers of the Qing Dynasty was a
useful rallying cry for the mostly Han revolutionaries. Zheng He’s story can also
be used in similar ways to that of Zhu Yuanzhang. Under the context of the
tribute trade system, Zheng He was seen by his contemporaries as fulfilling
China’s role as the “Middle Kingdom” and proving the superiority of Ming
(therefore Han) culture to the “barbarian” nations. This was often accomplished
through the giving of gifts to foreign envoys and using displays of power such as
the treasure fleet to show off the Ming Dynasty’s power to its vassal states. Such
displays are used in Chinese soft power projection today as journalist Lorand C.
Laskai has observed. The expensive and dazzling displays during the 2008
summer Olympics and the 2010 Shanghai expo show that the concept of glory
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and using that concept to impress foreign visitors is a crucial part of Chinese soft
power.136
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CHAPTER THREE
THE CONFUCIUS INSTITIUTE: SOFT POWER IN THE
CLASSROOM

The Confucius Institute is a non-profit educational organization that is
overseen by the People’s Republic of China’s Ministry of Education. The
Confucius Institute promotes Chinese language and cultural exchange and
focuses primarily on students in universities. Along with my argument made in
the previous chapters regarding historical use of Chinese soft power in the
person Zheng He, I also want to propose an additional argument: that the
Confucius Institute is the vehicle for one of the most effective uses of soft power
used by the PRC today. The Confucius Institute claims to be solely a nonprofit
educational organization free from government interference.137 However there
has been some considerable controversy regarding just how much control the
PRC government actually has over it. Serious complaints have been leveled that
the Confucius Institute stifles academic freedom.138
The Confucius Institute was founded in 2004 under the Office of the
Chinese Language International. It originally opened in 2004 in Seoul, South
Korea.139 and as of 2015 there were 450 Confucius Institutes operating in 120
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countries. In the United States there are approximately 100 Confucius Institutes
as well as 650 so-called “Confucius Classrooms” that usually operate in K-12
schools.140 Judging from the size and reach of The Confucius Institute it can be
said that this organization has enjoyed a significant amount of success. The
Confucius Institute has been compared to Goethe Institute in Germany, Alliance
Francaise in France and Italy’s Societa Dante Alighieri who are also teaching
institutions that have a focus on language and culture. The criticisms of the
Confucius Institute however, come from complaints regarding the integrity of
academic freedom. These accusations often stem from the fact that the
Confucius Institute operates not only in foreign universities, but their teaching
material is also supplied by Hanban, the Office of the Chinese Language
International who are sitting members of the policy making committee of the CCP
or Politburo.141 The main complaint about these teaching materials is that they
do not challenge the PRC’s view of the “One-China” policy. Additionally, it is
considered by some critics such as Marshall Sahlins at the University of Chicago
to be part and parcel of the PRC’s soft power policies.
The soft power capabilities of the Confucius Institute are indeed
formidable. While there has been some considerable backlash in universities in
the US, Europe and Australia, the Confucius Institute has had much more
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success in pursuing its soft power aims in developing nations in Africa. The PRC
itself has sunk a lot of money into its Africa policy and the spread of Chinese
language proficiency in countries such as Kenya shows that the Confucius
Institute has been very successful in teaching Mandarin and Chinese culture in
these countries. The Confucius Institute has had less success in Australia in
spite of Australia being a huge part of China’s soft power aims, and especially in
light of its geographic proximity. It is also true that there is no shortage of
criticism against an organization that is seen by its critics as a tool of the PRC
state apparatus.
So, is the Confucius Institute merely a teaching and cultural exchange
organization as Hanban claims? Or is it a soft power method used by the PRC to
spread influence in foreign countries to promote a view of China that’s favorable
to the PRC’s views, being one of the many components of China’s “charm
offensive”? If the latter is true, would this also be an example of the PRC using a
type of soft power which Joseph Nye has defined as co-optive power? Co-optive
power as defined by Nye is a soft power method that uses the attractiveness of
one’s culture as a method for a country to accomplish its goals.142 There is
certainly evidence that the PRC has used co-optive power before, especially in
its efforts of building infrastructure in Africa. Conversely, is there evidence that
the Confucius Institute is what it claims to be? Is the criticism used against it
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merely a symptom of rival nations in the west, especially the United States, using
a backlash against Chinese influence due to fears of being overtaken by China’s
rising influence in the world? What about worries that the Confucius Institute is a
threat to academic freedom in the Universities it’s embedded in?
In order to understand these questions, it would be useful first to take a
look at how the Confucius Institute has wielded its soft power by examining its
efforts and activities throughout the world.

Confucius Institute: Policies, Goals, Academic Freedom and the
Wielding of Co-optive Soft Power
The teaching component of the local
Confucius Institute is often
complemented by academic programs
such as guest lectures and scholarly
conferences on China. Considering that
the political constraints in effect on
public discussions of certain topics in
China are usually followed in Confucius
Institutes-no talking of Taiwan
independence, the status of Taiwan, the
fourth of June 1989 at Tiananmen
Square, Falun Gong, universal human
rights, etc.-these academics are largely
consistent with the “cultural activities” of
CIs, insofar as they likewise present a
picture of a peaceful, harmonious, and
attractive People’s Republic.
-Marshall Sahlins in “Academic
Malware”143
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According to Hanban’s official website, the official purpose of the
Confucius Institute is described thusly: “Hanban/Confucius Institute
Headquarters, as a public institution affiliated with the Chinese Ministry of
Education, is committed to providing Chinese language and cultural teaching
resources and services worldwide. It goes all out in meeting the demands of
foreign Chinese learners and contributing to the development of multiculturalism
and the building of a harmonious world.”144 In this context it would seem that at
least officially, the Confucius Institute is modeling itself on similar language and
cultural exchange institutions like Alliance Francaise. Cultural exchanges in the
context of the Confucian Institute policy would be events like classes on making
dumplings and cultural festivals that are used as opportunities to teach about
Chinese culture such as the Chinese New Year. These so called
“culturetainments” as titled by Lionel M. Jensen have had a big impact on
promoting Chinese culture that falls in line with the image of China that Beijing
wants to project.145 According to Sahlins, however, there is one worrisome
aspect of this: the plans of the Confucius Institute must be submitted to Beijing
for approval and the Confucius Institute that doesn’t do so is liable to be taken to
court for sponsoring an event that Beijing has not approved.146 So while The
Confucius Institute claims to be doing its service in the name of vague “Foreign

“About us”, Hanban, accessed Jan.15, 2017,
http://english.hanban.org/node_7719.htm
145 Timothy B. Weston and Lionel M. Jensen, China in and Beyond the
Headlines, (Plymouth, UK: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2012,) 295.
146 Sahlins, Academic Malware, 3.
144

112

Chinese Learners”, Beijing clearly has the final say on what these interests will
be. This point however, has been contested by the Confucius Institute itself.
Directors of the Confucius Institute deny that they take orders from Beijing and
that Hanban has in no way had its policies shaped by the PRC’s politburo
according to the directors of the Confucius Institute.147
Another component of the Confucius Institute and arguably its most
important and successful, is its language program. Designed to teach foreign
students to speak Mandarin and learn to write in simplified Chinese characters.
There have been significant measures of success in these efforts in African
nations, for example in Kenya there is an increasingly large number of Mandarin
speakers arising in the student population and Mandarin is starting to overtake
English as the primary spoken foreign language in Kenya and is now part of the
nation’s school curriculum.148 In Cambodia, over 100 teachers of the Mandarin
language have been sent to Cambodia with Cambodia’s government requesting
more teachers due to increased demand as Chinese language proficiency
increases in the nation.149 These are just two of many examples that show that
Mandarin language instruction has been very successful not only in western
universities, but in developing nations as well, especially in nations that the PRC
may have a geopolitical interest in.
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On the part of the Confucius Institute, there is a considerable effort to
promote scholarships in Chinese language learning for foreign students in China.
The State Council of the PRC published the recruitment procedures of the
Confucius Institute in 2014, which shows that as part of Confucius Institute
policy, non-Chinese citizens are given the opportunity to study in China, paid for
by the Confucius Institute. These are the recruitment procedures and eligibility
criteria published in this paper:
For the purpose of supporting the development of Confucius Institutes,
facilitating international promotion of Chinese language and dissemination
of Chinese culture, as well as cultivating qualified Chinese-language
teachers and excellent Chinese-language learners, Confucius Institute
Headquarters/Hanban (hereinafter referred to as Hanban) launches a
“Confucius Institute Scholarship” program to sponsor foreign students,
scholars and Chinese language teachers to study Chinese in relevant
universities of China (hereinafter referred to as “Host Institutes”).
Category of Scholarship and Eligibility Criteria
The scholarship of 2014 is divided into 5 categories:
1. Scholarship for Students of Master’s Degree in Teaching Chinese to
Speakers of Other Languages (MTCSOL),
2. Scholarship for Students of One-Academic-Year + MTCSOL,
3. Scholarship for Students of Bachelor’s Degree in Teaching Chinese to
Speakers of Other Languages (BTCSOL),
4. Scholarship for One-Academic-Year Students,
5. Scholarship for One-Semester Students.
Applicants shall be non-Chinese citizens in good health, aged between 16
and 35 (Chinese language teachers in post shall be aged below 45, and
applicants for BTCSOL scholarship should be aged below 20).150
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The Confucius Institute reaching out to students of the Chinese language
serves China’s soft power interests in two ways. Primarily it allows the Confucius
Institute to have a pool of potential recruits into its organization. Students who
were given a scholarship by the Confucius Institute may find themselves
interested in continuing their association with the Confucius Institute in the form
of employment. This gives China considerable soft power as its point of view on
the nuances of the Chinese language will be the dominant one in the minds of
these students. A secondary advantage is that China will appear to be a
benevolent power interested in sharing its culture to the world which helps the
PRC’s worldwide legitimacy be respected. This fits neatly into the PRC’s efforts
to charm the world through soft power and gain legitimacy through the
international community.
So, do these goals and policies of the Confucius Institute represent the
wielding of co-opitive soft power as defined by Nye? Nye separates hard and soft
power through the definitions of command power and co-opitive power, or
coercion and charm, respectively. In his definition Nye writes,
Hard and soft power are related because they are both aspects of the
ability to achieve one’s purpose by affecting the behavior of others. The
distinction between them is one of degree, both in the nature of the
behavior and in the tangibility of the resources. Command power - the
ability to change what others do - can rest on coercion or inducement. Cooptive power - the ability to shape what others want - can rest on the
attractiveness of one’s culture and values or the ability to manipulate the
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agenda of political choices in a manner that makes others fail to express
some preferences because they seem too unrealistic.151
Does the Confucius Institute fit Nye’s definition of soft power then?
Certainty, the PRC government and the Confucius Institute’s efforts in Africa and
South-East Asia have had a remarkable amount of success using a “charm
offensive” to make Chinese culture and language appealing to students and
educators alike. The wielding of soft power in western universities has also had
noteworthy and significant successes. At the University of Massachusetts
Boston, the Confucius Institute that is associated with the University held
celebrations for the Chinese New Year (Year of the Rooster) in 2017 on February
8th. Over 400 students and faculty attended.152 Such an enormous turn-out
promoting cultural activities gives credence to the idea that the Confucius
Institute is a useful tool in promoting an image of China that is peaceful and
welcoming, and one that also strictly follows the Chinese Communist Party’s view
of how China should appear to the world. A lot of the focus on what constitutes
as “Chinese culture” as promoted by the Confucius Institute are topics that could
be considered “safe” in the eyes of the PRC government. Examples such as
Chinese New Year celebrations, cooking classes and teaching state approved
forms of Chinese writing, such as simplified characters (as opposed to the more
complex traditional characters as Taiwan uses) are an easy way for China to
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promote itself abroad while not interfering with the PRC’s orthodoxy at home. A
common criticism of the Confucius Institute is its avoidance of topics that would
be considered ideologically “dangerous”.
A common saying is knowledge is power, therefore the suppression of
certain kinds of information can lead to increased power to those who wish to
control a narrative. As described in college professor and Confucius Institute
critic Marshall Sahlin’s Academic Malware, Liu Yunshan minister of Propaganda
and first ranked Politburo member, wrote a speech on September 7, 2010 as
reported in The People’s Daily saying: “Make sure that all cultural backgrounds,
cultural products, and cultural activities reflect and conform to the socialist core
values and requirements.”153 The accusations of suppression of academic
freedom in the universities of such countries as the United States and Australia
come from these kind of directions from the PRC government.
The Confucius Institute uses co-optive soft power to present a sanitized
image of the People’s Republic of China that conforms to views as expressed by
Liu. Therefore, topics such as the occupation of Tibet, the 1989 Tiananmen
Square incident and the legal status of Taiwan are subjects that are forbidden by
the Confucius Institute. Problems that arise from this approach come from
western universities whose efforts to promote academic freedom can collide with
this policy. For example, if Taiwanese students were studying in an American
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university and espoused views on Taiwanese independence in his or her
academic work, they might end up butting heads with their university Confucius
Institute or in some cases professors who are either Confucius Institute members
or associated with them or in some cases, simply sympathetic.
An example of a situation like what was described above occurred in 2009.
According to Sahlins, Bloomberg reported that a scheduled visit of the Dalai
Lama was cancelled at North Carolina State University. Writing on the subject,
Sahlins reports:
A scheduled 2009 visit of the Dalai Lama was cancelled by the interim
Chancellor of North Carolina State University, Jim Woodward, ostensibly
because there had been insufficient time to prepare for such an august
guest. The director of the NC State Confucius Institute, Bailian Li, a
forestry professor, got involved after the cancellation, he said, as a
warning for the future-telling the provost that a visit by the Dalai Lama
could disrupt “some strong relationships we were developing with
China.154
This is a clear case where academic freedom can easily be challenged. All of
the students of the University were denied their chance to hear a university guest
make a speech, and who was subsequently no-platformed by those who did not
wish the Dalai Lama to come to campus. The ominous “warning” which could be
seen as a threat by Dr. Bailian Li, shows evidence that not only is the Confucius
Institute willing to enforce its political views on its employees, but is also willing to
use soft power in the form of protest against speakers and policies it does not
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agree with. There is also a coercive hard power element in these forms of
protests. The Institute threatening its continued relationship with the university,
especially with the implied threat of withholding funds is similar to sanctions
which under Nye’s definition of power leans towards the harder side of the power
spectrum.155
This is certainly not the only case where a Confucius Institute has used its
influence in an American university to protest academic policies they have
objections to. As reported by Bloomberg on November 2, 2011, The Confucius
Institute gave an offer to Stanford University of $4 million to help host a
Confucius Institute at Stanford. There was only one caveat: No talking about
issues such as Tibet. Stanford, however, refused citing academic freedom and
the Confucius Institute decided to back down according to Daniel Golden.
Stanford in this case, managed to preserve its commitment to academic freedom.
But the fact that the Confucius Institute was bold enough to ask Stanford to
violate its commitment to academic freedom shows a trend that the Confucius
Institute is willing to assert its position the universities they are associated with
strongly. There is a legitimate fear that these efforts are compromising the
academic principles of the university system.
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The Backlash Against the Confucius Institutes and
The Hegemony of Academic Narratives
“Universities should cease their involvement in
Confucius Institutes unless the agreement
between the University and Hanban is
renegotiated so that (1) the university has
unilateral control over all academic matters,
including recruitment of teachers,
determination of the curriculum, and choice of
texts; (2) the university affords Confucius
Institute teachers the same academic freedom
rights…that it affords all other faculty in the
university; and (3) the university-Hanban
agreement is made available to all members of
the university community.”156
-Statement by the
American
Association of
University
Professors, June
2014157
Predictably, the backlash against the Confucius Institute, especially when
it is concerned with matters of academic freedom has been loud and clear. The
most famous example would be in April 2014, when the University of Chicago
disassociated itself with its Confucius Institute and refused to renew its contract.
Dr. Marshall Sahlins who has led the charge in criticism against the Confucius
Institute is a tenured professor there. He reveals in Academic Malware how
worrisome and underhanded the establishment of the Confucius Institute at the
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University of Chicago was. According to Sahlins, the Asian Studies faculty was
not even aware of the opening of the Confucius Institute on campus until some
faculty members read a newspaper article announcing it.158 Sahlins claims that
an expat professor Dali Lang was the impetus for getting the Confucius Institute
established. Sahlins claims the Council of the Faculty Senate was not allowed to
vote on the establishment of the Confucius Institute at the University of Chicago
in 2009 nor on its renewal in 2014.159 Also in 2014, a petition signed by 110
senior faculty members was also blocked by the board of directors, although this
petition eventually became vital in convincing the University to cut its ties with the
Confucius Institute in 2014.160 The University of Chicago after these events
became sort of a rallying symbol in 2014 for universities to heavily criticize the
establishment of the Confucius Institute in American universities.
While the Confucius Institute has been portraying itself as a legitimate
cultural exchange and teaching organization, there is considerable evidence of
events such as at the University of Chicago that not all universities are willing to
accept this definition. Indeed, a lot of universities in the United States including
such prestigious names as UC Berkley, Cornell, Harvard and UC San Diego
have refused to host the Confucius Institute on their campuses.161 The soft power
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aims of the Confucius Institute have not gone unnoticed by critics who also point
out the irony of using the philosopher Confucius’s name, pointing out that
Confucius was reviled historically during Mao’s regime. Back in 2009, an article
in The Economist stated the irony of using Confucius’s name, stating,
China's decision to rely on Confucius as the standard-bearer of its
soft-power projection is an admission that communism lacks pulling
power. Long gone are the days when Chairman Mao was idolized
by radicals (and even respected by some mainstream academics)
on American university campuses. Mao vilified Confucius as a
symbol of the backward conservatism of pre-communist China.
Now the philosopher, who lived in the 6th century BC, has been
recast as a promoter of peace and harmony: just the way President
Hu Jintao wants to be seen. Li Changchun, a party boss, described
the Confucius Institutes as “an important part of China's overseas
propaganda set-up.162
As described in this article in The Economist, there is a certain irony in
using Confucius’s name to promote a government that once despised him as
being a symbol of “feudal” oppression in the Marxist understanding of the word.
Of even more interest, is Li Changchun’s admission that the Confucius Institute is
a part of the PRC’s soft power efforts and shows that its very intentions are soft
power oriented, and more importantly not afraid of throwing its weight around. Of
course, the irony of using the name of Confucius can be explained logically from
a soft power standpoint. Confucius is a name that has a lot of recognition in the
west. It also gives Hanban the image of an educational organization by
promoting one of the biggest advocates of education in China’s history. Name
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brand recognition, coupled with a famous proponent of education who is well
known worldwide as one of the greatest philosophers in history, Hanban has
given itself the perfect mascot. It would be hard after all, to promote a cultural
educational organization called the “Mao Institute” or “Deng Xiaoping Institute” in
North America and opting for a more familiar name such as the ancient sage is
understandable from a business point of view.
The Taiwan Academy is perceived to be Taiwan’s answer to the
Confucius Institute and also as Taiwan copying the PRC’s soft power strategy.
According to the Taiwan Academy’s website, the aims of the Taiwan academy
are: Establishing a Taiwan Academy digital information integration platform to
serve the global internet users, promoting Mandarin Chinese instruction and
traditional Chinese characters, invigorating the research of Taiwan Studies and
Sinology and disseminating the results, managing scholarship programs
introducing Taiwan’s diverse and exquisite culture to the world and finally.
Establishing worldwide agencies and resource centers.163 The most important of
these points would be introducing Taiwan as a separate and unique culture. This
is a threat to Beijing’s perception of its own sovereignty as part of the “One China
Policy” and in terms of saving face, constitutes a threat to the PRC’s Maizan or
its social position. Several professors have had their academic freedom
threatened in western universities for teaching a view of Tawian that promotes
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the small island nation as a separate political and cultural entity. In Australia, as
reported by The Australian there has been a recent example of a lecturer being
forced to apologize for teaching this point of view:
A University of Newcastle academic has been targeted by Chinese
international students over teaching material which reportedly suggested
Taiwan and Hong Kong were separate countries. The incident comes just
days after a University of Sydney IT lecturer was been forced to issue a
public apology after international students were outraged by his use of a
map showing Chinese claimed territory as part of India. Now, High
Commissioner of India to Australia Dr. Ajay M. Gondane has come
forward to urge universities to protect the right to freedom of expression in
the wake of the map incident. The reported incident at the University of
Newcastle is the fourth prominent case since May where academic staff or
Australian universities have been targeted and their actions or teaching
material attacked on Chinese social media. Earlier this month, an
Australian National University lecturer said he had made a “poor decision”
after translating a warning about cheating into Mandarin.164
A university lecturer being forced to apologize after exercising an
academic right to teach material without political restraint is an interesting
example to use, especially in this case due to the influence that both the PRC’s
social media and the international students from China had. This is not very
surprising considering the important relationship the PRC and Australia have.
Chinese international students are a huge tuition component of Australian
universities. This has caused some serious issues regarding Chinese nationalism
clashing with academic freedom. Many of these students are full-paid tuition
students of these respective universities, this gives said students a large amount
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of sway over University policy. Australian universities coming from a sense of
self-preservation are quick to side with student demands in cases such as these.
If these students protest and raise enough of a fuss, its better in the eyes of
many university administrations to bow to pressure and acquiesce to these
demands. Students in this case are certainly using a mix of soft power and hard
power in this instance. The students use charm and persuasion in the form of
protest to make themselves heard. If that fails, the coercive nature of these
protests may give them what they want as a hard power strategy. The position of
the universities is understandable, since tuition income for the university itself is
threatened and many Australian universities don’t have the luxury of alienating
parts of the student body, lest international students boycott the school which can
threaten the entire budget. The New York Times reported on the rise of this
phenomena:
MELBOURNE, Australia — It was a routine quiz in a university business
class in Australia, but the answer to one of the questions was a surprise:
Chinese officials are truthful only when careless or drunk. Gao Song, a
student from China at Monash University in Melbourne, was so upset that
he condemned it online. His post created a stir back in China, where it
was quoted in the local news media. The Chinese Consulate in Melbourne
contacted him requesting regular updates. Global Times, an influential
state-run newspaper in China, asked him to write articles about the
incident. Under pressure, the university judged the question to be
inappropriate, and it suspended the professor. “As China is becoming
more and more powerful, we have strong backing even when we’re
overseas,” said Mr. Gao, 24. “When others find faults with China, we can
stand up to them and tell them we Chinese are great. “Like their
counterparts in the United States, Australia’s universities have opened
their doors to well-heeled Chinese students as a source of much-needed
tuition revenue. But as the number of Chinese students has grown, so has
the willingness of some like Mr. Gao to speak out against what they see
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as slights against China, and to push back at offending classes and
instructors.165
This phenomena in itself is an example of soft power, especially in China’s
perception of its own soft power. The PRC is more than aware of the influence it
can have on social media. The PRC is also more than aware of the importance
that is placed on the relationship between the two nations. It also gives the PRC
an aura of plausible deniability, the PRC could claim after all that this just the
view of the students and not the government and that any pressure exerted from
China itself is wrapped in the veneer of protecting the academic rights of its
citizens abroad. The clash between nationalism and academic freedom also
shows the amount of power nationalism has in shaping the discourse between
students and professors. A view of China that is promoted by the PRC has a lot
of problematic issues if they were being regarded by a lecturer of Taiwanese
descent for example. Should said lecturer’s rights to teach his or her class the
way the teacher wants to be considered less important than that of a student
from Beijing or Shanghai objecting to this point of view? The threat to academic
freedom is something that if ignored can have serious consequences for a
university’s integrity down the road and should not be ignored.
The Taiwan Academy claims not to either compete or cooperate with
Hanban, the promotion of traditional Chinese characters in language instruction
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shows a very visible challenge against the Confucius Institute.166 There is also
some controversy in regard to what Taiwanese culture actually is. Although
Chinese culture is dominant in Taiwan, there are many different cultural
influences on Taiwan as well, including that of Japan, Korea and even traces of
Spanish and Dutch culture from colonial times, as explained by Philip Yang, head
of Taiwan’s Government Information Office.167 Given the Taiwan Academy’s goal
to promote Chinese culture as Taiwan’s main culture (giving itself legitimacy as a
“Chinese” nation as opposed to the PRC’s One-China policy) and its promotion
of traditional writing styles as opposed to those favored by Beijing, the Taiwan
Academy has indeed shown as a competitor to Hanban.
From these clear examples it is certain that there is plenty of ample
evidence that the Confucius Institute is being utilized in China’s soft power policy.
The Confucius Institute does not deny that they are a soft power organization;
they just disagree on what their critics accuse their motives of being. While
Hanban may argue that their methods are a peaceful way to promote both
Chinese language and culture in a bid to improve China’s image in the world
favorably, (This is actually the exact definition of soft power according to Nye.) 168
the critics of the Confucius Institute have a different point of view. The point of
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view of the Confucius Institute also supports this study’s argument of soft power
being a tool of Chinese diplomacy in the past and on into the future, but with a
different and much more aggressive motive: the promotion of Beijing’s view of
what China should be. This is what is at the heart of the argument that the
Confucius Institute presents a threat to academic freedom which the following
subsection shall now focus on to give a greater understanding of what many
universities fear is the curtailing of very basic academic freedom, as well it will be
examining the discriminatory hiring practices of the Confucius Institutes.

Academic Freedom and Discriminatory Hiring Practices
The first day in class the teacher asked all the
students with obvious Asian heritage to say where
their families were from. When my daughter said, her
mother was from Taiwan, the teacher said, “Taiwan is
part of China.” Months later, during
some free minutes in class, my daughter was looking
at a map, which showed Taiwan and
all of the South China Sea as belonging
to China (naturally since all of the teaching
materials come from China). The teacher
approached, bent down, and
whispered into her ear: “Taiwan is a part of
China.
-Testimony of a Tennessee man
whose daughter attended a
Confucius Classroom169
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Academic Freedom is a concept that defines itself as being the freedom of
inquiry by university faculty members. Ideally, this gives a professor the freedom
to teach whatever content he or she wishes in their chosen discipline without the
fear of being censored by the university for their beliefs, and without fear of any
political or academic forces threatening their job, repression or censorship of
their work and in extreme cases the threat of imprisonment. In American and
European universities as well as in Australia, academic freedom has been lauded
as one of the greatest virtues of the university system. This allows professors to
publish their research and findings in a free setting and allows the flow of
accurate information to go unhindered. By far, the greatest threat the critics of the
Confucius Institute claim against the organization is that they threaten this
cherished right that many professors feel is at the core of the philosophy of the
university system.170
The argument in favor of this criticism is that there are numerous
examples of the Confucius Institute repressing information with examples such
as the legal status of Taiwan, the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident and Falun
Gong. The above quoted example about the Tennessee man and his daughter in
the Confucius classroom also shows a bullying nature when it comes to subjects
the PRC may find controversial. The United States is not the only country being
subjected to this kind of bullying. In June 2014, Sinologist Isabel Hilton wrote that
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there have been many attempts by Chinese officials to condition academic life in
British educational institutions. Hilton claims that events such as the Dalai Lama
visiting are often protested by Chinese officials who, according to Hilton, threaten
to discourage Chinese students from enrolling in British universities in
response.171 Sahlins references another example used by Hilton in his book
Academic Malware where Hilton describes some worrisome censorship in a book
she contributed to. Hilton claims:
I contributed to a short book for 6th formers (12th graders) on China,
without knowing that it was sponsored by a CI. The chapter was to the
length requested, and it was not until I saw a copy at the launch event that
I discovered that an entire passage about the work and subsequent arrest
of the Lake Tai campaigner Wu Lihong had been excised. I wish I could
believe it was just a coincidence.172
This passage shows an allegation that not only do the Confucius Institutes
bully and censor students, but that respected professors also have had
problematic dealings with the Confucius Institute. It shows a trend that Hanban
not only has shown evidence that it tightly controls its teaching materials but has
a stake in controlling information about China as a whole, and will use its clout to
get its way when it finds material that the PRC finds objectionable. While the
Confucius Institute claims to follow all the laws and academic rules of its host
universities, it has shown it is not beneath using underhanded tricks as well as
exerting enormous pressure on the board of directors of many universities to get
its way. This usually comes in the form of threatening to discourage students
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from attending universities as we have seen in the UK or in many cases in the
US, putting unofficial but heavy pressure on school officials.
It would seem that Hanban has found a very clever, effective, and heavyhanded strategy in using the threat of discouraging students from enrolling or the
threat of cutting their funding to Asia Studies programs. It is likely to be troubling
to professors who may feel that the very institutions they work for are being
undermined and seriously influenced by Hanban. Withholding funding is an
extremely effective bargaining chip, and so many professors are fearful,
especially those in Asian studies departments, that their academic freedom may
be undermined by university administrators not wanting to “rock the boat.” When
academic freedom is restricted there can also be the threat that the quality of
work is being compromised in academic research. A university at its core is a
place where all academically sound ideas and concepts can be researched and
tested. If another nation’s government has enough pull behind the scenes (also
giving it the ability of plausible deniability) then the actual flow of viable research
can arguably be diluted if not completely stopped. The American Association of
University Professors (AAUP) put out a statement on its website in October 2014
warning American universities to re-think their connections to the Confucius
Institute. The warning read:
Confucius Institutes function as an arm of the Chinese state and are
allowed to ignore academic freedom. “Their academic activities are under
the supervision of Hanban, a Chinese state agency which is chaired by a
member of the Politburo and the vice-premier of the People’s Republic of
China. Most agreements establishing Confucius Institutes feature
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nondisclosure clauses and unacceptable concessions to the political aims
and practices of the government of China. Specifically, North American
universities permit Confucius Institutes to advance a state agenda in the
recruitment and control of academic staff, in the choice of curriculum, and
in the restriction of debate.173
While a good number of these points outlined in this statement show a
clear and present threat to academic freedom, one of the most worrisome
practices noted here is the practice of discriminatory hiring. This is what is meant
by “the recruitment and control of academic staff” as mentioned in the statement
above. One of the most infamous cases of discriminatory hiring happened in
Canada at McMaster University in 2012 involving the case of a former CI teacher
by the name of Sonia Zhao. Ms. Zhao complained that the Confucius Institute
had discriminated against her due to her religious beliefs, namely because she
was a member of Falun Gong who have long been suppressed in the PRC. As
reported in The Globe and Mail the Confucius Institute does not allow its
teachers to join “illegal organizations like Falun Gong.”174 The discriminatory
hiring as practiced by Hanban, was the main catalyst that caused McMaster
University not to renew its contract with the Confucius Institute similar to the
events at the University of Chicago. These events underline a problematic
situation where by following Hanban’s hiring practices, universities are breaking
their own countries’ anti-discrimination laws. In much the same way, the
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Confucius Institute has posed a threat to academic freedom when professors at
American and Canadian universities are forced to undergo an “ideological purity
test” in violation of American and Canadian anti-discrimination laws. It is also not
above some Hanban-approved teachers to manipulate the students in their
classes to become involved in protests and demonstrations. According to
Sahlins, the academic director at Waterloo University by the name of Yan Li,
used her students to protest coverage of a Tibetan uprising in 2008.175
Yan Li was formally employed as a reporter for the Chinese news agency,
Xinhua, and had considerable connections to the CCP. Sahlins recounts that Yan
Li rallied Confucius Institute students to protest what Yan Li described as “local
sympathy for Tibetan separatists.”176 Yan Li was ultimately successful in her
protest causing the local TV station to apologize for perceived biased coverage
as reported in the Epoch Times.177 The amount of support Yan Li was able to
rally shows that the Confucius Institute has an iron-fisted grasp on the realities
and tactics of soft power. By using the powerful symbolism of student protest as
well as using perceptions of media bias, The Confucius Institute has shown that it
can use soft power to achieve its aims, even in a foreign country.
This is of course, ironically denying the media organization being
protested its right to a free press. There is also an argument to be made that
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using students to protest in favor of Beijing’s policy in a Canadian university is an
abuse of power from an authority figure. While there is no direct evidence that
Yan Li threatened to punish any of her students if they did not participate in the
protest, it is still a professor using her position of considerable power to influence
and manipulate her students to bully a media organization into complying with a
policy from a foreign country. And this does not consider what might have
happened to any of her students who might have disagreed with the professor
being silenced and having their own academic freedom violated, not to mention
the right of a free press. Perhaps the most worrisome aspect is not that Yan Li
committed these actions, which was her right under the same academic freedom
she threatened, but that her soft power tactics worked.

Ceding Power: The Future of Chinese Soft Power
With the election of Donald Trump to the Presidency of the United States
many academics have been worried about some threats to the field of academia.
Not only has President Trump threatened to de-fund universities such as Berkley
in 2017 in response to massive student protests, but Trump’s withdrawal from
international commitments has left a void that Beijing is more than happy to fill.178
Despite the nationalist rhetoric of the Trump administration has espoused, Trump
has been more than willing to be conciliatory to China in many respects. This
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isolationist view towards politics can be dangerous to many academic institutions
especially concerning the Confucius Institute. Under the previous Obama
Administration, academics could at least count on a strong and assertive US
government to protect academic freedom, but as the Trump Administration turns
a blind eye to Chinese soft power, university faculty can’t count on a strong
advocate for their rights concerning academic freedom on the international stage.
As Fareed Zakaria of the Washington Post reports:
The first major act of the Trump administration was to pull the United
States out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a treaty that would have
opened up long-closed economies such as Japan and Vietnam, but also
would have created a bloc that could stand up to China’s increasing
domination of trade in Asia. The TPP was, in Singaporean Prime Minister
Lee Hsien Loong’s words, “a litmus test” of U.S. credibility in Asia. With
Washington’s withdrawal, even staunchly pro-American allies such as
Australia are hedging their bets. Australian Prime Minister Malcolm
Turnbull has raised the possibility of China joining the TPP, essentially
turning a group that was meant to be a deterrent against China into one
more arm of Chinese influence. The United States’ global role has always
meant being at the cutting edge in science, education and culture. Here
again, Washington is scaling back while Beijing is ramping up. In Trump’s
proposed budget, the National Institutes of Health, NASA and the national
laboratories face crippling cuts, as do many exchange programs that have
brought generations of young leaders to be trained in the United States
and exposed to American values. Beijing, meanwhile, has continued to
expand “Confucius Institutes” around the world and now offers 20,000
scholarships for foreign students to go to China. Its funding for big science
rises every year. The world’s largest telescope is in China, not the United
States.179
With Trump ceding power, the void that is being filled by China is very
good news for the Confucius Institute. If academic freedom becomes less of an
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issue, the Confucius Institute may be able to wield influence over universities in
the United States much like they have in Australia. One only needs to look at the
appeasement shown in Australia towards the Confucius Institute to get a possible
preview of what might happen to American universities under an administration
disinterested in the battlefield of soft power politics. This new-found cynicism can
not only threaten academic freedom but also threaten perceptions on the
efficiency of democracy, a tactic that has covertly been a large part of PRC
policy.180
As soft power is ceded to Beijing, Washington will inevitably find itself in a
diminished position. Trade treaties that Trump has threatened to withdraw from
for example will give Beijing a void to fill in trade and soft power influence.
Furthermore, confidence in Washington itself will be shaken by even the most
pro-American allies may find themselves finding the PRC a more attractive
partner to deal with than the United States. Another thing to consider is the
Trump Administration’s antagonistic attitude towards the UN, which Trump has
threatened to decrease US funding to. China would gain enormous credibility and
soft power overseas and could become the most senior member of the Security
Council under these circumstances within less than a decade.181
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The Confucius Institute inarguably demonstrates its highly skilled use of
soft power, as well as its eagerness and lack of moral constraint by western
standards to employ “harder” versions of coercive power to achieve its aims.
Public persons such as Xu Lin and Yan Li have no reluctance whatsoever in
coercing and even bullying opposition and in that resolve, have found the means
to gain a cultural victory for Beijing by using grassroots level protest against
ideas that Beijing finds subversive, and in this practice, paradoxically also
enjoying the legal protections of free speech to its logical conclusive advantage.
The Confucius Institute has played a considerable role in the “charm
offensive” that has been Beijing’s soft power initiative for over two decades.
Joshua Kurlantzick identifies this in Charm Offensive as being a critical part of
Chinese diplomacy. According to Kurlantzick the promotion of cultural studies
and language by Beijing is a crucial part of the PRC’s public diplomacy. 182
Kurlantzick quotes Hu Youqing, a deputy to The National People’s Congress as
saying, “Promoting the use of Chinese language will contribute to spreading
Chinese culture and increasing China’s global influence. It can help build up our
national strength and should be taken as a way to increase our country’s soft
power.”183 Hu’s statement can be seen as a part of Hanban’s goals as a whole,
and the Confucius Institute serves as a kind of “front-line fighter” in China’s
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“charm offensive”. It is an intelligent and effective strategy because it applies the
principle of infiltration and stealth, in the Confucius Institute’s dealings.
The evidence is conclusive that the Confucius Institute uses grassroots
activism as well as pressure against university faculty and administration to
achieve its goals. The Confucius Institute is able to achieve this while presenting
itself as a legitimate teaching exchange program. This allows the Confucius
Institute plausible deniability, that is to say concealing its intentions, despite its
overt ties to Beijing and the PRC’s politburo. From the standpoint of preserving
academic freedom, it is encouraging to see that some universities in North
America have begun questioning their ties to Hanban and the Confucius Institute,
but that does not mean that universities in other parts of the world have that
luxury. In African nations like Kenya for instance, there is sizable reliance on
Beijing for aid development which many of these nations depend on. Therefore, it
may not be prudent in their case, to antagonize Beijing. In the case of North
America, Europe and Australia however, it is not so easy. As Nye points out, softpower is very hard to wield as it exists outside total government control and relies
on charm and also because it can sometimes take years for its effects to be
realized.184 Western universities so far have shown to be both resistant to the
coercive power of the Confucius Institute such as in the famous case of the
University of Chicago, but also susceptible in many cases to Hanban’s pressure
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such as was seen in North Carolina State University’s cancellation of a speech
by the Dalai Llama. Certainly, one thing is for sure: Hanban both recognizes and
utilizes a form of power that has been used all around the world and in China
since at least the Ming Dynasty, that being the power of charm and shaping a
narrative, which the Confucius Institute has a monopoly on when it comes to the
field of sinology.
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CHAPTER FOUR
CONFUCIANISM AND SOFT POWER: POLITICS
AND FOREIGN POLICY IN MING AND MODERN CHINA

“Can Confucianism enrich modern Chinese foreign
policy? This would have been an unthinkable and
certainly ‘counterrevolutionary’ question in the
revolutionary era of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), who
took eradicating ‘feudal dregs’ such as Confucianism
as one of the main missions of his continuous
revolution. Yet for contemporary China it is no longer
an idle or quixotic question. Reform-era (1978–
present) Chinese leaders from Jiang Zemin onwards
have occasionally invoked Confucian concepts in
foreign policy statements. With President Xi Jinping,
however, a significant shift has occurred: President Xi
has made the use of ancient Chinese classics,
including Confucian texts, one of the hallmarks of his
political discourse.”185
-Feng Zhang, in
“Confucian Foreign
Policy Traditions in
Chinese History”
The practice of soft power in China has a long and detailed history. As
observed previously, in the historical sense in the person of Zheng He and
observed in the modern sense with the example of the Confucius Institute, there
are examples that can easily be seen by researchers and students alike that can
be easily accessed. What concepts and philosophies form the basis of foreign
185
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policy in both the Ming era and the modern PRC? Confucianism has played a
large role in the historical narrative of Chinese history as well as that of the
eunuch officials in the courts of many Chinese dynasties. During the tenure of
Chairman Mao Zedong however, Confucianism was officially looked down upon
by the government of the PRC, seeing it as a relic of China’s “feudal” past
according to Mao.186 However, Confucius has begun to have a bit of a
rehabilitation with China’s leadership, especially in recent times under Hu Jintao
and Xi Jinping. With the example of the Confucius Institute, which is a
government sponsored program, we can see that at the very least, the current
government in the PRC recognizes the value of the Confucius name, especially
when marketing to an international audience.
It is important to also consider that Confucius is hardly the only figure in
how soft power has developed through Chinese history. In Chapter Two, the
Ming Dynasty eunuchs were discussed in length in terms of foreign policy, and it
was the Confucian scholar officials who gave them their greatest opposition.
Another figure in historical Chinese philosophy, Mencius (385-302 BC) wrote
extensively on the virtues of “just rule” and emphasizes the importance of being
good to the common people. This is in clear contrast to Confucius who himself
wrote extensively on the virtues of rulers and generally held the ruling upper
classes in high regard. Where Mencius and Confucius find some common
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ground, however, is in the rejection of profit. Perhaps in this rejection of profit we
can also see the historical origins of how the merchant class in many East Asian
societies, especially in China and Japan were treated as a far lower class in the
traditional class systems of both nations, often being regarded as “parasitic” in
nature. This also goes to explain the opposition the eunuch officials faced in Ming
China from their Confucian rivals in regard to the treasure voyages. These
voyages would have been seen by the Confucian officials as wasteful and
against the better interests of the state as profit was considered a vice rather
than a virtue in the minds of the Confucian scholar officials.187
It will also be important in this chapter to look at the foreign policy of the
PRC under Mao and his successors and the vilification of Confucianism under
Mao and the rehabilitation of Confucius by his successors, especially within the
last few decades as Beijing has begun its rise in the world and study of the
classics have become an integral part of China’s soft power policy. The
Confucius Institute also bears a name that would have shocked Chairman Mao
greatly. But before China’s historical and modern soft power policies can be
discussed, it will be prudent to give some historical background information on
Confucius and his life. Also, the roles eunuchs played in the Ming Dynasty will be
important to examine as well as modern day efforts to rehabilitate the
conceptualization of Confucius.
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Confucius and Soft Power
The Master Said: “To Learn and then, in its
due season put what you have learned into
practice- isn’t that still a great pleasure? And to
have a friend visit from somewhere far awayisn’t that still a great joy? When you are
ignorant by the world like this, and bear no
resentment-isn’t that the greater nobility?188
-Confucius,
The Analects
(1.1)189
Confucius (551-479 BC), known in China as Kongzi (Grand Master Kong)
was born in 551 BC in the state of Lu which was a vassal state of China’s
Zhou Dynasty (1050-771 BC). Losing his father at an early age and then his
mother when Confucius was 23, left the young man truly alone in the world. 190
After finishing his basic education, Confucius began his early writings and
teachings, gaining a small number of followers. His reputation as a teacher
and philosopher had begun to gain him considerable recognition and the
government of Lu expressed an interest in having him serve in a political
career. By 501, Confucius was appointed governor of a small town in Lu.
Eventually Confucius would rise to the position of Minister of Crime. He
served with distinction and high position in the state of Lu until he ran afoul of
a viscount by the name of Ji Huan whose policies forced Confucius into self-
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exile in 497 BC. This was a result of Confucius’s policy of trying to centralize
the government of Lu failed. After spending several years wandering the
numerous city states, Confucius was able to return home when he was 68
years old. During this time period, he taught 77 disciples and wrote down his
teachings in several texts known as The Five Classics.
The goal of Confucius was for his students and mankind to awaken and
achieve their humanity (Ren). If there is one overall ethic that Confucius
considered the most important out of all his philosophies it would be the
pursuit of study and education. With the emphasis on study, it is little wonder
that the teaching and cultural organization the Confucius Institute borrows his
name. Likewise, throughout the history of Imperial China, in order to become
a scholar official of the state, a state examination system focusing on
mastering the Five Classics was started during the Tang Dynasty (618-907).
By the time the Ming Dynasty came to power, the first emperor of the Ming,
Zhu Yuanzhang had re-established the Imperial Examination system,
essentially giving China a state-run Confucian school system as well.
Concerning the establishment of the Ming school system, Theodore de Barry
writes:
When it came to schooling however, the plebian autocrat Taizu left no
doubt that he conceived of it as training and indoctrination-not at all the
voluntaristic process of learning for one’s self that Zhu Xi had
advocated. He provided Ming China with a universal, state-funded
Confucian school system down to the county level. A college in the capital,
and the schools in each of some thousand prefectural and county seats
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throughout China, served a student body of some 25,000 licentiates
(shengyuan).191
These schools while different and stricter than some of the academies of
the past, still offered a way for Ming subjects to obtain their degrees and enter
the civil service, with a Jinshi degree from passing the court exam, these few
students could even enter the court as high-ranking officials. These
academies were also notoriously strict concerning the rules and regulations
governing their students. By order of the emperor Zhu Yuanzhang, a series of
incredibly strict rules were applied for those studying for their examinations.
The following is a few excerpts from The Ming Shilu’s The Horizontal Stele192
showing the rather authoritarian nature of Zhu Yuanzhang’s state school
system:
1. Students are forbidden to present legal suits before the officials, unless
the case involves them personally and in some major way.
2. Students are forbidden to exceed their station and recklessly discuss
political or military affairs.
3. The Way of teaching requires that students revere and respect their
teachers. Students must listen with sincere minds to their teacher’s
explanations. They are forbidden to act arrogantly and argue.193
This clear authoritarian bent on the rules of the Confucian Academies
established by Zhu Yuanzhang is reflected in his autocratic nature. His
attempt to extend this to the Confucian academies is therefore rather
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unsurprising. Perhaps there is an interesting parallel between these
authoritarian Confucian public schools and the Confucius Institute. For
example, followers of the religion Falun Gong are forbidden to serve as
Confucius Institute instructors. The PRC state has often accused religions
that break away from the orthodoxy of the state to be individualistic and
therefore destroying social harmony between the state and the people.
McMaster University in Canada ended its association with the Confucius
Institute for example, due to these strict and discriminatory hiring practices.194
Much like Zhu Yuanzhang’s authoritarian state schools, there is a strict
implied obedience to the state and that not being obedient causes social
disharmony through excessive individualism. Consider these quotes from the
Confucian Analects in regard to the wrongness of individualism and the
virtues of being deferential to authority for the greater good of humanity:
The Master said: “In youth, respect your parents when home and your
elders when away. Think carefully before you speak, and stand by your
words. Love the whole expanse of things, and make an intimate of
Humanity. Then, if you have any energy left, begin cultivating yourself.
(The Analects: 1.6)195
Adept Ch’in asked of Adept Kung: “Whenever the Master visits a
country, he learns all about its government. Does he have to search out
this information, or is it just given to him? Adept Kung replied: “Congenial,
good-natured, reverent, frugal, deferential-that’s how he learns so much.
Its altogether different from the way others inquire, don’t you think?
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(The Analects: 1.10)196
When Lord Meng Yi asked about honoring parents, the master said:
“Never disobey.” Later when Fan Chi’ih was driving his carriage, the
Master said: “Meng asked me about honoring parents, and I said never
disobey. “What do you mean by that?” asked Fan Ch’ih. “In life, serve
them according to ritual,” replied the Master. “In death, bury them
according to Ritual. And the, make offering to them according to Ritual.”197
(The Analects: 2.5)198
The filial piety promoted in Confucianism were applied to society as a
whole and not just one’s parents, with the emperor (or in modern times the
state) being the “father” and his subjects the children. When it comes to Falun
Gong and the Confucius Institute’s discrimination against them, the Confucian
aspect of social harmony explains the hostility towards “dissenting” groups as
they violate the very social harmony that Confucius and the state espouse in
their outlook on life. It is therefore, easy to understand why the first Ming
emperor had such harsh policies when it came to education and the parallels
to this harshness in the modern day have become evident.
The traditional Confucian Ming curriculum was extremely difficult for
prospective students when it came for them to finish their Confucian
education and take the Imperial Examination. These examinations
traditionally had been performed by the writing of several long three-legged
essays on the Five Classics, with commentary by Zhu Xi. 199 However, the
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early Ming Dynasty may not have had as complex examinations as its
predecessors owing to the fact that much more attention was focused more
on the other famous Confucian Texts, the Four Books, which were
considerably easier to understand.200 In the 18th century Qing historian Qian
Daxin (1728-1804) pointed out that even in the Yuan Dynasty the Five
Classics were still expected by the Chinese to be understood and applied in
their essays.201 Qian Daxin theorized that this was conceived as a concession
to non-Han Chinese during Zhu Yuanzhang’s time. In any case, it is certain
that China, stretching back to the Sui and Tang Dynasties had an unrivaled
system of education in the world at the time, and under the Ming Dynasty
Neo-Confucianism flourished.
By the time of Zheng He’s voyages, the rivalry between the Confucian
Scholar officials had developed a decades long rivalry with eunuch palace
officials, which Zheng He got caught up in as well, leading to the end of his
voyages and his near-erasure from history due to the machinations of his
Confucian rivals.202 Going back to the teachings of Confucians, these officials
educated either by private tutors or by the Confucian state schools would
have applied the teachings of Confucius in all aspects of their duties,
including that of foreign policy. Concerning the scholar officials’ opposition to
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the treasure voyages, this can be partially explained on the Confucian
principle that stated profit was something not to be sought and could be
considered an unvirtuous aspect in a person. It was fine in Confucius’s mind
to gain wealth properly by following “The Way” but not at a cost of one’s
“humaneness.” Confucius himself devoted several sayings on the subject of
profit and also the proper way to gain wealth. Confucius also devoted sayings
on the practice of frugality which he saw as a virtue. These selections come
from David Hinton’s translation of The Analects:
The Master said: “Wealth and position-that’s what people want. But if
you enjoy wealth and position without following The Way, you’ll never
dwell at ease. Poverty and obscurity-that’s what people despise. And
if you endure poverty and obscurity without following the Way, you’ll
never get free. “If you ignore Humanity, how will you gain praise and
renown? The noble-minded don’t forget Humanity for a single moment,
not even in the crush of confusion and desperation. (Analects 4.5)203
The Master said: “If profit guides your actions, there will be no end of
resentment.” (The Analects 4.12)204
The Master said: “How noble Yen Hui is! To live in a meager lane with
nothing but some rice in a split bamboo bowl and some water in a
gourd cup-no one else bear such misery. But it doesn’t Hui. His joy
never wavers. O, how noble Hui is!” (Analects 6.10)205
The Master said: “The noble-minded are clear about Duty. Little people
are clear about profit.” (Analects 4.16)206
Confucius considered distractions to duty such as profit to lead to unwise
governance. He also promoted aestheticism in his students and praised
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governance that showed proper respect to duty and humaneness, instead of
simply profit and gain. The treasure voyages were indeed profit motivated, as
Ming China was also hungry to reestablish the formally lucrative trade empire
China once had in the Indian Ocean which was temporarily stopped by Zhu
Yuanzhang and was re-established by Zhu Di with Zheng He as his agent.
The treasure voyages’ desire for profit was not the only thing wrong with them
from a Confucian point of view. Confucius also disapproved of foreign wars
and entanglements that weren’t defensive in nature. Confucius considered
good and humane governance to be the primary concern of the state rather
than that of war. From The Analects, Confucius writes:
Duke Ling of Wei, asked Confucius about tactics, and Confucius said “I’ve
learned something about the conduct of worship and sacrifice. But for the
conduct of war-that is something I’ve never studied.” (Analects 15.1)207
The Master treated three things with the greatest care: fasting, war and
sickness. (Analects 7.13)208
Confucius as we can see saw war outside of defensive measures as
wasteful of the state’s resources, and it would be better for members of a
nation to honor their parents, perform the necessary rituals for daily life and
give good and just governance to discover their humaneness. Very likely, the
Confucian scholar officials of Zheng He’s time saw his voyages as a waste of
expenditure, but also as Zheng He getting involved in foreign conflicts which
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is discouraged in Confucianism.209 This is an important point to understand
when trying to study the conflict between the scholar officials and the
eunuchs: foreign wars and their support or opposition as controlled by court
factions who used philosophy as policy. Even foreign travel in itself from the
Confucian point of view could be seen as “rude” and “debasing” according to
Levathes who recounts Confucius’s justification for isolationism:
Once feeling underappreciated in his native Shandong in northern China,
Confucius announced to his disciples that he was going to live with the
“wild tribes.” “How could you do such a thing” one follower asked. “They
are rude.” He replied that as the superior man among them, he would
tame their rudeness. But, aside from this boast, as his writings make clear,
Confucius thought foreign travel interfered with important familial
obligations and believed trade was inherently mean and debasing.”210
What then was Confucius’ and the Ming Confucian’s view of correct
foreign policy? The Confucian point of view tended to look inward at China
itself. There was a distrust of mercantile pursuits, and foreign travel was
generally frowned upon, with the Confucian view being that these were
wasteful pursuits and worse of all interfered with filial piety, which was above
all the highest priority in a “humane” person’s world view according to
Confucius.211 Shin-shan Henry Tsai, author of The Eunuchs in the Ming
Dynasty gives an excellent summary of what Confucians saw as the just and
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moral way of diplomacy and foreign relations as it regards the tribute trade
system:
The tributary system is the Chinese version of imperialism, not by
territorial conquest or economic exploitation but control of ideas and
cultural domination. The Confucian concept of diplomacy differed from its
European counterpart, which stressed legal equality of nations and the
sanctity of state sovereignty. In international relations Confucian family
morality was applied as a guide for the preservation of harmony. As such,
China the superior “Middle Kingdom” was not equal to her peripheral
states, who were considered younger brothers or children in the family of
nations. China produced the dominant civilization from which the
peripheral states derived much of their culture. States around China were
civilized only to the extent that they accepted Chinese ideas, customs, and
institutions and agreed to use the Chinese lunar calendar to date their
official documents. Such an ideology also engendered a chauvinistic
concept that China was a world in itself, not a nation among nations and
that no other human authority was equal in the Son of Heaven in China.
As a consequence, there was no need for treaties as agreements of any
kind at the foundation of the tributary system. The core of the system was
the periodic exchange of visits of state, envoys and the requirement of the
lesser states to recognize China’s cultural superiority and political
suzerainty. 212
The tribute trade system worked in a Confucian mindset because it
allowed officials to be closer to home, and instead demanded that other
nations come to China to pay their respects to their overlord the Emperor of
China. While the Confucian’s promoted the tribute trade system as a way to
preserve the teachings of Confucius in proper governance, with China being
seen as the center of the world there was perhaps a small tinge of irony in
this arrangement. The irony is that while the Confucians had helped create
and build up the tribute trade system, only for the eunuchs to use the tribute
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trade in the Ming Dynasty to justify the voyages of Zheng He. After all, was
China not the Middle Kingdom? Should China not then send envoys and
powerful military ships to gain acknowledgement of China’s suzerainty? It is
very apparent then why the Confucians would have considered Zheng He an
enemy. He was a threat not only to their power but also to their outlook on
life. It is easy to see why that at the end of the Zheng He’s life, the Confucians
took such pains to minimize his role in history, and portray his journeys as
useless expenditures.213

Eunuchs of the Court: Historical Scapegoats and
Ming Foreign Policy
The eunuch ministers and officials of the Ming Dynasty stand out as a
clear contrast to the Confucian ministers. The eunuchs had a very clear
understanding about the importance of soft power and its role in politics.
While the eunuchs weren’t a group with a common philosophy like the
Confucians, many eunuchs saw the advantage of foreign commerce and
trade as opposed to the Confucians, who saw agrarian principles as the best
economic method for China. The Confucians held the pro-agrarian view
mostly due to Confucius’s belief that the welfare of the people was considered
more important than the profit and advantage of the state.214 The eunuchs
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themselves were organized into twelve directorates, four offices and eight
bureaus in the final organization of the eunuch bureaucracy.215 They were
required to wear a special uniform that denoted their rank and position. For
example, as Professor Tsai explains, the eunuchs of the fourth rank were
required to wear red robes while eunuchs of the fifth rank and below were
required to wear blue robes instead.216
While many eunuch officials seem to have thought ahead in terms of
economic prosperity, this focus on profit, often cast them as the villains of the
era. The view of the miserly scheming eunuch is still a powerful trope in
literature and film in China, even in modern times. There are exceptions such
as Zheng He, but the historical view of eunuchs until the twentieth century
had been a rather dim one, not to mention it did not help that many of their
rivals the Confucians, were the record keepers. Professor Shin-shan Henry
Tsai in the opening of his book The Eunuchs of the Ming Dynasty gives some
elaboration on the subject:
Constantly locked into an adversary position against the eunuchs, these
highbrow bureaucrat- scholars had a tendency to portray their arch rivals
as rapacious, wicked and unscrupulous. They attributed all the evil to the
despised and hateful eunuchs when in fact the cause of the ills of the
society was the very imperial institution that the Chinese intelligentsia
gleefully served. The two groups collided, interacted and conflicted
throughout the Ming period and for nearly 250 years vied with one another
for control of the imperial apparatus. Corresponding to such idealism and
rivalry was the timidity and lack of revolutionary tradition of the Chinese
Robert B. Crawford, Eunuch Power in the Ming Dynasty, T’ong Pao, Second
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intelligentsia. Consequently, Chinese historians rarely openly and
persistently criticized the autocratic political system and the tyranny
spawned from it. Instead, they singled out the eunuchs as the scapegoats
and refused to treat this lowbrow group as a social and political
complex.217
Professor Tsai introduces a pretty compelling argument that the common
negative view of the eunuchs throughout Chinese history was made by their
rivals the Confucians in an effort to discredit them and place all the woes of the
imperial administration on the shoulders of the eunuchs, while failing to criticize
the very system that was causing the suffering to the common people. The
eunuchs indeed had an unfair reputation as schemers and connivers, negative
traits that were put on them due to the jealousies of their rivals. Jealousy was not
the only motivation or the hatred against the eunuchs by the Confucians
however. As previously noted, the pursuit of profit had been condemned by the
Confucians ever since the time period of Confucius himself and the eunuchs
would have been seen as “parasitic” to their rivals. The distrust of eunuchs has a
long historical origin, but a lot of its origins in the Ming Dynasty can be traced
back to Zhu Yuanzhang the founder of the Ming Dynasty. Professor Tsai
summarizes Zhu Yuanzhang’s attitude towards the eunuchs in this passage,
citing a historical decree from the Emperor:
When Zhu Yuanzhang (known as Emperor Hongwu) founded the Ming
Dynasty in 1368, he was keenly aware of the potentially pernicious
eunuch problems and decided to limit the number of court eunuchs to
fewer than 100. Even though he was later to increase the number of place
servants to more than 400, he reportedly also decreed that no eunuch be
permitted to learn books or to give advice on political matters. Even the
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few eunuchs with whom Hongwu might chat were kept dutifully awed and
were never allowed to discuss politics. In 1384, he had the following
inscription engraved on an iron tablet in front of the palace: “Eunuchs are
forbidden to interfere in government affairs. Those who attempt to do so
will be subjected to capital punishment.” Shortly before his death he
ordered that the eunuchs should no longer be allowed to wear the uniform
of government officials and that their rank should not exceed the fourth
grade. Officials of all departments were forbidden to communicate with
eunuchs by written documents.218
Zhu Yuanzhang clearly intended to limit the power of the eunuchs in favor of the
learned scholar officials. However, according to Professor Robert B. Crawford in
his 1961 scholarly journal article Eunuch Power in the Ming Dynasty, Zhu
Yuanzhang also did not trust the scholar officials much either and allowed the
eunuchs to exist as a power balance, despite the Emperor’s distrust of them.219
Despite Zhu Yuanzhang’s dislike for the eunuchs by the time Zhu Di came to
power in 1402, the position of the eunuchs was greatly enhanced in contrast to
Zhu Di’s father’s policy. Dr. Tsai suggests that one of the reasons that eunuchs
like Zheng He were so trusted and put into high position was because of the
Confucian officials’ tendency to remain loyal to the former Jianwen emperor
whom Zhu Di had deposed.220 It was under Zhu Di that the eunuchs were for the
first time given posts outside of the palace and were given a higher diversity of
positions such as Zheng He’s military career.221 The eunuchs serving in the
military became one of the positions open to them in the time of Zhu Di’s reign
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and it was thanks to him so many such as Zheng He were able to excel in the
military. Professor Tsai recounts how even after Zhu Di’s death the eunuch’s
found plenty of new opportunity in the military:
Then in the first moon of 1425, the Admiral Zheng He was named
shoubei, or the grand commandant of Nanjing: and one month later the
eunuch Wang An, a Sinicized Jurchen native, was appointed grand
defender of Gansu, hence the beginning of the eunuch Zhenshou system.
During the late summer of 1426 two more court eunuchs, Huang Rang
and Chen Jin, were dispatched to the important Grand Canal city of
Huaian to suppress a rebellion staged by Prince Gao Xu of Han. In short,
only two years since the death of Emperor Yongle, the eunuchs had
become increasingly visible in the management of Ming military affairs.222
The new opportunities given by Zhu Di during and carried on as policy after his
death allowed the eunuchs to gain power outside the palace. Even after their fall
from grace after Zhu Di’s death they managed to be far more powerful and useful
to the Ming Dynasty then they had during the reign of Zhu Yuanzhang. Another
gain that the eunuchs were able to achieve, at least during Zhu Di’s time, was the
eunuchs getting involved in foreign policy, which should be noted was a capital
offense during Zhu Yuanzhang’s reign.
In the field of foreign policy in Zhu Di’s time, the conflict between the two
groups intensified to a huge level and the treasure voyages of Zheng He was the
perfect catalyst. The treasure voyages re-ignited the debate about the value of
soft power foreign policy in the service of the Ming Dynasty. The Confucians who
believed the treasure voyages as being a wasteful burden on the people of
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China, motivated by profit and the eunuchs who believed that the treasure
voyages would bring glory and recognition to the emperor’s regime once again
clashed. The eunuchs, being part of the opposition who helped Zhu Di come to
power, recognized that the nations of the Indian Ocean as well as China’s
neighbors could bring legitimacy to a usurper’s regime. This would also fit into
Nye’s idea of attractiveness and exporting one’s culture, which was a key
component of the tribute trade system.223 The eunuchs also did not agree with
the way Zhu Yuanzhang and his Confucian advisers had decided on an agrarian
economic system in China in order to conform to Confucian ideals, which had an
unfortunate effect on the Ming economy during the beginning of Zhu Di’s reign.
This was another motivation for the treasure voyages. The eunuchs were also
supporters of Zhu Di’s expansionist beliefs and Hilton gives credence to the
assertion that out of all the motivations for the treasure voyages, Zhu Di was
probably motivated the most by hoping to surpass his father’s achievements and
re-opening the Indian Ocean sea trade was the greatest way to enhance his
prestige.224 Regardless of Zhu Di’s reasons, the already trusted eunuchs had
much to gain by going along with the emperor’s plans and the profit from the
numerous trade relations being developed would be an excellent motivator. After
all, wars cost money and Zhu Di proved to be a very expansionistic emperor.
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Using charm is an aspect of soft power that Nye has mentioned and
earlier I connected it to the tribute trade system in this paper. Attractiveness to
culture as mentioned before, was a deeply embedded part of the tribute trade
system, while the Confucian advisers saw the tribute trade system as part of the
family system of filial piety. The eunuchs saw the spread of China’s culture
almost as an early modern advertising campaign for countries to engage in trade
with the Ming Dynasty and bring it prestige. For example, the large number of
foreign ambassadors that would come to visit Zhu Di was significant in improving
China’s image. These emissaries were so important to the emperor’s image that
Zhu Di’s grandson Zhu Zhanji the Xuande Emperor, lamented the lack of so
many grand emissaries coming to the court to pay tribute. This was one of the
motivations that allowed Zhu Zhanji to authorize Zheng He to go on his final
voyage.225 Even under the Xuande Emperor who did not fully embrace soft
power and the treasure voyages, there was a sense that international recognition
and reaching out to foreign nations had some merit even if they could on
occasion conflict with the Confucian view of the tribute trade system which
demanded that other nations come to China instead to display their filial loyalty to
their “elder brother.”.
The eunuch members of the court play a part in Ming political history that
has been sadly misrepresented by their rivals, a trend that only started seeing a
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reversal in the twentieth century. The eunuchs by supporting the creation of the
Ming armada and support for Zhu Di’s expansionistic policies may have created
a very different China than the one encountered by the British in the 19 th century
during the Opium Wars. Had the Ming kept their advanced navy, by the time of
the Qing Dynasty would China have had the technological prowess to avoid the
“century of humiliation”? Perhaps if Zheng He’s legacy had been successful;
Ming China would have been the great colonial power of latter centuries.
Fortunately, thanks to scholars such as Professor Tsai, the eunuchs of Imperial
China are getting a far fairer representation in history and they are slowly being
portrayed as being competent advisers, military leaders and political force in their
own right.
Looking at the experiences of the eunuchs, one must wonder if there are
any parallels in modern Chinese history with scapegoats being used to further a
political cause. In modern Chinese history there is a parallel between the
treatment of the eunuchs as scapegoats and the treatment and demonizing of
academics and teachers during the Cultural Revolution from 1966-1976. Much
like the eunuch’s there was an “othering” of teachers who were accused by the
CCP and more specifically The Red Guards, student-led revolutionaries who
were infamous for their violent “struggle sessions.” Like the eunuchs the
academics were seen through their teachings as a violation of the social
orthodoxy, in the case of the teachers being accused of being against the
socialistic tenants of Marxism, despite many of these teachers being ardent
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Marxists themselves. Chen Qiang who was a student at these time period shares
his experiences:
I have always been a very direct speaker. When the Cultural Revolution
was starting, I spoke out about what I was seeing. The day after I said
something, a big-character poster appeared on campus overnight: “Save
the reactionary speechmaker Chen Qigang.” I was so young. I didn’t
understand what was going on. Yesterday we were all classmates. How
come today all of my classmates are my enemies? Everyone started to
ignore me. I didn’t understand. How could people be like this? Even my
older sister, who was also at my school, came to find me and asked,
“What’s wrong with you?” You saw in one night who your real friends
were. The next day I only had two friends left. One of them is now my wife.
At the time, no one really knew who was for or against the revolution. It
was completely out of control. The students brought elderly people into the
school and beat them. They beat their teachers and principals. There was
nothing in the way of law. There was a student who was two or three
years older than me. He beat two elderly people to death with his bare
hands. No one has talked about this even until this day. We all know who
did it but that’s the way it is. No one has ever looked into it. These
occurrences were too common.226
The violent reaction against academics and students who did not toe-the line like
Chen Qiang were ostracized and if unfortunately, even killed. Revisiting the
conflict between the court eunuchs and the Confucian scholar officials, there are
similar motivations to suppress perceived “dissidents” and blame the state of the
country on them. For the eunuchs they were blamed for the economic woes of
the later Ming and were used as scapegoats. For these teachers, similar
economic and social consequences were being put upon them, with both
eunuchs and academics being blamed for bringing misfortune on the country and
accused of “scheming”. The caricature of the scheming eunuch and the
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scheming “counterrevolutionary” would also serve in both cases to further vilify
them. Perhaps the most striking similarity would be the call for the destruction
and criticism of their works. Zhen He’s story was almost lost to history due to the
burning of his log books and countless books, political pamphlets and ideas
written to paper were similarly burned by the Red Guards. Reactionary
repression against perceived threats to the state seems to be a common theme
in the history of many countries and China is no exception, nor is there any
exception in the use of censorship and violence to enforce a state orthodoxy.
Even today with the Confucius Institute there is a longing to enforce strict
orthodoxy and obedience to the state and any teachers with views contrary to
this would be considered problematic. While China seeks to find legitimacy as a
global power, anything that can possibly threaten the social harmony would be
seen as detrimental to that goal.

The Legacy of Deng Xiaoping: Modern Day Foreign
Policy and Soft Power
The foreign policy of today’s modern-day PRC is complex and times often
contradictory, but it has in recent decades fully embraced the theory of soft
power in international relations. There has been a long and rocky road from the
era of Mao Zedong to the era of Xi Jinping in the context of the embrace of soft
power but in recent years it has given rise to China’s standing in the world. It was
the work of Deng Xiaoping, (1904-1997) Mao’s successor who had worked hard

162

to reform the Chinese economy and could be considered the “founder” of the
more market friendly People’s Republic that is better known today. The embrace
of soft power however, has been a slow process that could be traced to the end
of Deng Xiaoping’s time and encouraged by his successors. The peaceful
transfer of Hong Kong from the UK to China in 1997 and the growth of Chinese
markets in the early twenty-first century have propelled Chinese economic power
to amazing heights and China is able to contend with even heavyweights such as
the United States in terms of economic power. Despite Mao Zedong’s support of
“righteous struggles” around the world such as the Khmer Rouge in the 1970’s in
Cambodia, the PRC of Deng Xiaoping, Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping have taken a
“non-interventionist” stance on world affairs. This approach had its genesis even
during Mao’s time in the 1950’s by China’s agreement with India’s “Five
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” (known in India as the Panchsheel Treaty)
on the 29th of April 1954. The treaty stipulates:
•

Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and
sovereignty.
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•

Mutual non-aggression.

•

Mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs.

•

Equality and cooperation for mutual benefit.

•

Peaceful co-existence.227
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The principles that China claims to follow in the Panchsheel Treaty give a
good look to how China conducts itself in foreign affairs. China will often vote
against interventionist measures in the UN and currently makes the claim that
China “will not seek hegemony” as Xi Jinping claimed in 2015 during
commemoration of the 70th anniversary of the victory of the Chinese People's
War of Resistance against Japanese aggression, according to Xinhua.228 China’s
efforts in Africa and Southeast Asia in recent years have been based on creating
mutual co-operation and in Africa’s case have given China access to resources
and new allies in China’s effort to create a multipolar world in opposition to the
hegemony of the United States. In this case, China has been very successful in
offering an alternative form of diplomacy in developing countries offering mutual
cooperation and benefit by helping developed countries reach new levels of
development and giving a helping hand to resource extraction (which allows
China to gain access to resources without resorting to hard power methods). The
embrace of soft power as a whole, however, has only been seen since Mao’s
death, indeed the foreign policy of the modern-day PRC may have been met with
hostility from Mao if he could have been able see it today. Joshua Kurlantzick
writes in Charm Offensive how the PRC in Mao’s time rejected some soft power
principles (The Panscheel Treaty notwithstanding):
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Back in 1949 Beijing also believed it might wield power in the world,
but not soft power. Triumphing over both the Japanese invaders
and Chiang Kai-shek’s seemingly superior nationalist forces, Mao
Tse-tung’s communists thought themselves invincible when they
established the People’s Republic of China on October 1st 1949.
After all, the communists had ended the “century of humiliation” for
China that started with the Opium Wars in the 1840’s and 1860’s
when Britain and other European powers had crushed China’s
military and begun a process of national disintegration that
precipitated the end of the Chinese empire.229
Mao’s PRC had strictly followed the “export the revolution abroad” and the
concept of soft power would have been seen as a “weak” method of wielding
power abroad, when the Maoist principle was to participate in what Mao deemed
“liberation movements” in Asia. During the 1950’s, The Great Leap Forward, Mao
attempted to industrialize the PRC in order to keep up with its enemies and also
to bring a more modern age into China by remaking society in one generation.230
One of the more famous actions taken during this time was ordering the creation
of collectives with the government taking full control of the industrial and
agricultural sectors of the country, by following the Marxist principle of “seizing
the means of production.” During the Great Leap Forward, ordinary citizens were
also expected to collect and melt down possessions of theirs made out of iron in
order to increase iron production in the country, however due to poor backyard
furnaces and the materials the iron was smelted from, a very weak form of “pig
iron” that was nearly useless was produced. After the failure of the Great Leap
Forward and the blow it gave to Mao’s reputation, the Cultural Revolution was
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announced with the infamous Red Guard inflicting violence on the population and
destroying any of the old traditional pillars of society which Mao would have
considered to be “feudal”. These included such traditions as Confucianism and
Taoism and other traditional Chinese religions, beliefs, as well as the traditional
arts and educational institutions.231 During this time period in the foreign policy
scene, the PRC supported revolutions in Burma and were an early backer of the
Khmer Rouge. The PRC also cultivated a working relationship with the Soviet
Union at first but the Sino-Soviet split starting in the 1960’s complicated the
relationship and led to China and the United States to open relations with each
other starting with Nixon’s famous visit in 1972.
Mao died in 1976, which allowed the once disgraced Deng Xiaoping to
start his return to power. Kurlanztick describes how Deng’s rise to power allowed
the political changes necessary for China to embrace soft power and create the
foundation for the modern day economic power that the PRC is today:
After Mao’s death, Deng returned to power. A savvy political infighter,
Deng carefully cultivated top members of the Communist Party, and then
used his backers within the regime to outmaneuver the Chairman’s
appointed heir, Hua Guofeng. By the early 1980’s Hua conceded that he
had lost the support of the Party, and Deng essentially took control of
China, appointing his reform-minded protégés to top positions. And since
Deng’s restoration, twenty-five years of unparalleled economic growth has
changed China enormously. The drastic changes in China itself have set
the stage for China to exert soft power over the world.”232
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Deng Xiaoping’s rise had given birth to what Kurlantzick termed the
“charm offensive.” The modern-day PRC to whom Deng can be considered a
kind of “father” owes its existence to Deng’s reforms and the “charm offensive”
which has been so important in the administrations of Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping is
thanks to his reforms. The new charm offensive of the twenty first century has
followed a lot of Joseph’s Nye’s principles of soft power attraction. According to
Nye, soft power heavily relies on others by finding agreements that aren’t signed
with threats and payments and instead uses the attractiveness of one’s culture to
gain cooperation.233 Beijing has learned that lesson well, and in recent decades
even softened its opinion on traditional Chinese customs and thoughts, like
Confucianism, in order to present an attractive face to the world. By following the
principle of attractiveness, the PRC has presented itself to the world as a rapidly
modernizing nation open to investment and a rising powerhouse in Asia. Beijing
has also presented itself in its foreign policy as a non-interventionist country on
the one hand that wishes peace on its neighbors and economic cooperation, but
also a militarily powerful one that is the top and strongest power in Asia and is
not to be trifled with. While soft power efforts are a core part of China’s
diplomacy, the PRC is not afraid to flex its muscles either, with recent events
such as the South China Sea dispute showing that the PRC is despite its soft
power stance, not a pacifist country.
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The PRC State Council issued a white paper in 2015 which shows the
sharper side of the power spectrum concerning the PRC. What can be learned
from this paper is that while China flexes its military muscles around its
neighbors, China still is adamant that this new-found power will not be used for
hegemonic purposes:
The world today is undergoing unprecedented changes, and China is at a
critical stage of reform and development. In their endeavor to realize the
Chinese Dream of great national rejuvenation, the Chinese people aspire
to join hands with the rest of the world to maintain peace, pursue
development and share prosperity. China’s destiny is vitally interrelated
with that of the world as a whole. A prosperous and stable world would
provide China with opportunities, while China's peaceful development also
offers an opportunity for the whole world. China will unswervingly follow
the path of peaceful development, pursue an independent foreign policy of
peace and a national defense policy that is defensive in nature, oppose
hegemonism and power politics in all forms, and will never seek
hegemony or expansion. China's armed forces will remain a staunch force
in maintaining world peace.234
Beijing’s foreign policy is very sensitive to clarify its non-hegemonic status.
This gives China an opportunity to claim non-interventionalist policy as part of its
diplomacy, but still use its military to protect the “indivisible” nature of China,
especially regarding fishing rights and territory in the South China Sea, and most
famously the legal status of Taiwan. The PRC in the future will have to clearly
decide whether gaining soft power legitimacy in the eyes of the world versus
maintaining the policy of an inseparable China backed with military force is more
preferable to China’s legitimacy. These two ideas, self-contradictory at times may
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cause a crisis of large proportions in the future. If China feels the status quo is
threatened with Taiwan for example, China may suspend the charm offensive
and find that a coercive option is preferable.
The current president of China, Xi Jinping, has also shown an interest in
reviving Confucianism in the PRC. In the shadow of the Cultural Revolution,
Confucius was an almost villainized figure in the Chinese world in Mao’s time
with the exception of Taiwan where a lot of traditional Chinese culture has been
kept intact due to Taiwan not being affected by the Cultural Revolution on the
mainland. The “Criticize Confucius” campaign was a large and integral part of the
Cultural Revolution, so it may be strange seeing the PRC’s leader break with the
orthodoxy of Mao, yet now several generations removed, and with the Gang of
Four and the far more orthodox members of the CCP either dead or elderly, there
has been no easier time than the last decade for China to re-discover its
traditional culture. This has been a boon for cultural relations and has helped the
Confucius Institute quite a bit, not only allowing the organization being permitted
to be named after what Mao would consider a “feudal relic” but also being able to
present a culture for China to the world that is not only familiar and traditional, but
one that does not conflict too much with the CCP’s views of what China should
be either.
Xi Jinping in his famous anti-corruption campaign has also promoted
Confucian values as a way to fight corruption. In this section from an article
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written in TIME Magazine, Xi Jinping is shown to have used Confucius as a
model for his anti-graft campaign:
Xi seems to be taking this effort to a whole new level. He appears to be
employing Confucius as part of a broader program to remake the
Communist Party and realign the power structure within it. For instance, Xi
apparently believes a dose of Confucian morality will aid stamping out
official graft. Over the past year, Xi has launched an aggressive campaign
against government corruption, likely engineered to both eliminate political
enemies and clean up an out-of-control bureaucracy that had lost the trust
of the populace. A high-level Communist Party conference in October
pledged to strengthen the independence of the judicial system to improve
rule of law. Confucius is part of Xi’s reform team. For 2,000 years,
Confucius’s doctrine laid down the code of ethics for proper behavior in
China — the way of the gentleman — and now Xi seems to be trying to
recreate those Confucian standards through persistent exhortation.235
This new embrace of traditional values has worked very well in the foreign
affairs of China. However, China, while appearing soft on some foreign affairs
has still projected strength and might showing that they are not a country to be
pushed around as it was in the nineteenth century when China was at the
complete mercy of the Western colonial powers during the Opium Wars and the
Boxer Uprising of the early twentieth century. With the Confucius Institute
teaching around the world and President Xi using the Sage’s advice to spread
Chinese ideals around the world and use Confucius as a moral example against
corruption in China’s government, the ancient Sage has gotten a new lease on
life in the post-Mao PRC. How ironic it is that the PRC has greatly profited from
the sage who considered profit to be one of the greatest vice’s humanity can
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commit. In any case, the old Chinese way of foreign policy and politics has
merged with the new China and together has presented to the world a country
that remembers its past and is willing to use that past to further its goals in the
world, but is also a nation that looks forward and is unwilling to ever submit to the
West in a humiliating fashion such as in the nineteenth century.
The need for a cohesive social order in the PRC seems to be the priority
of the Beijing over that of following a strict communist ideal. Evan Osnos a
reporter at the New Yorker in his article Confucius Comes Home explains how
the shift of focus from Marxist ideals to the traditional ideals of Confucius came
about. Osnos writes:
It would have been anathema to Chairman Mao, but his heirs have
changed their view on revolution. In the eighties, when China set itself in
pursuit of prosperity, the Party studied how Confucian values had helped
to stabilize other countries in East Asia. Generations of Chinese thinkers
had dreamed of finding the optimal recipe for “national studies”—the
mixture of philosophy and history that might insulate China from the
pressures of Westernization. After the democracy demonstrations at
Tiananmen Square in 1989 ended in a violent crackdown, leaders
needed an indigenous ideology that might restore the Party’s moral
credibility. Top Communists gave speeches at meetings devoted to
Confucianism, and state television launched a series about traditional
culture intended, it said, “to boost the people’s self-confidence, selfrespect, and patriotic thought.” In 2002, the Party officially stopped calling
itself a “revolutionary party” and adopted the term “Party in Power.” The
Prime Minister, Wen Jiabao, declared, “Unity and stability are really more
important than anything else.” In February, 2005, the Party chief, Hu
Jintao, quoted Confucius’ observation that “harmony is something to be
cherished.”236
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The complicated task of having to maintain a one party communist state
and embracing traditional Confucian values that were once seen as reactionary,
will be a difficult task for the PRC to balance in the future. The PRC will have to
choose between coercion or charm to achieve these ends as well. Will it take the
soft power approach and appeal to a traditionalist cultural and moral system or
will it use force and coercion to enforce a strict party orthodoxy in the future?
More likely, Beijing will follow the pragmatic approach of paying lip service to
Communist ideals and use traditional culture to achieve social harmony so that
both systems work within one another.
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CHAPTER FIVE
COUNTER THESIS: ZHENG HE THE IMPERIALIST AND
DEFENSE OF THE CONFUCIUS INSTITUTE

The Ming Eunuch Zheng He who commanded
fleets that voyaged to Southeast Asia and the
Indian Ocean in the early fifteenth century, is
today depicted as an “ambassador of
friendship” between China and other nations.
The present article suggests a revisionist view
of the man and his voyages. By examining
these “voyages to the western ocean” as
simply an element of expansion from the Yongle Emperor (r.1403-1424), linked to his
invasions of Dai Viet and Yunnan we see these
“voyages of friendship” as aggressive attempts
to create a “Pax Ming” in the Asian maritime
realm, with Melaka, Palembang, and
Samudera as key elements. We also observe
the Ming efforts to dominate the trade routes
linking the Middle East and East Asia. The
paper concludes with a discussion of the
characteristics of colonialism and imperialism
and suggests the voyages constituted a
maritime proto-colonialism.
-Geoff Wade, in the
Abstract to The
Zheng He voyages:
A Reassessment237

Thus, it is no surprise to find that much of the
criticism has come from predominantly Englishlanguage speaking countries Whilst both Japan
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and India have been concerned about the
general influence of Chinese soft power, most
of the fiercest resistance to the CI’s has come
from the USA, Canada, The UK and Australia.
No doubt people are concerned about what
they say they are concerned about: political
espionage and Falun Gong. Yet evidence for
such interference is scant. Whilst CI organizers
complain of bureaucratic obstacles and illequipped staff, given the number of sites
involved and opportunities for political
interference, it seems that actual cases of
wrongdoing do not match the rhetoric of
worry.
-Michael
Barr in
“Who’s
Afraid of
China?”238
Counter Thesis Questions and Overview
Now that the main arguments regarding historical and current day Chinese
soft power has been discussed, it will be important to take a look at the criticisms
regarding the points that have been made earlier in this study. The thesis of this
paper was that there are parallels between Zheng He’s quest for Ming glory and
the Confucius Institute and that perceptions of hard and soft power are not always
the same across cultures as well as easily defined. This paper has also made the
argument that although there are some hard-power elements to the Zheng He
voyages including military action, the general perception of the voyages as being
mostly peaceful and diplomatic voyages, with the re-establishment of the tribute
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trade system that had been in place for centuries as its main goal. However, it
would be unwise to ignore a rather imperialist nature to the voyages and that must
be addressed. Regarding modern soft power in China, this paper uses the
Confucius Institute as an example of soft power being used by the PRC, arguing
that the CI’s are often used to push an idea of Chinese culture that is acceptable
by Beijing, and also that they present a threat to academic freedom as many
academics such as Marshall Sahlins have proposed. But what are the criticisms of
this point of view? Are the CI’s really an effort to subvert academic freedom in the
west and teach state propaganda, or can many of the negative incidents
concerning the Confucius Institute be explained by poorly trained staffed and a
“fear” of China’s rise as Michael Barr suggests. For example, author Michael Barr
in Who’s Afraid of China: The Challenge of Chinese Soft Power writes:
In short, CI’s are physical representations of China’s will to promote its
culture to the world. They are in effect China’s most comprehensive
exercise of soft power to date. And they raise numerous issues, none
more intriguing than this: with over 1 billion native speakers, will the
spread of Chinese as a second language eventually unseat English as the
world’s language of choice?239
Barr raises an interesting point that should be addressed: that of Sinophobia.
Sinophobia can be described as an irrational fear of China, Chinese culture and
Chinese people either local or abroad. The element of Sinophobia in the context
of the arguments regarding the Confucius Institute are in effect the “elephant in
the room” so to speak regarding the criticism of the Confucius Institute. The fear
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of Beijing’s rise especially in the United States is nothing new and can be traced
back to the colonialism during the nineteenth century also known as China’s
“Century of Humiliation”. In more modern times, there has been vast Sinophobia
in the United States and other western countries due to the Cold War and this
form of Sinophobia has often been mixed with anti-communist sentiment as well.
In this atmosphere of Sinophobia, there can be a serious case of
underreporting the good that the Confucius Institute does around world. For
example, as recent as September 7th 2017, The Nation the university newspaper
of the Nnamdi Azikiwe University in Nigeria, announced that sixty four of its
students have been granted government scholarships from the PRC to study in
various universities around China, giving these students numerous opportunities
that they may have been denied if it were not for the Confucius Institute’s
language programs at their university.240 This story is part of the charm
component of soft power that China has been attempting to fulfill in resource-rich
Africa, and the Confucius Institute has played a large role in education in
numerous secondary schools and universities in African nations. Aside from
concerns of Sinophobia, there is also the phenomenon of selling fear in many
publications that offer news about the Confucius Institute. In the modern day with
the internet dominating much of news reporting in the last few decades, the rise
of the problem of “clickbait” or articles using sensational and on occasion
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misleading headlines, can compound the problem of underreporting positive
stories in favor of negative ones. After all, “Confucius Institute accused of
espionage and curtailing academic freedom” makes a more sensational headline
(and more page views) than “The Confucius Institute has spread Chinese
language proficiently in Africa considerably.” While it is important to look critically
at the Confucius Institute and what the organizations soft power effort’s
consequences have been regarding academic freedom and censorship, it would
also be academically dishonest to ignore the boon the Confucius Institute has
also been on impoverished nations and bringing opportunities to their citizens.
Returning to the dangers of propaganda and historical revisionism, it is also
important to investigate the rather “sanitized” version of Zheng He’s voyages that
the PRC is eager to present to the world, showing Zheng He as a benevolent and
kind explorer and adventurer compared to that of his European counterparts.241
There is a danger of presenting Zheng He as a wholly benevolent figure by the
government of the PRC that borders on straight revisionism rather than
presenting Zheng He as a complex figure who used mainly soft, but on occasion
hard power to achieve his objectives in building a trade empire in the South
China Sea and Indian Ocean.
In order to properly provide a counter thesis for this paper’s points, a
series of questions will be presented that will be used to criticize this study’s main
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points. They will be divided up into two categories: historical soft power which will
cover the Treasure Voyages and modern soft power which will cover the
Confucius Institute. The questions will serve to challenge the thesis of this paper
and in the final section of this chapter I will attempt to refute them, making the
arguments in favor of the thesis much more convincing and showing that they
can hold up under scrutiny.
Historical soft power counter thesis questions
•

Zheng He’s voyages in popular culture and imagination in the 21st
century have been images of a heroic explorer who brought
Chinese culture to numerous nations in the area of the Indian
Ocean, Arabian Peninsula and Persian Gulf. In modern times, the
government of the PRC has often presented Zheng He in this light.
Is this more a form of propaganda or is some truth in this point of
view? Was Zheng He engaging in a form of imperialism or were
these mostly soft power actions with the occasional use of hard
power?

•

In regard to the actions of Zheng He in the Civil War in Ceylon,
could this be seen as a threat to the peaceful narrative of Zheng
He’s voyages?

•

Is there a connection between the Treasure Voyages and Zhu Di’s
invasion of Dai Viet? Is there evidence that the Treasure Voyages
may have been part of a grander empire building strategy by Zhu
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Di? Could the Treasure voyages been an attempt to refill the state
treasury through trade to prepare for more aggressive actions
against Ming China’s neighbors?
•

Are there any modern-day examples of the PRC using the Zheng
He story to justify acquisition of territory through historical claims?
Modern Soft Power Questions

•

Could the criticisms against the Confucius Institute be rooted in
Sinophobia?

•

Are there reasons other than Sinophobia for the lack of positive
stories of the Confucius Institute’s positive contributions? Could this
be a problem with so-called “clickbait” articles?

•

Do the accusations of violating academic freedom have any
validity? Is there any hard evidence of this occurring?

Zheng He and Imperialism
Zheng He as portrayed in the modern-day PRC has within the last few
decades been seen as a national hero and both a symbol of Ming China’s
technological prowess and “benevolence” in foreign affairs. The PRC has
significant motivation to portray Zheng He as a sort of soft power superhero as it
fits in with Beijing’s policy for the South China Sea and relations with African
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nations. According to Michael Barr, former Chinese president Hu Jintao at the
University of Pretoria in South Africa claimed:
Six hundred years ago, Zheng He, a famed Chinese navigator of the Ming
Dynasty, headed a large convoy which sailed across the ocean and
reached the east coast of Africa four times. They brought to the African
people a message of peace and goodwill, not swords, guns, plunder or
slavery. For more than one hundred years in China’s modern history, the
Chinese people were subjected to colonial aggression and oppression by
foreign powers and went through similar suffering and agony that the
majority of African countries endured.242
Barr also adds that not only is Zheng He being used in a soft power
superhero way in this passage, but also Hu Jintao is bringing up China’s “century
of humiliation” that had its genesis in the opium wars of the nineteenth-century.
He also goes on to explain that by using Zheng He in this manner, Hu Jintao was
indicating that China’s ambitions in the region will not only be peaceful but will
also be non-aggressive unlike that of the western nations which took advantage
of Africa during colonialism. This shows that Beijing in recent decades has
realized the propaganda value that a sanitized Zheng He story can bring, and
portraying Zheng He as a peaceful explorer who visited Africa for fully peaceful
purposes gives Beijing a PR campaign that is perfect for portraying the PRC as a
non-expansionist power that is only interesting in spreading culture and trade
relationships and who better than Zheng He is there to act as a historical poster
boy for future policy?
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Geoff Wade in The Zheng He Voyages: A Reassessment counters the
theory that Ming China in this time period was completely peaceful. Indeed, as
we read in previous chapters, the emperor whom Zheng He served, the Yongle
Emperor Zhu Di, was one of the most expansionistic in the history of Ming China.
While Zheng He was sailing in the Indian Ocean, Zhu Di was participating in the
invasion of the nation of Dai-Viet which is located in modern day Vietnam. In his
article Wade describes the planning and troop numbers Zhu Di used to invade
the neighboring country:
In 1406 in an effort to increase Ming influence and power in Dai Viet (the
polity known to the Ming as An-An) The Yongle Emperor attempted to
send a puppet ruler named Chen Tian-ping (Tran Thien Binh) into that
polity. Tran Thien Binh was killed as he proceeded into the country. This
killing by the Vietnamese became the immediate pretext for Yong-le to
launch a huge invasion of the polity, a move obviously well planned before
the event. He appointed senior generals, sea crossing commanders,
firearms commanders, rapid-attack commanders, and Cavalry
commanders. On a day equivalent to July 30th 1406, the boat-borne forces
set sail from Nanjing. They landed in southern China and joined with other
forces in the border province of Guang-xi. These forces included 95,000
troops from the provinces of Zhe-jiang, Jiang-xi, Guang-dong, Guang-xi
and Hu-guang, a further 10,000 cavalry and various infantry troops from
other guards, and 30,000 native troops from Guang-xi. An additional
75,000 cavalry and troops were deployed from Yun-nan, Gui-zhou and Sichuan. Guang-xi and Yu-nan provinces had been ordered to supply
20,000 shi243 of grain to feed the expeditionary army, and Yu-nan was to
arrange 10,000 troops as reinforcements. The official account tells us that
in all, some 800,000 troops were mobilized for the Ming for this
expedition.244
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Judging from the number of troops involved, (not to mention the sacrificial
lamb of Tran Thien Binh to serve as casus beli for the invasion) this was a
planned and coordinated effort on the part of Zhu Di to annex Dai Viet in a
method that can only be explained as expansionism and Imperialism. As for
Zheng He himself there were notable events that could be indeed considered
Imperialism or as Wade puts it, proto-Imperialism such as the conflict with
Ceylon.245 It is also important to consider that the Treasure Voyages and the
invasion of Dai Viet were happening at the same time and likely were related one
another. Judging from the number of troops needed for Zhu Di’s invasion as
presented by Wade, the Treasure Voyages likely had another purpose besides
giving Zhu Di legitimacy and re-establishing Chinese hegemony in the Indian
Ocean, the replenishment of the treasury was likely a huge motivator for the
voyages. After all, invading a nation with nearly a million troops is a costly
expenditure on any state’s treasury not to mention he costs the subsequent
occupation would incur. Zheng He’s fleet would also be valuable as a scouting
fleet looking for weaknesses in government and military defenses of possible
future conquests. Even the Imperial tribute trade system itself can be seen as a
form of Imperialism albeit that of a much softer tone. A client state is still
subservient to the foreign policy and wishes of its “protector” in many cases. Zhu
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Di for his part has plenty of historical evidence that indicates that he had a grand
expansionist strategy for much of China’s neighbors. Levathes mentions that Zhu
Di had an increased interest in improving relations with Siam as part of the Ming
policy of “fragmentation of the barbarians” effetely attempting to divide and
conquer in way that Caesar in Gaul could have easily recognized.
It is clear there was a military nature to the treasure fleet that is
unsurprising due to being a part of a regime under an expansionistic emperor. So
indeed, there is an argument to be made that legitimizes the first and third of the
questions concerning Zheng He at the beginning of this section. There is
evidence as shown by Levathes and Wade that there may have been a
connection between the Treasure Voyages and Zhu Di’s annexation of Dai Viet
as well as using Zheng He as a way to use the fleet as a scouting fleet as much
as a trade armada. Furthermore, in the context of the first question, there does
indeed seem to be an attempt by Beijing to offer a cleaner version of Zheng He
as a form of PR spokesman from the distant past. Much of this line of thinking is
as evidence has shown rooted both in China’s conflict with Imperialistic powers in
the 19th century, as well as presenting Beijing itself as an alternative trade
partner than the United States and the European Union. With Zheng He China
indeed has a sufficient symbol to present an effective form of propaganda in the
figure of Zheng He.
Concerning the question regarding the invasion of Ceylon being a protoimperialist venture on the part of Zheng He, there is also considerable evidence
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to support this point of view. As explained in Chapter 2, Zheng He had invaded
the portion of the kingdom ruled by the usurper Alaggakonora during
Alaggakonora’s civil war against the legitimate Tamil rulers of Gampola and
Kotte. During Zheng He’s attack on Alaggakonora’s capital city, Zheng He
managed to capture the ruler and bring him back to Nanjing to be judged by Zhu
Di. While from the point of view of many in Ceylon, Alaggakonora may not have
been a legitimate ruler, many still saw him as a warrior hero who resisted the
Chinese incursion into Ceylon.
The kidnapping of Alagakkonora despite his supposed illegitimacy, could
definitely be seen as aggressive move bordering on Imperialism. While the
Chinese elected not to directly rule Ceylon, they still interfered in a civil war which
was not theirs and the next ruler of Alakeswara’s kingdom, legitimate or not, was
still decided by Zhu Di and not the people of Ceylon. Wade also has a similar
description for Zheng He’s attack on Ceylon:
Perhaps the most telling as to the nature of the eunuch-led maritime
voyages was the military invasion of Sri Lanka,246 the capture of a local
ruler, and his being carried back to the Ming court in modern Nan-Jing in
1411. Zheng, He invaded the royal city, captured the king, destroyed his
military, and carried the king and his family members back to court. Some
say that the Tooth Relic of the Buddha was taken, but there are no
contemporary records that support this. As happened in similar scenarios
in Yun-nan, the Ming appointed a puppet ruler to replace the king,
presumably to act in ways beneficial to the Ming. The Chinese troops who
returned from the expedition to Sri Lanka were rewarded in the same
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manner and equivalent levels to those forces who invaded Dai Viet in
1406, suggesting similar aims of the forces.247
Wade and Levathes both seem to argue in favor that the attack on Ceylon
was an aggressive move. Levathes does however note that on Zheng He’s initial
arrival, that Alakeswara did attempt to rob Zheng He of the treasure ship’s loads
of gold and precious materials and that was the catalyst for the battle.248
However using this as an example to justify a subsequently bloody invasion
followed by the kidnapping and forced abdication of a state’s ruler seems
somewhat dubious although admittedly even in modern times a forceful change
of governance is considered a legitimate consequence of winning a war. The
heart of the issue of this example is that it does poke a rather large hole in the
narrative of Beijing’s version of Zheng He that the PRC sells to foreign
audiences. Even in the Chinese narrative of the event, Zheng He’s actions can
be seen as aggressive and there were further examples of aggressive hard
power behavior in Java as well in 1407.249 250 Indeed, the hard power nature of
some of Zheng He’s action cannot be denied. The real question is however, what
the general nature of the treasure voyages were. There were elements of both
traditionally defined Imperialism as described by Wade in regard to Ceylon and
Java and the pirate suppression campaign of Zheng He’s first journey. However,
many of the traditionally expansionist actions taken Zhu Di were land based in
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Vietnam whereas with the exception of Ceylon and Java were committed in the
context of the Chinese tribute trade system which predated Zhu Di’s reign by
centuries and was practiced by numerous other dynasties.
The final question concerning Zheng He’s actions is related more to recent
events. The South China Sea dispute and the Daimyo/Sentamu Island dispute
between China, Japan and Korea respectively has taken an interesting turn in
recent times. In many of the PRC’s disputes regarding overseas territory in
neighboring sea regions, Zheng He’s journeys have in recent decades been used
in the South China Sea dispute by Beijing to give historical “precedence” to their
territorial claims as well as justifying the use of the Chinese Navy to patrol in the
area. Barr gives a good description and summary of these recent developments
in the last decade:
The South China Sea boundaries are an especially problematic issue
since there are overlapping unilateral claims to sovereignty over an
assortment of semi-submerged islands. Eight states claim title to these
South China Sea islands, which are important for several reasons; their
position in the midst of strategically important commercial and military sea
lanes, their utility for nearby fishing grounds and, last but not least, their
supply of mineral resources. The islands are in fact one reason why
Beijing has pushed the Zheng narrative in Southeast Asia. However, it’s a
mixed message, for Zheng’s greatest political asset to the Ming was his
role in re-establishing the tributary system of relations. Whilst Zheng may
have achieved this through diplomacy and gift-giving, his large and wellmanned armada must have helped awe-would-be enemies into
agreement. As China would have it, the tributary was premised on
unequal social relationships, but the relationship was like that between a
father and son; unequal but benign.251
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Barr brings up an interesting point that while using the Zheng He story as
a way to lay claim to uninhabited islands; such claims can prove to be a doubleedged sword to Beijing where the uncomfortable subject of the tribute trade
system is brought up. While the PRC’s official explanation for the tribute trade
system may seem outwardly benign, there is still an element of imperialism in it
as even Barr admits is based on an unequal relationship in terms of trade treaties
and implied submission. This is an interesting point to criticize and lay claims of
hypocrisy on the part of the Chinese government, since the root of China’s
“century of humiliation” was rooted in the unequal trade treaties forced upon
China by European powers and the United States. Nevertheless, Zheng He’s
journeys still have given China an effective PR spokesman in Zheng He showing
a benign man who did not loot and plunder but instead brought trade and
prosperity to the region, as well as using history for China to lay claim on territory
in the South China Sea, which not coincidently have strategic military and
economic value due to their geographic location.
The BBC reported in 2015 that China has claimed to be the “historical
owners” of the South China Sea since “ancient times” and the article mentions
that with the exception of Zheng He’s voyages, that China’s historical claim was
dubious at best due to China for most of its history having trouble controlling
China’s own coastlines.252 Furthermore, in 2013 Professor Mohan Malik at The
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Diplomat reported that a noted Asia-watcher Philip Bowring claims that China
was a relative latecomer in the region as a maritime power historically. Malik
claims that most of China’s overseas claims can at best be traced back to Chiang
Kai-Shek’s Nationalist regime and that if there is any people who had a historical
maritime claim to the region it was Malayo-Polynesian peoples who had traded in
the era for centuries.253 There is considerable evidence therefore that Beijing’s
claim on the regions and using Zheng He as an effective form of propaganda
may not have the strongest amount of evidence to back it up, despite the claims
of China’s government. Therefore, while Beijing may currently be using Zheng
He as PR for the time being, this method may prove more problematic to
Beijing’s ambitions due to the uncomfortable historical questions it brings up
when Zheng He’s actions are put under scrutiny combined with the relatively
short time period Ming China held hegemony over the region compared to that of
other nations and peoples. Going back to the question of whether Zheng He’s
actions can be considered Imperialism, the hard power nature of several
incidents in his story cannot be historically denied. The real question is what was
the nature of Zheng He’s actions in terms of soft and hard power in general: hard
and soft? In the final section of this chapter I will argue for the former rather than
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the latter while still recognizing that Zheng He was known to engage in hard
power politics despite Beijing’s claims to the contrary.

In Defense of the Confucius Institute: Sinophobia
and Media Bias
The Confucius Institute certainly has not been a stranger to controversy in
recent years. While it is hard to justify blatant attempts at suppressing academic
freedom or restricting the hiring of teachers on religious grounds, such as
adherents to the Falun Gong movement.254 However in this era of “fake news”
and “clickbait” it is also common for mass-hysteria and xenophobia to also be
mobilized as a weapon against the Confucius Institute. As reprinted by Michael
Barr, an article in the Christian Science Monitor uses a combination of both
sinophobia and mass-hysteria to create a moral panic about the Confucius
Institute:
Let us suppose that a cruel, tyrannical and repressive foreign government
offered to pay for American teens to study its national language in our
schools. Would you take the deal? Actually, we already have. Starting this
fall, American high school students will be able to take an Advanced
Placement (AP) course in “Chinese Language and Culture.” Developing
the course and exam cost the College Board, which runs the AP Program,
about [US]$1.4 million. And half that sum was picked up by-you guessed
it- the People’s Republic of China. That’s right. The same regime that has
brought us public executions, forced labor camps, and Internet censors
will soon be funding a language and culture class near you.255
Marshall Sahlins, “China U”, The Nation, 12 November, 2013
Jonathan Zimmerman, Beware China’s Role in US Chinese Classes.
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The article touches upon to common phobias: both the Sino phobic
“othering” of China and playing on the moral fear of “corrupting the youth.” If the
Christian Science Monitor is to be believed, it would seem that Chairman Mao
never died and is indeed still ruling China. While there are valid fears presented
in this article, such as being suspicious of a foreign government picking up the
tab for funding of Chinese language courses, the article for the most part can be
dismissed as fear mongering. China is presented as a nefarious nation that is
plotting to corrupt the youth with its communist ideology and “repressive values”
in a conspiratorial way that plays on the xenophobic tendencies that this article’s
target audience is aiming for. The title: Beware China’s Role in Us Chinese
Classes also has some Sino phobic undertones, implying China in itself is
something to be feared when it comes to influencing education. Michael Barr also
lists an incident that occurred in the Los Angeles suburb of Hacienda Heights,
which has an unfortunate history of racial tensions between the white population
and more recently arrived Chinese immigrants
By 2008, after decades of Chinese immigration into the region, Asians
made up more than a third of the population, the same proportion as the
city’s non-Hispanic whites. The area’s ethnic and racial make-up provided
a backdrop to the CI dispute as ethnic Chinese comprised the majority of
the school board whilst the student body was overwhelmingly Hispanic.
Armed with signs that read “America, Not Confucius’ opponents vowed to
unseat the four members of the five-person board who voted to accept the
Hanan’s offer. One letter to the paper commented, “China already owns
and [has] changed most of the shopping centers in Hacienda Heights. Do
we really want them to change our minds too?256
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The Hacienda Heights incident where a mostly Asian school board
accepted Hanan’s offer also show’s some of the simmering racial tension that
also lies at the heart of Sino phobic sentiment. For example, if it were the Goethe
Institute teaching German or the Académie Francoise teaching French in
Hacienda Heights would have there been as much an outcry by the mostly white
members of the community? Bobby Faker, one the residents of Hacienda
Heights was quoted by Jacob Adelman reporting for the San Diego UnionTribune as saying ““These children have young brains that are very malleable
and they can be indoctrinated with things that America would not like.”257
Franker’s comment mixes both Sino phobic sentiment and Cold War anticommunist rhetoric against China and the Confucius Institute while also
subscribing the to the justification of protection of children’s minds, a common
justification for moral panic. The Confucius Institute in the case of Hacienda
Heights had no known controversies with the exception of the school board
granting their funding for a language program that was in dire need of it.
According to the Los Angeles Times, Norman Hsu, a longtime school board
member claimed he Heights had personally reviewed all of the teaching materials
supplied from Hanban and nothing controversial or subversive to PRC interests
was found. Furthermore, all of the teaching materials were also available for
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public inspection.258 In the case of Hacienda Heights, there was no harddocumented evidence of any wrongdoing or subversion the Confucius Institute
and indeed, it would seem that the Confucius Institute was being used as a
scapegoat for the Sino phobic beliefs of certain members of the Hacienda
Heights community. The Hacienda Heights controversy is a very good example
of Sino phobic sentiment being used as criticism of the Confucius Institute. It is
clear that it was the racial tensions of the community that had caused the
controversy and unlike the controversy surrounding the University of Chicago, it
is clear that the Confucius Institute was the victim in this situation. Therefore,
there is evidence that Sinophobia or at least Xenophobia is used on occasion to
criticize the Confucius Institute, even when there are cases that the Confucius
Institute can be shown to have not done anything unethical.
Another defense for the Confucius Institute’s position is the issue of media
bias, namely the phenomenon of fake news and clickbait articles. Clickbait is
defined by Merriam-Webster as: “something (such as a headline) designed to
make readers want to click on a hyperlink especially when the link leads to
content of dubious value or interest.”259 Fake news is a phenomenon where
newspapers print clearly false or at minimum misleading new stories that wish to
push a certain agenda, often that of political or cultural points of view. Fake news
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became a part of popular discussion in the United States during the 2016
election between Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton, with both the left and the
rightwing sectors of politics accusing the other of engaging in the practice of fake
news. When it comes to newspaper pieces that are critical of the Confucius
Institute, there are cases when clickbait sounding articles have been used in
ways that might suggest an alternate agenda. For example, Hele C. Dale writing
for rightwing online newspaper Breitbart wrote an opinion piece on Chinese soft
power on August 1 2010 titled: Red Alert: China Is Taking Over… With PR. The
article itself is very short and brings nothing but commonly known information
such as the statistics on the size of the Confucius Institute and the amount of
money Beijing has spent on PR efforts.260 The sensational title, which would
seem more appropriate for a shocking scoop rather than a rather basic list of
statistics that are commonly known, is intended to generate clicks due to ad
revenue even though the value of the piece is dubious at best.
Fake news on the other hand, can be a bit tricky being able to prove, as
the story itself would normally have to be proven false. Since intent is hard to
prove and many Fake News stories often use some kernels of truth to give
credence to a story, one has to dig deep to avoid stories that outright lie or
misinterpret truth. A common tactic with a fake news stories is to twist the truth
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often by using a clickbait title and misrepresenting a fact, statistic or interview
with a person to suit a particular agenda. The Confucius Institute for reasons
legitimate and illegitimate have made plenty of enemies both inside and outside
academia and politics and many would have ample reason to slander or discredit
them. It is therefore important to take a look at who is criticizing the Confucius
Institute and for what reasons. For example, Marshall Shalin’s may have some
legitimate criticisms of the Confucius Institute and its practices but that also does
not mean that he and other critics of the Confucius Institute are free from
personal bias. News stories such as the Hacienda Heights debacle can be blown
out of proportion, and the Confucius Institute has proven to be a perfect
scapegoat for those who may fear and hate China for Sino phobic reasons rather
than concerns regarding academic bullying

Response to Counter Thesis: An Appeal to the Middle Ground
Now that the criticisms regarding my position have been established, it
would be prudent to perhaps find a middle ground between criticism of Zheng He
and the Confucius Institute. In regard to Zheng He following certain practices that
in the modern day would be considered Imperialist in modern day definitions of
the term, it is also important to look at the tribute trade system as a system as a
system of “soft power” Imperialism rather than the traditional “gunboat diplomacy”
of 19th century European powers (although admittedly the Ceylon intervention
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could also be seen as analogous to this concept as well). Modern day Chinese
diplomacy also has some relation to Ming and Qing China’s soft power tributary
systems as well. Eric Tea Chow reporting for the New York Times in his article:
Paying tribute to Beijing: An ancient model for China's new power compares
modern day Chinese soft power diplomacy to the diplomacy of the Ming tribute
trade system. Chow defines the tribute trade system by pointing out its three
cardinal points:
First, China considered itself the "central heart" of the region; this tributary
system assured China of its overall security environment. Second, to
ensure its internal stability and prosperity, China needed a stable
environment immediately surrounding the Middle Kingdom. Third, the
Chinese emperor would in principle give more favors to tributary states or
kingdoms than he received from them; for this generosity, the emperor
obtained their respect and goodwill. 261
As Chow shows, there is an idea “reciprocity” in the traditional tribute trade
model. Namely, the Emperor would “reward” his client states by giving gifts and
favors to its emissaries and better trade deals for acknowledgement of China as
the center of the world as it was after all in Chinese thought the “Middle
Kingdom”. While this would seem more like hard power imperialism in the
modern world, in its time period it could be considered a “softer” approach to
international diplomacy. It is also important to consider that this relatively
peaceful form soft power was being developed and implemented during the time
of Zhu Di, who as we have seen through his invasions of Champa and Dai Viet
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was no stranger to using hard power means to achieve his goals and with Zheng
He’s fleet he certainly had the naval power to enforce a hard power stance with
China’s neighbors. Chow points out in his article that the PRC still follows this
form of reciprocity and follows the concept “giving more and taking less.” As a
long-term strategy this would help increase China’s “brand” internationally giving
the PRC prestige and being seen as “generous” as a country promoting its
“brand” is an important aspect of Nye’s definition of soft power.262
This helps shed a bit of light on the “Imperialism” argument put forward by
Wade. A middle-ground approach to Zheng He’s actions may be the last
problematic way to approach the subject of Zheng He’s journeys. The conflict
with Alakeswara for example has two very different narrations from the Ming
point of view regarding Zheng He’s actions and that of the Singhalese point of
view. The Ming saw themselves as being exasperated by the constant insult of a
“rouge state” and took military action to save face and honor the emperor. The
Singhalese point of view from records of the time period portray Alakeswara as a
national hero who fought and was defeated defending the honor of his
kingdom.263 Both narratives may have bits of truth in it but both have their biases
as well as both of these narratives are meant to defend the national honor of
China and Ceylon. A non-problematic position to take on Zheng He’s position is
somewhere between the praises of Levathes and Dryer and the condemnations
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of Wade: That Zheng He was a product of his time and compared to later
explorers he practiced soft power diplomacy far more often than that of hard
power, but that does not mean he did not take hard power stance when
necessary. However, it is also important not to buy into the narrative of a wholly
peaceful Zheng He as promoted by the PRC. Zheng He may not have been an
“imperialist” by the traditional definition, but the military nature of his explorations
cannot be ignored either, despite them being closer to soft power ventures than
military operations.
When it comes to the controversy surrounding the Confucius Institute
there are a lot of examples to show that the Confucius Institute has a more
dubious legitimacy. While indeed there have been situations where the Confucius
Institute has been a victim of discrimination due to racial tensions in Hacienda
Heights, there is a bit of irony and hypocrisy on the part of the Confucius Institute
to claim discrimination when the organization itself has been known to use
discriminatory hiring practices itself. One of the leading reasons for Marshall
Shalins and the American Association of University Professor’s criticism of the
Confucius Institute was the University of Chicago being complicit in the
Confucius Institute’s discriminatory hiring practices. Sahlins gives evidence of
this:
Claims by officials of the Confucius Institute and the Center for East Asian
Studies that the University of Chicago fully controls the hiring process of
CI teachers from China turn out to be misleading. According to the
Chicago faculty member in charge of engaging the Chinese teachers,
Hanban recommends the candidate-whose eligibility is thereby limited by
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PRC laws and custom: no Falun Gong, human rights advocates, etc.-and
no teachers recommended by Hanban have been rejected by the
university.264
Sahlins comments that this is proof that the University of Chicago before
the cancellation of the contract with the Confucius Institute, was complicit in the
PRC’s discriminatory hiring despite rules and regulations of the University
prohibiting such. McMaster University in Canada also cancelled their association
with Hanban for similar reasons.265 The overall point of these examples is to
show that while there have been incidents where the Confucius Institute has
been unfairly targeted, there are plenty of questionable incidents that give the
Confucius Institute deserved scrutiny. A proper middle ground approach to this
problem would be not to assume any intentional malice from the Confucius
Institute and maybe look at it from a point of view of teacher training and
misunderstanding of cultural norms. Perhaps if Confucius Institute teachers were
better trained and educated on laws that govern discrimination in universities in
the US and Canada for example, incidents such as those at McMaster and the
University of Chicago may not have happened. Another possible solution to the
problem of discriminatory hiring would be for Universities to come to an
agreement with Hanban that allows the universities to have a say over the
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Hanban hiring practices when Hanban sends its teachers to the university in
question.
Overall, it is important to see the Confucius Institute as being an
instrument of PRC soft power. Therefore, the Confucius Institute has every
reason to suppress bad press and promote good press as they for better or
worse are unofficial “diplomats” of the PRC, in some cases being the only
exposure an American student may have with PRC representatives in a
classroom setting. While it has accomplished the “brand” recognition that is
important to Nye’s theory of soft power, it falls short in its charm offensive when
running into the rules and regulations governing universities in North America,
Europe and Australia. If the Confucius Institute hopes to succeed in North
America, arrangements will have to be made to make sure that academic
freedom and fair hiring practices are to be followed. It is important not to
demonize the Confucius Institute but that does not mean they should be
pandered to either. The middle ground approach therefore is the most
constructive way to view criticism of the Confucius Institute, and in the case of
China may prove a boon to the nation as it attempts to find legitimacy in its role
as a future global power

199

CHAPTER SIX
THE FUTURE OF SOFT POWER STUDIES

Political leaders have long understood that
power comes from attraction. If I can get you to
what I want, then I do not have to use carrots
and sticks to make you do it. Whereas leaders
in authoritarian countries can use coercion and
issue commands, politicians in democracies
have to rely more on a combination of
inducement or attraction. Soft power is a staple
of daily democratic politics. The ability to
establish preferences tends to be associated
with intangible assets such as attractive
personality, culture, political
values and institutions, and polices that are
seen as legitimate or having moral authority. If
a leader represents values that others want to
follow, it will cost less to lead.
-Joseph Nye
In “Soft Power”266

In a short period of time, Beijing has proven
that it can shift its foreign policy quickly and
woo the world, often focusing on countries
America has alienated. China
has drastically changed its image in many
parts of the world from dangerous to benign. It
may already be the preeminent power in parts
of Asia, and it could develop China-centered
spheres of influence in other parts of the globe,
like Central Asia or Africa. American allies like
Australia have moved closer to Beijing.
-Joshua Kurlantzick
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In “Charm
Offensive”267

The Importance of the Study of Soft Power in Medieval
and Modern China
Now that the arguments for the connection between Ming and Modern
China’s practice of soft power has been established, it is important to show why
that the points raised in this study are important and what use this study will have
on future students of Chinese history and politics. Why for example, does
studying Zheng He’s life have any value besides what has been established in
the paper? What use is there in studying the soft power nature of the Confucius
Institute as a component of a larger soft power strategy of the PRC? The
importance of studying soft power as a citizen of the United States or any other
country is important in understanding international politics. In a time where
isolationism is gaining traction in the United States today, there is a clear and
present danger that the United States may find itself in a hard situation where the
US ignores the value of soft power and China fills the soft power vacuum. Even
ignoring geopolitical considerations for the United States, students of both
Chinese history and Chinese politics will find a lot of value in the study of
historical and modern soft power in China. The People’s Republic of China is
today a growing economy with an incredible amount of both soft and hard power
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as part of its foreign policy. However, there seems to be a consensus that soft
power is a new or novel concept in Chinese geopolitics.
As this paper has argued, historical Chinese soft power has a long
tradition and Zheng He is probably the most prominent example of it that can be
found. Students of Chinese history may know who Zheng He was and that he is
an example for soft power, but perhaps they do not connect the Treasure
Voyages with the modern day soft power policy of the PRC. Therefore, this study
has value in teaching students a different perspective, that soft power is a
historical topic as well and not relegated to the halls of the Political Science
departments. An MA student studying Chinese history for example, may wonder
why they have to take political science or economics courses to get a history
degree, perhaps thinking: what does this have to do with my field of study? This
study can correct that assumption by showing the diversity the social sciences
are indeed connected with one another by giving a clear example of different but
related disciplines: The Journeys of Zheng He (history and geography) and the
Confucius Institute (political science, geography, economics).
Students studying this topic of Chinese soft power will also get a good
understanding of Beijing’s “charm offensive” which is becoming one of the most
debated topics in geopolitics today. China’s ability to go from a rather isolated
state with limited world relations to a twenty first century economic powerhouse
can have many numerous explanations but one of the most prevalent is the
charm offensive. It is important for students of Chinese history to look at the
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success this has accomplished. As Joshua Kurlantzick points out, the pragmatic
lengths that the PRC goes to be successful in “being everyone’s friend” would
have been unthinkable to the CCP old guard:
In supposedly trying to be everyone’s friend (Taiwan and Japan stand as
notable exceptions), Beijing was displaying a type of pragmatism
unthinkable to a previous generation of Chinese leaders. For past leaders,
ideology defined relationships, trumping other factors. Now China would
deal with any state it thought necessary to its aims. In the Philippines,
China would ask to mediate between the government and communist
insurgents, so alienating the communists that they started threatening
Chinese businesspeople investing in the Philippines. In Nepal the Chinese
government would offer support to the monarchy, even reportedly sending
truckloads of arms and ammunition, despite the fact that the king was
fighting-and eventually lost to-a Maoist rebel group pursuing the very
military tactics that Chairman Mao himself had pioneered.268
This new pragmatic approach to world politics practiced by Beijing should
be of great interest to students of history and political science. The PRC which
began as a revolutionary Communist state and the founder of the Maoist doctrine
was now supplying a “reactionary” force against Maoist rebels. This pragmatic
approach to world politics may be part of the explanation of how China's
economy is booming today. However, there are still massive problems with
authoritarianism that have been having a bit of push-back under the tenure of
President Xi Jinping. Xi Jinping has indeed been using China’s soft power as a
way to woo countries that have been alienated from the United States and its
allies as a way to re-assert China’s role in the world. However, there have been a
lot of hard power efforts being made under President Xi’s tenure such as the
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artificial islands that China have been creating in the South China sea as a way
to claim territory, backed by military force. A lot of Xi’s assertiveness is reaching
back to China’s past when China was the strongest world power and is correcting
it’s “century of humiliation” in the 19th century. An article in the New York Times
written by Ian Johnson gives examples of this kind of thinking prevalent in
Chinese geopolitics regarding the “recapture of glory.” Ian Johnson writes:
Two weeks after taking China’s top office in November 2012, Xi Jinping
took part in what seemed like a throwaway photo op. He took his top
lieutenants to the newly renovated National Museum of China, a vast hall
stuffed with relics of China’s glorious past: terra-cotta soldiers from Xi’an,
glazed statues from the Tang dynasty and rare bronzes from the distant
Shang dynasty. But Mr. Xi chose as his backdrop a darker exhibition: “The
Road of Rejuvenation.” It tells the story of how China was laid low by
foreign countries in the 19th and 20th centuries but is now on the path
back to glory. There, in front of images of China’s subjugation, Mr. Xi
announced that his dream was to complete this sacred task. This soon
became the “China Dream” and has shaped his rule ever since.269
Johnson also writes extensively in the article about Xi Jingping’s authoritarian
policies that make him stand out from other leaders in post-Mao China who were
less bold and out in the open about authoritarian practices and indeed were open
to reform. Johnson now argues that many of those aspects of reform have dried
up and practices by Xi Xingping like his anti-corruption campaign have been
used to target political rivals.
The study of China’s charm offensive is also important in understanding
the motivations of the charm offensives of China’s neighbors. For example, India
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has become something of a rival to China both in a hard power military sense
with a clear example being the recent showdown between Chinese and Indian
military forces over a remote Himalaya mountain pass that has the potential to
explode into a wider conflict.270 But perhaps it’s the soft power cultural war
between India and China that has been emerging as a threat to China’s soft
power efforts by India making similar gains through its unique film industry aka
“Bollywood.” Amy Qin writing for the New York Times explains these recent
events concerning the release for the Indian movie Dangal:
While China’s film industry has long sought both to emulate and compete
with Hollywood, the runaway success of “Dangal” has prompted Chinese
production companies to turn their gaze from West to East. Suddenly,
Chinese companies are racing to snap up all things Bollywood —
partnerships and distribution rights, but also Indian directors and
screenwriters. And that has led to some unease. China and India are
engaged in a wary competition for regional influence and leadership. For
much of the summer, the two nations were locked in a border standoff
over a remote mountain pass in the Himalayas. But more and more, the
two Asian giants are also competing to project soft power — or cultural
influence — outside their borders. And “Dangal” has revived concerns in
China that it is falling behind.271
Judging from Qin’s article it would seem that India has learned a great
deal from the PRC’s charm offensive and has launched a soft power initiative of
its own, focusing on its very successful film industry. India has become in many
the ways the new rising star of Asia and by harnessing a charm offensive of their
own, India has shown that it may emerge as a serious rival to Beijing.
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Geopolitically speaking, this could have major consequences in regard to border
skirmishes and other hard power military actions that the two rising states may
engage in. For the time being however, India has mostly been content with
achieving soft power through its film industry which was even predicated by
Joseph Nye all the way back in 2005.272 Beijing is therefore not alone in the
charm offensive business and may find some healthy competition from India in
the future.
Another use for the study of soft power, is studying how Zheng He’s
historical narrative has been shaped and modified over the centuries. In Chapter
Five we examined how Zheng He has been used as a sort of “PR” representative
for Beijing’s geopolitical aims. There are also other narratives that show an
interesting evolution of Zheng He’s story such as local legends that bear some
connection to the Zheng He story. For example, in Malacca there is the legend of
“The Sultan’s Bride” where supposedly the ruler of Malacca at the time Mansur
Shah was wed to a Chinese princess named Hang Libo who was supposedly in
this legendary account, escorted to Malacca by Zheng He, as Louise Levathes
explains:
There is a story every schoolchild in Malacca learns. It is a tale about a
beautiful Chinese princess named Hang Libo, whom Zheng He was
supposed to have escorted to Malacca to become the bride of Sultan
Masnur Shah. So that the princess would not be lonely in her new home,
her father sent five hundred maidens with her, who eventually also
married and settled at the base of a hill near Malacca’s harbor that
became known as Bukit China, or China Hill. The princess converted to
272
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Islam and bore the sultan a son named Mimat, and the descendants of the
noble maidens were said to be the nucleus of Malacca’s large Chinese
community.273
Although there is no hard-historical evidence for this event and marriage
happening, it is still interesting to consider the fact that the treasure voyages
have been used as a method of national pride for China but also Malacca as well
(or at least by Malacca’s significant Chinese minority). There is a lot of historical
value in studying legends such as the Sultan’s Bride in understanding
international relations and how different countries can share national hero’s or at
the very least have a connection to them. These stories also have a use in the
diplomacy of the PRC as it can be used to claim a cultural connection between
China and Malacca and Malaysia in general. The Chinese minority in Malaysia
have also seen the value of emphasizing the ties between Malaysia and China
by using Zheng He as a common uniting historical figure between the two
nations. In 2006 on the site of the warehouse complex Guan Chang, which was
founded by Zheng He, the Malaysian government created the Cheng Ho Cultural
Museum, which has exhibits on the life and travels of Zheng He.274 Indeed,
Zheng He’s historical appeal has shown that nation’s outside of China can
benefit from the story of Zheng He in a soft power sense. Zheng He sailed all
over the South China Sea and Indian Ocean so nation’s like Malaysia, especially
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if they are trying to gain greater relations with Beijing, can benefit by seeing
themselves as part of the Zheng He story. This has given a lot of soft power to
Beijing as the historical connection between the two nations and a shared
national hero can be seen as a force of unity and as a symbol of continuing
relations between Malaysia and China that stretch back to the Ming Dynasty.
While the “Sultan’s Bride” may be a legend, the study of legends such as The
Sultan’s Bride and how they are used in the modern day can be of extreme use
to students of soft power and geopolitics as well as students of history.
Overall, the importance of studying medieval and modern Chinese soft
power cannot be understated. In a modern world where China and other nations
are reaping the benefits of soft power it would be wise to gain an understanding
of the historical basis and success of soft power in Chinese history. Zheng He
and the Confucius Institutes are of course only two examples, but they serve as
two very large and important ones. By using these examples, we can see that
both Zheng He and the Confucius Institute both have soft power qualities to them
that can be used to both praise and criticize China’s embrace of soft power.
Zheng He has proved a huge boon to China, by giving the nation a national hero
that transcends borders but also has been used as a way to claim territory in the
South China Sea and has been used as a propaganda tool to emphasize the
“close relationship” between China’s neighbors, even if that “close relationship”
was accomplished through the lens of China being the “Middle Kingdom” and
under the tribute trade system where China’s “younger brothers” were clearly the
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junior partners in such a relationship. This leaves one to ponder if the tribute
trade system is truly abolished or if it has been remade under a form that is more
acceptable to modern day geopolitics. Likewise, the Confucius Institute has
proven to be very successful and beneficial in developing nations where Chinese
is quickly becoming a common second language but on the darker end of things,
the Confucius Institute has caused numerous problems concerning academic
freedom as well as discrimination in its hiring practices which in some cases
make American universities complicit in an action that is illegal.275 Therefore, it is
very imperative that the study of the history of soft power in China be considered
an important component in sinology

Final Conclusions on Zheng He and the Confucius Institute
The research of soft power concerning Zheng He and the Confucius
Institute in the realm of soft power has resulted into serval narratives concerning
the portrayal of Zheng He’ s journeys and the Confucius Institute’s soft power
actions. Zheng, He as we have seen is a complex hero figure whose status as a
national hero and legend often conflicts and has indeed grown as large as the
actual historical narrative. Likewise, the Confucius Institute has been heavily
criticized for reasons both legitimate and illegitimate but it cannot be denied they
have had a positive impact on developing nations. Ethics aside, The Confucius
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Institute and the Zheng He story both rely heavily on soft power both in a
historical sense and in a sense of purpose since soft power is how these
historical and modern symbols of Chinese soft power function. Zheng He as we
have seen, has immense soft power value as both a historical figure and as a
legendary one. Zheng He can indeed be seen as larger than life and his
accomplishments either real or legendary have played a role in China’s soft
power charm offensive. The Confucius Institute, has been both a boon Africa as
far as second language proficiency goes, nut that does not mean there has been
opposition on this front too as some citizens for South Africa have raised
concerns that the teaching of Mandarin comes at the expense of learning local
languages.276 Furthermore as stated in preceding chapters, there is also a worry
that the PRC is determining what exactly constitutes the Chinese language. For
example, the Confucius Institute exclusively teaches the Mandarin language and
simple Chinese characters, neglecting other Chinese languages such as
Cantonese and not teaching the more complex characters which may have
implications of a political nature. Michael Churchman representing the Australian
National University writes an informative piece regarding these teaching
techniques centered around the Confucius Institute’s “Tenth Principle” in its
bylaws that state only Mandarin can be used:
This Tenth Principle is the only explicit evidence for the exclusion of
certain subjects from the teaching syllabus of Confucius Institutes, but few
Lily Kuo, “South Africa’s Schools Will Start teaching Mandarin and continue
neglecting local languages,” Quartz Africa, August 12, 2015.
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commentators seem to have paid it much attention. The significance of the
regulation, however, is clear: not only is it against the rules to teach any
Chinese language other than Putonghua within a Confucius Institute, it is
also forbidden to teach students the non-simplified characters still widely
used in Taiwan, Macau, Hong Kong and many other Chinese communities
beyond the direct control of the Chinese Communist Party. The reason
why the most obvious interdiction covering subject matter in the Confucius
Institutes has been so little discussed probably stems from the fact that
although outsiders are always on the lookout for evidence that the
Chinese party-state is trying to exercise control over prominent political
issues, linguistic matters are generally regarded as being relatively
insignificant.277
Hanban controlling language teaching as implied from Churchman is an
exercise in soft power in itself deeply rooted in political conflict. As Churchman
implies it’s also something largely ignored as most criticisms of the Confucius
Institute tend to be “bigger” targets such as academic freedom and discriminatory
hiring. Defenders of the Confucius Institute will of course point out that Germany
and France also have cultural and language teaching center’s such as Goethe
Institute and Alliance Francaise respectively. The main difference between these
organizations however is that they are nominally independent institutions and
they do not embed themselves in foreign universities but instead act as separate
entities.278
The Confucius Institute overall, has proven to be an effective tool of PRC
soft power being wielded in modern times. The organization itself however has
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been a bit of a “double edged sword” depending which country university the
Confucius Institute is being hosted by. The University of Chicago shows the
darker side of this mode of soft power and Marshall Sahlins raises good
arguments against the abuses of student’s academic freedom and other
criticisms of the Confucius Institute.
This not to suggest however that the Confucius Institute has not been a
victim of false accusations such as the Hacienda Heights incident which was
rooted not only regular Sinophobia but also in the simmering racial tension of the
residents, using the Confucius Institute as a convenient scapegoat. Despite all of
this however, the Confucius Institute remains a soft power force and a lot of its
success at least in universities in the United States, Canada and Europe lies in
its enticing funding model. After all a university, especially an underfunded one,
would have a lot of trouble resisting forming a partnership with Hanban, an
organization that will provide funding, teachers and textbooks from its own
money. This enticing model is perhaps one of the most apparent pieces of
evidence linking the Confucius Institute to soft power. This model is a perfect
example of China’s soft power policy of giving more than China receives. A
Confucius Institute will typically give a start-up fund usually up to $100,000 USD
per annum of the duration of the signed contract which is usually for a period of
five years. The university usually in return agrees to provide accommodation and
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infrastructure support for the host teachers.279 This however, gives the Confucius
Institute a rather powerful bargaining position. If a university brings in a speaker
that is controversial to the PRC, the Confucius Institute can threaten to withdraw
funding in protest or encouraging Chinese nationals not to enroll in the university,
putting a financial and administrative burden on the school’s staff.280
The Confucius Institute has shown that it is a soft power force that has
given China considerable leverage and power concerning how Chinese culture is
perceived by foreigners. It has shown itself to be an efficient model and despite
criticisms from the opponents of the Confucius Institute, it remains as one of the
foundations of modern Chinese soft power as seen through the lens of the
greater charm offensive which is the central part of China’s soft power policy.
While China in recent years, especially under President Xi has been following a
hard power policy regarding territorial disputes, the charm offensive itself is still a
huge part of Chinese foreign policy. Even with its numerous criticisms it would be
difficult to deny the enormous amount of soft power the Confucius institute has
brought the PRC. It has also served as an example of the pragmatism of the new
rising China. An organization named after an ancient philosopher who was vilified
by the founder of the PRC is now trying to charm the world and putting out a
narrative that China is a peaceful, happy and prosperous nation with a rich
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culture. The traditional Chinese culture that is taught in its classrooms was a
culture that Mao the founder of the modern nation of the People’s Republic of
China deeply loathed and tried to destroy in the Cultural Revolution. Indeed, the
Confucius Institute is a good representation of the pragmatism that is being
followed under Chinese foreign policy in general and may be the greatest
weapon China wields in its soft power arsenal.
Zheng He himself in summation, also represents a powerful component of
both historical and modern day soft power. In the second chapter we established
Zheng He as a historical character in regard to his actions and the effects they
had on soft power historically. In the fifth chapter we examined Zheng He’s
actions in a modern day soft power light or rather how the Chinese government
makes use of the Zheng He story to use as a way to explain China’s historical
“harmonious” relationship with its neighbors. But what are the other uses that
studying Zheng He in the realm of both soft and hard power have in
understanding modern day politics and culture? We have already examined
Zheng He’s record in his own actions regarding whether or not he had
Imperialistic tendencies and came to the conclusion that while Zheng He indeed
had some imperialistic or rather proto-imperialistic tendencies, the voyages were
for the most part peaceful and focused on trade. However, Geoff Wade’s
argument against Zheng He seems a bit harsh and overzealous (although
Wade’s point that the PRC uses his story as a way to claim territory or falsely
claim that Zheng He was an arbiter of peace in the Indian Ocean is indeed a
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valid one). Hansen has a very good counterargument that gives a sufficient
explanation of the failure of expansionism during the Yongle Emperor Zhu Di’s
reign and Zheng He’s journeys:
To argue that the Chinese lacked the stomach for empire would be too
simple. Zheng He’s men did commit atrocities, and they did not hesitate to
forage for and even steal food when the local people did not provide it. In
one instance, the Chinese ships killed five thousand pirates in Sumatra on
the Malacca Strait, and in another, they became enmeshed in a dispute
between two rulers in Siam and Java. But these military campaigns were
exceptions. The Chinese had reservations about conquering less civilized
people so far removed from their own cultural sphere. The objects of Ming
attempts at conquest, the Mongols to the north and the Vietnamese to the
south, both lay directly on China’s borders, and their residents had long
exposure to Chinese ways.281
Hansen’s argument attempts to dispel the idea that European style
colonialism and imperialism is comparable to the Ming conquests of Vietnam and
Mongolia. Even the conquest of Vietnam was not a long-time occupation since
after Zhu Di’s death the troops were withdrawn and the invasion deemed a failure
twenty years later.282 While it is indeed true that Zheng He was not perfect and
did indeed engage in atrocities as Hansen argues, they were after all exceptions
to the main rule and arguably often were in response to aggression such as in
Ceylon or the suppression of pirates in Sumatra. It can be easily explained that
Zheng He was following the “carrot and stick” approach to soft power as first
described by Nye. As was noted previously, Kurlantzick gave a wider definition of
soft power, describing it as “anything outside the security realm” and arguing that
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sanctions and other economic punishments can be seen as a form of soft
power.283 In the context of the tribute trade system which Zheng He operated
under we can see this system as an economic weapon in itself that Zheng He
and Zhu Di wielded with great effect. After all, if the emperor were to restrict trade
with foreign powers that could be as much a punishment as a military attack or
other hard power method, due to the crippling of the economies China’s
neighbors would suffer if the emperor were willing to restrict trade. Zheng He’s
kidnapping of king Alakeswara could also be seen as a soft power action in a
sense since the emperor decided to spare his life rather than execute him.284 The
humiliation of Alakeswara was considered to be enough along with replacing him
with a king friendlier to Ming interests. The soft power element in this example is
that by sparing the king, emperor Zhu Di showed himself to be simultaneously as
the dominant power powerful party but also willing to show mercy and being
quick to explain that if Alakeswara were more diplomatic with Zheng He’s fleet,
he would not be in the position he was now. Carrots and sticks, indeed.
Zheng He as both a historical figure and a modern day legendary figure in
southeast Asia has indeed also shown the power a good story has in the study of
soft power. In summation, Zheng He’s story remains a powerful narrative in
Chinese politics and has been previously been shown to be used in politics
today, especially in territorial claims. But what about soft power elements of a
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different kind like popular culture? With the story of Zheng He becoming more
popular around the world, how long till we see a Zheng He film in Hollywood or
be playing roleplaying fantasy video games set in worlds that are based on the
Ming era age of sail? In China this may be already happening since Zheng He’s
story in the last few decades have been something of a sensation and been a
huge part of national pride. In 2009, CCTV created a fifty-nine-episode period TV
drama directed by Ma Xiao and Liu Hiatiao based on Zheng He’s life titled,
Zheng He Xia Xiyang.285 It is interesting to wonder how long it will take for a
western company such as Netflix to make their own series as Zheng He’s
popularity and story is becoming more known in countries like the United States.
If Chinese television and movie companies could take advantage of this possible
rising market it could be another method of soft power that the PRC can engage
in. The use of Zheng He in popular culture could give China considerable power
in shaping the narrative of Zheng He’s story as well. Clearly, the future potential
of Zheng He in popular culture as a soft power icon could prove to be lasting and
powerful indeed.
Zheng He has proven to be a perfect example of the historical connection
of China to soft power politics. This is an interesting turn of events since due to
the interference of Confucian scholar officials, his story may not have been told
at all. While it has been previously stated, a good review of the actions of the
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scholar officials should be given to highlight how close this incredibly important
historical event was nearly lost to history and thus lost to the study of early
Chinese soft power. Shin-shan Henry Tsai gives a good summation of the efforts
that went into suppressing Zheng He’s historical record:
But as fascinating as these voyages were, Ming Chronicles only used
some 700 words in the 330 chapters of Ming official history to describe
such epic events. And perhaps because Zheng He was considered one of
the “rapacious eunuchs” by his literati rivals, official Ming historians cared
to spare only thirty words to identify Zheng He, the half man. In fact, we
might not even know about Zheng He and his most significant
contributions to maritime explorations had it not been for the three little
books written by Zheng He’s subordinates. One is called Yingyai shenglan
or The Overall Survey of the Ocean’s Shores, dated 1433, written by Ma
Huan; the second one was entitled, Xingcha shenglan or The Overall
Survey of the Starry Rift, dated 1436 and authored by Fei Xin; and the
third one, written by Gong Zhen, was called Xinyang fanguo zhi or
Description of the Barbarian Countries of the West. Based on these three
books, plus many newly discovered monuments, artifacts, and other
related sources, recent scholars, many of whom are Europeans and
Japanese, have been able to reconstruct a clearer picture of these more
extraordinary but least known-so far as the Occidental world is concernedmaritime activities of the fifteenth century.286
Shin-shan Henry Tsai’s example shows how dangerously close the
historical record was in losing the Zheng He story. This would have had a
detrimental effect on soft power studies as Zheng He is one of the most cited
examples of historical Chinese soft power and this very study itself would likely
either not exist or would have had to use other less-documented historical
examples. Indeed, it was not until 1905 when Chinese revolutionary Ling Qichao
(1873-1929) a reformer and participant in the late Qing Dynasty’s Hundred Days
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Reform and one of the historical figures who helped modernized China,
published an article in his newspaper Xinmin Congbao titled: Zheng He: A Great
Navigator of our Times, which brought Zheng He back into popular Chinese
historical thought. Ling Qichao compared Zheng He to Columbus and used him
as an example to be followed, especially in light of China’s recent humiliating
defeats to European powers in the previous century.287 If not for the tireless
efforts of scholars in the recent centuries, Zheng He may have been regulated to
those thirty humiliating words in the official Ming chronicles. In effect since soft
power is overall a method of wielding influence, the actions of the Confucian
scholar officials could also be seen as an example of soft power in itself, using
their influence with the emperor to destroy Zheng He’s logs and essentially
making him unknown until his re-discovery in his homeland in the early twentieth
century.
The final question concerning Zheng He in conclusion of this study is why
Zheng He is important as the best example of China’s long history of soft power.
Zheng He is more than just a man, but also serves as a symbol. Although that
enough isn’t enough to explain why Zheng He, but it is a good start. The best
example is due to how Zheng He’s story is used as a PR tool for Beijing’s
expansionist policies in the South China Sea. Another example is how Zheng He
is used to promote the idea of the glory of the Ming to the benefit of the Chinese
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state. Some of the claims used in promoting that glory regarding are dubious,
with former president Hu Jintao even claiming that Zheng He had reached
Australia.288 289 However, even if some of the more outlandish territorial claims
are untrue, the legendary Zheng He has proved a boon for Zheng He, especially
domestically. The main reason however that Zheng He was chosen for this study
was that he is probably the best known historical example of China having a soft
power foreign policy long before the modern times. Indeed, due to the continued
use of his story for propaganda purposes it can be argued that Zheng He lives
until this day still serving the PRC as a soft power symbol.

Sailing Into the Horizon: Future Uses for This Research
Before this study concludes, it would be of great use to describe what
future history students could use from this research of historical soft power. The
research in this thesis has mostly focused on historical aspects of both Zheng
He’s life and the function and purpose of the Confucius Institute but that does not
mean that future research in trying to prove China’s soft power legacy should be
solely focused on just Zheng He and the Confucius Institute. Research into the
workings of the tribute trade system for example, which far predates the Ming
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and indeed could be said to have its beginnings in the Tang Dynasty (618-907
AD) could be and has in the past been used as a very informative way to study
soft power in a historical sense in China. According to Michael Barr, even the
philosopher Mencius (372-289 BC) had aspects of soft power in his teachings.290
Michael Barr uses a passage from James Legge’s translation of The Works of
Mencius that shows that even in early Chinese history soft power was a concept
known to the great sage:
There is a way to gain the whole world. It is to gain the people, and having
gained them one gains the whole world. There is a way to gain the people.
Gain their hearts, and then you gain them…If others do not respond to
your love with love, look into your own benevolence; if others do not
respond to your attempts to govern them, look into your own wisdom; if
others do not respond to your courtesy, look into your respect. In other
words, look into yourself whenever you fail to achieve your purpose. When
you are correct in your person, the whole world will turn to you.291
Soft power is shown by Mencius (and also to an extent by Confucius in as
shown in Chapter 4) as being an old concept in Chinese history, especially in
philosophy. A prospective student studying both politics could gain further
research about historical Chinese soft power. It is also important that hopefully
further research into the nature of historical Chinese soft power can be
influenced by this work, by examining philosophers such as Mencius and
Confucius as well as looking at historical figures such as Zheng He and others. In
order to fully understand the soft power practiced by Beijing today, it is important
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to reach into the past and understand that soft power as both a philosophy and a
political tactic have existed in China for centuries and continuing research on this
topic would be of great benefit to the field of history.
In modern times, Beijing’s soft power has grown to an incredible amount
of influence rivaling even Washington in many respects. The research made in
this master’s thesis could help students further understand what a lot of the
origins of Chinese soft power comes from and use that history to understand
China’s actions. China engages today in what Kurlantzick defines as “public
diplomacy” which shows a serious departure from China’s policies in the cold war
era.292 Part of this public diplomacy is being seen as more accommodating and is
an integral part of the PRC’s “peaceful rise”. Concerning the Confucius Institute,
Hanban’s efforts can be considered part of this public diplomacy which is an
integral part of the charm offensive.
Future students of politics and history, especially in the United States,
may benefit greatly from this research. One of Nye’s motivations for writing his
book was that he believed that the United States had lost its grasp on why soft
power was important and was indeed a contributing factor to America’s victory in
the Cold War.293 It is no secret that Beijing’s rise has worried many leaders in the
United States and in order for the United States to catch up with the PRC’s
charm offensive, Washington will have to re-establish its “brand” by once again
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looking at soft power as a viable strategy. In the past, “blue jeans and rock and
roll” were America’s charm offensive in the twentieth century and perhaps it is
time for America to establish its “brand” as Nye would put it, once again. In the
realm of politics by studying Beijing’s success with soft power the United States
may once again keep its soft power hegemony which is just as powerful if not
more than America’s hard power hegemony. To achieve this, Kurlantzick gives
some good sage advice for future diplomats in the US Foreign Service:
Supporting public diplomacy, the United States will need to rethink its
formal diplomacy-how diplomats operate on the ground, and how its top
leaders interact with leaders and populaces from abroad. Some of these
changes should steal ideas from China. China has pushed its diplomats to
return to one country for multiple tours of duty and to learn local
languages. Unlike China, the US foreign service cannot force its
employees to go to any country, but the state department could more
aggressively encourage its Foreign Service Officers to pick one region of
the world (or even one country), specialize in that area, and return to it
over and over.294
Kurlantzick’s advice of diplomats specializing in one particular country of
study has some soft power merits to it. By having fully trained and linguistically
educated diplomats, the US could give of the veneer of being a highly educated
country with well-trained diplomats which could put forth a charm offensive of its
own. The supreme irony is however that this is not a new concept in US foreign
affairs, but in recent decades starting with the Bush Administration in the early
2000’s hard power has been seen as a more desirable outcome in US
diplomacy. Perhaps it is time to take the theories put out by Nye to heart and for
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Washington to reclaim its soft power legacy much as Beijing wishes to regain its
legacy in the world after its “Century of Humiliation”. In any case, research such
as presented in this paper may be useful to those same policy makers who want
to understand the origins of Chinese soft power and future students who wish to
gain knowledge about the soft power policies of Zheng He and the Confucius
Institute may find the information contained here informative into their own
research.
As Beijing’s stature rises, the whole world will have to look at the origins of
this rise and its motivations, and perhaps by looking at the story of one eunuch
admiral who bravely sailed the oceans to spread his culture and bring wealth and
prestige to his nation may finally understand why China wishes to reclaim its
legacy. There are many reasons, most stemming from China’s century of
humiliation but as has been shown in this paper, China’s pride in its culture and
accomplishments have also served as a reminder of how powerful China once
was. Zheng He therefore is not just a symbol but a motivator, for China to once
again reach out to the world and show off its wealth and prestige in an effort to
charm others. As Zheng He once sailed around the South China Sea Indian
Ocean in the fourteenth century, the Confucius Institute today travels around the
world using the same velvet fist of charm and coercion to achieve its goals and
through this institution, the PRC can shape the world opinion of what China is
and what it should be. As the Confucius Institute sails into the horizon like Zheng
He, will the Confucius Institute choose a path of charm or coercion?
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